

April 2014

Northwest Passages, A Collection of Historical Writings from the University of Portland, 2013 - 2014

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Recommended Citation

Huitt, Sierra; Dawson, Lesley; Otton, Andrew; Banda, Victoria; McCormack, Colleen; O'Halloran, Francis; Young, Carissa; Amos, Hunter; Klemsz, Matthew; Blakeman, Harry; and Hoag, Karrie (2014) "Northwest Passages, A Collection of Historical Writings from the University of Portland, 2013 - 2014," *Northwest Passages*: Vol. 1 : Iss. 1 , Article 1.

Available at: <http://pilotscholars.up.edu/nwpassages/vol1/iss1/1>

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Carissa Young, Hunter Amos, Matthew Klemsz, Harry Blakeman, and Karrie Hoag



NORTHWEST PASSAGES

2013-2014

Sponsored by Phi Alpha Theta, Rho Pi Chapter

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GRAND AT NIGHT BY MATT KLEMSZ

INTRODUCTION

The fourteenth edition of *Northwest Passages* proudly presents the work of selected history students of the University of Portland. Each paper has been chosen for its historical merit and uniqueness by a team of student editors that belong to the University's Department of History. The authors of these papers have spent months crafting their theses and seminar papers to adhere to the university standards and shed new light to their various topics. We are happy to have the opportunity to not only publish their work, but to give them the recognition they deserve. Each paper explores an array of subjects within a variety of countries and time periods. Inside this edition, the editorial team chose topics such as Colleen McCormick's examination of motherhood during Argentina's Dirty Wars and Lesley Dawson's analysis of Canadian hockey culture and Canadian identity. Also included is Victoria Banda's thesis on the importance socialites and socialism had during the United States' Shirtwaist Strikes of 1909 and Andrew Otton's research on Franklin D. Roosevelt and his analysis of FDR's democratic dictator persona. This journal also features two U.S. Consumerism seminar papers by junior history students Carissa Young and John Francis O'Halloran. Young creatively approaches consumerism through the eyes of comic book readers as O'Halloran's paper provides insight into the politics of consumerism in Cold War America. Whether it is the hopes of Argentinian mothers or the excitement of comic book heroes, we hope you enjoy these papers and their diversity.

The editorial staff would first and foremost like to thank all who submitted their papers and gave our staff the chance to read about subjects we had never experienced before. We also wish to express our gratitude to those photographers whose submissions creatively brought Northwest imagery to the theses and seminar papers.

Thanks must also be given to Dr. Eifler, our faculty advisor, and the entire History Department for their guidance and support throughout the editing process. We would like to thank our sponsor

the Rho Pi Chapter of Phi Alpha Theta, the National History Honor Society, for their help. The staff is also very thankful for Melissa Thongtan and the entire Marketing Department at the University of Portland for their hard work and direction in publishing. And finally, I would like to thank the team of editors for their hours of hard work and editing, Kevin Jensen, Michelle Wilcox, Xilen Vega, Harry Blake-man and Francis O'Halloran.

Sierra Huitt

Editor-In-Chief, *Northwest Passages*

University of Portland

Spring 2014

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Lesley Dawson is a senior history major with a communications minor. She has spent the last year and a half working for the Portland Winterhawks while completing her degree. She enjoys spending time with family and friends, all things Canadian, and of course hockey.

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SNOW ON SILVER STAR BY MATT KLEMSZ

THE 'DOMINION CHALLENGE':
UNDERSTANDING CANADIAN NATIONAL IDENTITY
THROUGH THE DEVELOPMENT OF ORGANIZED HOCKEY
AND THE BIRTH OF THE STANLEY CUP

■
LESLEY A. DAWSON

During the nineteenth century, hockey rose to the forefront of Canadian sports and captivated national interest as a year-round sport. As hockey moved from free play on the open-air ponds in winter to newly constructed indoor rinks, an obvious pattern of social exclusion in hockey began to develop. The widespread popularity of hockey during this period prompted the development of organized leagues and the formation of early athletic associations based on traditional European structures, such as sports played within schools and military units. Soon, these athletic associations became centered on perpetuating a new, socially exclusive ideology of the 'athletic amateur' — intended for the improvement of the sportsman and then, through his individual improvement, society as a whole. While this takeover of the greater Canadian sporting community by the ideals and interests of these amateur sportsmen ushered in an era of more formalized competition, and widespread participation in hockey became increasingly popular, the birth of the first Dominion Challenge trophy in 1893, the Stanley Cup, provided the key moment in the proliferation of hockey as an acceptable national pastime and soon, a source of a distinct Canadian identity as it remains today.

Though it remained a true 'challenge cup' for less than twenty years, the Stanley Cup became one of the most sought after and significant aspects of popular Canadian culture beginning in 1893 when Governor General Lord Stanley officially donated the trophy to the Dominion of Canada and the greater hockey community as a whole. In a nineteenth century social environment in which the dominant social class sought to monopolize amateur sport for the benefit of the upper reaches of Canadian society, the creation of the Stanley Cup

— as the first Dominion Challenge Trophy — helped pique a wide interest in the sport of hockey, transforming the game into a wildly popular spectator sport and unifying diverse social groups behind a common Canadian identity in the pursuit of good competition, athletic excellence, and the development of a unique sense of what it means to be Canadian.

Canada is a country that has always been primarily defined by its geographical location because it has most often been associated with the season that dominates every aspect of life in the North: winter. Temperature measurements from throughout Canada suggest that it is the coldest country on earth, given the average temperatures throughout the reaches of the entire country taken annually.¹ Historians Ken S. Coates and William R. Morrison give definition to the concepts of the 'North' and 'winter' in their essay "Winter and the Shaping of Northern History: Reflections from the Canadian North," in which Coates and Morrison argue that darkness and frigidity of winter have significantly influenced both the economic and social lives of Canadians over the course of the past two centuries. In fact, Coates and Morrison argue that the ideas of "winter" and the "North" tend to be seen as synonymous because: "without winter, the North is only a direction, not a place..."² One of the largest parts of what makes the Canadian North so distinctively 'northern' is the fact that it is wholly inseparable from its geographical susceptibility to the harshest conditions during the winter months. Importantly, this idea of the Canadian North would be motivated in part by some kind of 'northern exceptionalism,' or the idea that the North was unique and thus made Canada different or 'exceptional' when compared to other geographical areas, which Canadian national identity later echoed.³

Even with these potentially deadly winters in mind, the final years of the eighteenth century brought a handful of Europeans over to pre-Confederation Canada, allowing them to piece together a portrait of the unique Canadian landscape and describe the lifestyles of

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Europeans, first generation Canadians, and natives living on the North American continent.⁴ One such traveler, Irishman Isaac Weld, began travelling through Quebec in November 1795 searching for a more “agreeable place of abode” than his war-ridden European home.⁵ In his account of the St. Lawrence Valley in the upper region of Quebec, Weld explores the possible benefits of life in Canada to an audience of potential European emigrants. He tells the reader of the hospitable Canadian people — *les Habitants* or the inhabitants — the remarkable retention of European customs and their adoption in Canada, and the natural beauty of the Canadian landscape that is “grand beyond description.”⁶

The tail end of Weld’s account reveals perhaps one of the most important pieces of information regarding this new life in Canada: the unique Canadian spirit. According to Weld, the Canadians he interacts with embody a sense of toughness, and even indifference, towards their climate. Whereas he expects Canadians to shy away from the harsh climate, they relish in the obstacles that accost them on a consistent basis: they “laugh” in the face of “dreadful storms,” never complain when “exposed” to the “inclemency of the seasons,” and gladly accept the prospect of remote habitation in the woods as a welcome challenge.⁷ Even before Canada became a true Confederation, it is this fearless approach to accommodating to life in a harsh landscape, as seen in Weld’s description, which helped create the foundation for the most central values dictating the Canadian way of life going forward.

A massive influx of immigrants from Europe beginning in the second decade of the nineteenth century allowed Canadian society to begin building and solidifying its own social structure, separate from Europe but not wholly removed from European influence. The great majority of these immigrants hailed from both Europe and the United States beginning in the eighteenth century and continued forward into the nineteenth century. Most came from the British Isles, along

with Loyalists fleeing the American Revolution in favor of continuing British rule. Collections of immigration data from the Canadian Museum of Civilization show that less than 5,000 European immigrants moved to Canada between 1800-1815.⁸ However, the numbers of Canadian immigrants increased significantly in the next four decades. From 1815 until 1830, Canada averaged just above 70,000 immigrants during every four-year interval. Beginning in 1831 and continuing onward, Canadian immigration exploded, bringing at least 100,000 immigrants into Canada every four years, a trend which continued for the next twenty-five years.⁹ These immigrants proved to be central to the development of organized sports in Canada because of the Victorian ideals they brought over with them from Europe, which translated into the Canadian way of life in a number of ways: first through basic community development, and eventually through recreational activities and sport.

As the European population in Canada exploded, these immigrants began seeking ways to establish their new life in a new country along with many other first-generation Canadians. Stepping wholeheartedly into a new Canadian life, these immigrants and their Canadian-born children began earnestly searching for more exciting ways to occupy free time during the long winter months to which they were unaccustomed.¹⁰ In an increasingly European-based Canadian culture that relied primarily on agriculture, the few hours of daylight afforded during winter meant that the flow of the seasons dominated much of life in Canada.¹¹ The lengthy northern winters created many physical limitations for Canadians, primarily forcing them to adapt to the cold temperatures and snow. However, the influence of the harsh winters, which tested the human ability to survive and adapt to life under less than hospitable conditions, became an important element of the Canadian ruggedness pointed out by Weld, a key value in Canadian national identity moving forward.¹²

In order to successfully navigate their new life in Canada, these

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immigrants and first-generation Canadians used previously existing traditions to inform their new lifestyle, extending the limit of their previous experience with life and the conditions in Europe. Luckily for these new Canadians, indigenous peoples had already paved the way for survival in Canada, seeking out ways to live with the stifling winters by partaking in seasonal activities. Coates and Morrison describe these indigenous activities as coping mechanisms for surviving the confines of the winter season in Canada.¹³ Just as the native peoples created these 'social outlets' during winter, Europeans immigrants and first-generation Canadians had to find useful ways to make the most of a harsh life in the North. These activities began to set the framework for community building and the development of new forms of recreation that could take place throughout the year, and especially during winter.¹⁴

The role of British influence in the development of the earliest Canadian sports is yet another way in which Europeans translated their old values into their new Canadian society; in many ways, the growth of organized Canadian sport and presence of British influence are inextricable.¹⁵ Drawing on the immigrants' European roots in athletics, many of the first sport organizations in Canada began simply as fraternal-type groups that provided an opportunity for higher classes of Canadian men to socialize and participate in recreational activities with one another.¹⁶ The Montreal Curling Club, formed in 1807 provides an early example of sporting organizations that implicitly limited its membership to men of the same elite social class.¹⁷ The casual nature of these organizations and others like them created little need for regulating actual play, freeing the members to focus their efforts on perpetuating a certain ideal that would drive the development of hockey at its earliest formal stages: the athletic "amateur."¹⁸ However, this ideal motivating the formation of sports organizations, sustained in part by British influence, created a niche allowing social exclusion take a near-permanent hold in the sport of hockey.

Though these 'amateur' collectives drew support from a variety of social and economic interest groups, they quickly populated their membership with members of the Canadian upper-middle class. From their earliest days, the organizers of these 'amateur' leagues relied on the common British practice of drawing members from existing social groups in order to increase membership. Reframing British tradition through the lens of the Canadian experience, these 'amateur' leagues found members in social groups that could likely be found in most parts of Canada at that time such as in universities and military garrisons.¹⁹ Using these membership bases, the game of hockey expanded beyond Montreal and into eastern Ontario to Toronto and Manitoba in the late 1880s, increasing amateur competition so drastically, both within and between Canadian cities, that formalized leagues became a necessary support system. Because these members came predominantly from the upper and middle class, the motivation to give automatic privilege to the higher classes in Canadian society, while paying little regard to the interests or desires of the rest, became ingrained in these leagues from their very outset.

The process of 'inventing traditions,' as explained by economist and social historian Eric Hobsbawm parallels the formation and perpetuation of the amateur ideal at the foundation of Canadian sports during the nineteenth century. Hobsbawm defines 'invented traditions' as a 'set of practices governed by overtly or tacitly accepted rules and of a ritual or symbolic nature.'²⁰ Hobsbawm argues for a distinction between the concepts 'custom' and 'invented tradition;' he argues that 'custom' can serve as a historical precedent for sanctioning any 'desired change' or, conversely, resistance to change.²¹ However, unlike 'custom,' the 'invented tradition' does not sanction a particular change but instead aims to instill 'certain values' and 'norms of behaviour' through repeated action.²² At its most basic sense, the formation of the amateur ideal followed the same developmental process as Hobsbawm's idea of an invented tradition rather

than a custom; using elements of their European past, the organizers of early amateur sport had to formalize and ritualize in order to achieve the various goals of its members. One key element of Hobsbawm's definition of the 'invented tradition' that is particularly relevant to the amateur ideal is the presence of a set of specific values that is ingrained in the people through the process of "repetition."²³ According to Hobsbawm, these value sets can be political, social, cultural, or economic in nature, but almost always imply a certain sense of 'continuity' with their European 'past.' As an 'invented tradition,' the prevailing ideal of athletic amateurism in nineteenth century Canadian sports retained a certain set of values in continuity with earlier European tradition: exclusivity.

In order to understand the impact it had on the formative years of organized hockey, it is important to define the amateur ideal in context of its predisposition for and support of social exclusion in hockey. As the numerous conceptions of the 'amateur' floated around in the nineteenth century North American consciousness, the Montreal Pedestrian Club, one of the most well-known amateur athletic associations established in the cradle of Canadian sports, helped push this ideal towards one universal definition. The Montreal Pedestrian Club's 1873 version of its Constitution and By-Laws provides a concise definition of the athletic 'amateur' most in line with the other definitions circulating at the time. According to the Club's Constitution, an 'amateur':

has never competed in any open competition or for public money, or for admission money, or with professionals for a prize, public money or admission money...²⁴

This definition shows that from its outset, the Montreal Pedestrian Club's definition of the 'amateur' clarifies that commercial and monetary interests had not yet eclipsed this ideal view of athleticism. At this specific point in time, personal and moral improvement still motivated athletic participation for the 'amateur'; like these other organized sports at the time, organized hockey retained this

romanticized notion of the self-improving athletic ideal and had not yet become a commodity motivated by profit.

The presence of money in athletics would not prove to be the most important element of this ideal of the athletic amateur that became so highly prized by Canadian sportsmen. Rather, the Montreal Pedestrian Club took care to include in its definition of an 'amateur' a key additional stipulation: that the athletic amateur has, at no point in his life, "taught or assisted in the pursuit of Athletic exercises as a means of livelihood" nor is he "a laborer or an Indian."²⁵ In the clearest language, the Pedestrian Club explicitly prohibits members of certain social classes from participating in such 'gentlemanly' activities. Though the definitions of the amateur circulated freely at this time, the Montreal Pedestrian Club set a standard for other sport organizations to follow by defining the 'amateur' in a narrow context that could be easily translated into the charters of many other athletic organizations modeled after the Montreal Pedestrian Club, such as the hockey-centered Montreal Amateur Athletic Association.²⁶ Thus, by including explicit racial and socioeconomic boundaries in one of the most widely accepted and 'official' definition of amateur sport, these sports organizations created a precedent for social exclusion based on race and economic class for years to come.

The tale of the development of this amateur ideal in Canadian sports, especially hockey, is a prime example of the intermingling of the idea of keeping 'continuity with the past' and the Canadian adaptation to a new environment. Hobsbawm argues that in a discussion of 'invented tradition,' especially in Canadian history, adaptation has a specific purpose: it allows people to survive by using the 'old models' of what they know for 'new purposes' when living under 'new conditions.'²⁷ Canadians living during the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries were doing just that: learning to adapt. Both Canadian frontier sports, and increasingly organized sports developing in urban areas, give two important insights into the very tangible

importance of sport in Canada: first, the ability of the Canadian people to develop a lifestyle in harmony with the harsh and often overbearing physical environment, and second, the ability to translate both traditional European and North American indigenous activities with a new Canadian community in order to help people adapt to a different way of life in the New World.²⁸

As a populace initially comprised of predominantly European immigrants, the 'old models' of how to survive came directly from the values of Victorian British society.²⁹

British influence on the development of Canadian sport is both obvious and undeniable. Records from the beginning of the nineteenth century show popular involvement in various British sports such as rugby, football, and arguably the most British sport cricket had already been imported into Canadian society in at least the 1830s. By this point, these sports represented not only the strong connection to England, but also the two main pitfalls of European sport in its original form in Canada: first, the lack of formalized competition and second, the inability of these sports to grow past the local level.³⁰ This informal system of play, or lack of formalized systems of play, limited Canadians' ability to participate in traditional forms of European sport because it removed the support base that later Canadian sports relied upon for growth. Likewise, it failed to spark a desire for increased participation in traditional British sports on the part of the greater Canadian population. Ultimately, this meant that traditional British games massively influenced only the development of organized sports in Canada, but they would never move past the foundation-building stage in Canadian sports.³¹

As an interest in organized sports grew in Canada, so too did the need make a distinction between the sports brought over from Europe, signifying the European past, and the new life born and experienced in Canada. This attempt for distinction can be seen especially in the English-dominated Canadian university system,

where students mostly came from English families that had at least some ties to the landed aristocracy. This new generation of young men, almost all Canadian born and of mostly direct English descent, instilled their social values in sport, rejecting all but the latent British sport ideology for anything that would bring them closer to their home country, Canada. Representing the emergent Canadian middle class, the influence of British sports but also need for differentiation encouraged these Canadian sportsmen, who would soon play a significant role in the development of hockey, to seek a more clearly defined label for themselves and their pastimes in a rapidly changing Canadian landscape.³²

The same economic changes in Canadian society during the latter half of the nineteenth century, prompted by industrialization, that created what Canadian political scientists Richard Gruneau and David Whitson refer to as a 'democratized access to leisure,' allowed significant social exclusion in hockey to become possible.³³ Historian Alan Metcalfe argues that these combined processes of urbanization and industrialization, along with westward continental movement, radically altered the landscape of Canadian society. The rapid development of urban centers such as Montreal and Toronto caused the demand for land to increase so significantly that property prices skyrocketed. This would impose two main limits on the game of hockey in the years to come: creating physical boundaries for hockey by moving it indoors within a defined spatial area, and because of its economic potential, the construction of 'specialized facilities' to house it.³⁴

Hockey's move indoors during the nineteenth century perfectly illustrates one essential development in the Canadian middle class: control. Previous to the city rinks, hockey's only major limitation came from the winter season, a satisfactory amount of players, and the presence of a stretch of good ice on any open surface.³⁵ However, the move indoors changed the nature of the game; now, economic

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development had put new restrictions not only on space, but also the types of men that would be able to play based on their personal economic status. Given the popularity of hockey in the latter half of the nineteenth century, the 'amateur' leagues throughout Canada certainly did not represent all of the teams playing semi-organized hockey in a given area. In Manitoba and Ontario especially, Canadian sport historian Alan Metcalfe writes that the middle-class had near complete control of this formalized league play, which continued to push the interests of other hockey playing classes aside.³⁶

From its outset, organized sport made no room for the 'minorities' in the surrounding Canadian society. Developed by a handful of Anglophones from the commercial and professional middle class sectors of the leading Canadian metropolises, organized sport, including hockey, in nineteenth century Canada began with the interests of only the narrowly defined class in mind.³⁷ Just as with the other Canadian 'minorities,' which included any working class individual or Native American, amateur sport made absolutely no mention of another societal group: women. It is important to recognize that this occurred primarily because the amateur organizers wanted to maintain the "gentlemanly" aspect of the amateur ideal with the utmost strictness. Given that Governor General Stanley's own daughter played on a ladies' hockey team, it is clear that women did play hockey in their own leagues throughout the second half of the nineteenth century. However, one newspaper article written in 1875 provides an example of the most common depiction of women as they relate to hockey during the time of the amateur athletic: lady spectators turning away in terror as a result of witnessing the violence of a random hockey match with little do to with the sport itself.³⁸

The original ideological motivation for the spread of athletic activity during nineteenth century came directly out of the elite desire to achieve a 'structured' and more 'rational' approach to leisurely pursuits. The focus of these activities followed a shift in the mentality of

the upper class throughout the nineteenth century. Over time, social activities became intertwined with the prevailing sense of morality driven by the concerns that followed the development of urban industrial society.³⁹ This mentality carried with it a “spirit of regulation” that inspired the elite to concentrate on personal improvement as a key aspect in the development of all activities, not just sport. As the “traditional markers of masculine competence” that had helped men define themselves became obsolete due to the advent of industrial technology, the ‘gentlemanly’ class attempted to create a new sense of masculinity based on “rational,” organized, and self-improving activities. In the minds of the organizers, Gruneau and Whitson argue, all young men had the ability to benefit from this link between sport and social and physical self-improvement; however, the monopoly of elite interests on the organization and regulation of athletic activities failed to include members of the working class or ethnic minorities — anyone who did not fit exactly the white, English, middle-class mold.⁴⁰

At its most basic level, the organizers sought to promote a narrow set of so-called “universal” interests through sport; according to Gruneau and Whitson, these universal ideals are based on an “implicit social contract” governing participation in sports that drew on the social contract thought to govern the “civilized society” that surrounded them.⁴¹ This new athletic “contract” required its participants to buy in to the idea that through these “modern sports,” society would achieve “universal gains” made through participation in and the institutionalization of activities. Undoubtedly in the minds of the organizers, these “gains” would not simply be tailored to the interests of any specific individual or small community, rather the greater community as a whole.⁴² However, a close examination of these lofty aspirations reveal a direct, and inherent, contradiction discussed by Gruneau and Whitson: that the definitions of organized sport, namely how and for what purpose sports should be played, came from the

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minds and mouths of the most dominant and narrow social class.

Because of their socioeconomic demographics, the original proponents of organized sport in Canada, especially hockey, considered sport in its earliest stages to be an activity tailored specifically for a particular type of gentleman, namely, the white, English, middle-class gentleman.⁴³ Before the 1850s, athletic achievement did not yet completely motivate this brand of "gentlemanly" activity; rather, Gruneau and Whitson argue that early competitive hockey contests tended to be more inclusive because they actually brought together disparate social groups on specific occasions such as holidays.⁴⁴ Though the competitive spirit actually prompted the inclusion of many different social groups of the time at these special occasions, the organizers ultimately pushed against the institutionalization of any sort of social equalization found in these settings. As the popularity of hockey increased in other social groups — women, Indians, laborers, European immigrants, and especially first generation Canadians — the Anglophone class attempted to withdraw further into even more exclusive groups. Informed by their own specific set of elitist "cultural meanings" and the social, class, gender, and racial prejudices of the nineteenth century, this dominating class pushed an increasingly achievement-based agenda in an effort to insulate themselves from the influence of other social groups.⁴⁵

In the years when the dream of the 'amateur' remained unsullied by the profiteering interests of individual team owners, before participation in high levels of hockey became unattainable to the public, the Stanley Cup became the predominant force in encouraging a widespread interest in hockey. Among other Canadian historians, Gillian Poulter argues that in addition to other Canadian winter sports, the Montreal Winter Carnivals provided the first catalyst for spreading a public interest in hockey.⁴⁶ The Carnivals began as an annual event in 1883 to showcase the budding Canadian cultural life to the rest of the world. Poulter points out that the Winter Carnival

could have easily held during the summer months because lacrosse, a sport played in fairer weather, also increased dramatically in popularity at the same time hockey spread throughout Canada. However, the interest in attracting the largest number of foreign visitors to Canada encouraged the organizers to hold a carnival that would showcase the Canadian sports that represented the most common international understanding of life in Canada — winter sports.⁴⁷ With commercial and professional interests in mind, the middle-class, Anglophone organizers of the Montreal Winter Carnival created an annual showcase for Canadian winter fun.⁴⁸ These displays aimed to display to large audiences what Canadians considered to be the country's most 'unique signifiers,' popular winter pastimes, such as figure skating and snowshoeing.⁴⁹ Braving the bitter Canadian cold, over 50,000 visitors from within Canada, the United States, and even visitors from Europe, arrived in Montreal by train to witness the festivities and celebrate Canadian winter life, and an increasingly popular sport — hockey.⁵⁰

The impact of Montreal's Winter Carnivals cannot be understated in the context of hockey's growth as a spectator sport.⁵¹ Just as the organizers intended, the Carnival succeeded in generating wider interest in various winter sports such as snowshoeing and figure skating. However, the hockey matches quickly became the most popular attractions, drawing some of the largest and most enthusiastic crowds ever recorded in the sport.⁵² One article in the *Montreal Witness* reports the outcome of the much-anticipated contest between the Montreal and Quebec teams during the first Winter Carnival in Montreal, writing that Carnival-goers and "lovers of the game" alike had "looked forward" to the match with "considerable interest."⁵³ In this match and so many others like it, the teams "made the most" of unfavorable ice conditions as spectators looked on in earnest, and perhaps most importantly, carried a "great keenness" and a palpable enthusiasm for this growing sport from Montreal to their hometowns.⁵⁴

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In its sixth year in Montreal, the Winter Carnival hosted one of its most important dignitaries: the Governor General of Canada, Lord Frederick Arthur Stanley, Earl of Derby. Stanley became the sixth Governor General in Canadian history in June 1888; he arrived in Canada with his wife and children and quickly began settling into their new life in an unfamiliar, young country.⁵⁵ On February 4, 1889, Lord Stanley and his entourage became part of the record-breaking crowd at the Victoria Skating Rink in Montreal during the Winter Carnival. Historians Shea and Wilson write that, as Stanley and his group entered the rink, both teams ceased play to welcome the Governor General with cheers and applause as they took their seats next to the ice in a manner of showing respect for the Governor General and his decision to attend their hockey match.⁵⁶ According to the *Montreal Gazette*, Lord Stanley expressed his delight with the spectacle he witnessed at the Victoria Rink; Stanley became especially fascinated with and impressed by the “expertise of the players” as his notorious love for the “game of hockey” itself began before the crowd in Montreal.⁵⁷

Historical accounts suggest that, though he attended his first official hockey match at the Montreal Winter Carnival, Lord Stanley's personal involvement in sport was not out of the ordinary; throughout his reign as Governor General, Stanley attended numerous sporting events and exhibitions outside of hockey, including figure skating and cricket.

After attending his first hockey game at the Carnival in 1889, the Stanley family returned to Ottawa and the Stanley children, including daughter Isobel, began participating in informal play at Rideau Hall, which later became the home of the Ontario Hockey Association.⁵⁸ The involvement of the Stanley children as hockey players became the most important personal connection Lord Stanley would have to the game itself. Like previous Governor Generals, Lord Stanley became “deeply interested” in hockey, often appearing at the

local rink to show support for his family and watch many of the best players of the time square off.⁵⁹ The pool of 'like-minded' hockey 'enthusiasts' in Ottawa grew, bringing in more and more members from the Canadian social elite including many members of Stanley's personal and political circles.⁶⁰

Because of his personal involvement in hockey, Stanley, with the help of his family, sought to encourage his surrounding population to become more involved in the popularization sport. To accomplish this, Stanley chose build on the tradition of previous Governor Generals and hold numerous "at home" parties at Rideau Hall in Ottawa; these "at homes" allowed the early Governor Generals of the Dominion to interact socially with peers while at the same time becoming more intimately connected to the general communities of which they were a vital part.⁶¹ Among the figure skating displays and other popular Canadian winter sports, the 1891 Stanley family "at home" included a mock hockey match.

The players wore clown costumes and, as Shea and Wilson explain, historians believe that the squad of hockey-playing clowns likely included some of the Stanley children.⁶² By introducing hockey into the repertoire of most prominent winter sports demonstrated at the "at home," the Stanley family shared their personal love for the game with a larger Canadian audience, bringing hockey once again into their Canadian public sphere.

By 1892, the significance of Stanley's involvement in hockey as a patron figure is obvious based on the numerous articles in Toronto-based newspapers mentioning his presence at well-attended local hockey matches. One such article from *The Globe* mentions Lord Stanley's attendance of a local match between the Montreal and Ottawa athletic association teams, along with his aide de camp Lord Kilcourse, before even revealing the final score of both teams.⁶³ Less than a month after this article appeared in *The Globe*, another report arrived announcing the formation of the Ottawa Amateur Athletic

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Association and its first annual dinner at the Russell House Hotel in Ottawa. Held on March 18, 1892, the dinner honored the Ottawa Hockey Club's triumphant championship season — one that was ripe with the spirit of the 'pure love of sport' and athletic fraternity.⁶⁴ After giving a well-accepted toast to Stanley's interest in hockey, Lord Kilcoursie, Stanley's representative at the banquet, read a letter that changed the spirit of hockey competition forever:

I have for some time past been thinking that it would be a good thing if there were a challenge cup which should be held from year to year by the champion hockey team in the Dominion. There does not appear to be any such outward and visible sign of a championship at present...⁶⁵

This excerpt shows that Stanley recognizes himself and points out the obvious 'general interest' that hockey matches throughout Canada quickly garnered leading up to the 1889 Montreal Winter Carnival. Using this popular interest in hockey as his basis, Stanley announces to the banquet audience at the Russell House Hotel that he will establish the newest and most prestigious challenge existing in the Dominion to that point.

By the time Stanley wrote his letter to the Ottawa Amateur Athletic Association, the rules of hockey had been formalized and for all intents and purposes, 'generally recognized' within the larger hockey community at that time.⁶⁶ Though he wished to alter the 'present regulations' on the location where the matches would be played, the formalization of hockey rules throughout the athletic community created the perfect opportunity for a championship trophy to be instituted. As a true 'challenge cup' whichever two teams reached the finals of the national competition played for the opportunity to win the Stanley Cup on a 'year to year' basis. No matter who won the trophy in a given year, the 'challenge cup' would return to the hands of the Dominion before the next victorious team could claim its title. Thus, with his letter to the banquet at the Russell House, Stanley created a 'challenge cup' and expressed his profound support for the

sport of hockey from the pen of the most prominent member of the royal government living in Canada, giving anyone who accepted the challenge added nationalistic incentive to become its captor.⁶⁷

Even aside from the influence of Lord Stanley and the Dominion Challenge trophy, no sport is from its very beginning more unquestionably connected to Canadian national identity as hockey.⁶⁸ According to Stephen Leacock, the most widely known Canadian political humorist of the twentieth century, hockey defines in many ways what it means to be Canadian:

Hockey captures the essence of Canadian experience in the New World. In a land so inescapably and inhospitably cold, hockey is the chance of life, and an affirmation that, despite the deathly chill of winter, we are alive.⁶⁹

Leacock includes in his remarks two very significant adjectives in his articulation of the Canadian experience as they relate to the harsh environment: first, inescapable, and second, inhospitable. In the most basic sense, the ability of the Canadian people to adapt to their surrounding environment shows the truest sense of the unique Canadian spirit mentioned by Isaac Weld as early as the 1790s. Interpreted through the lens of Canadian nationalism, Weld's discussion of the prevailing Canadian spirit at the end of his account of the St. Lawrence Valley shows the more desirable values highly prized by Canadians that would contribute to hockey's success in Canada over other winter sports. Using the rich country at his disposal, the Canadian sacrifices physical comfort for the excitement of adventure and finding new ways to survive the elements.⁷⁰ Discussions of hockey time and again return to the idea that this spirit motivates the Canadian national identity: the ability to survive in a meaningful way in the New World, as Leacock mentions, against all conceivable physical odds.

In 1877, one of the earliest Canadian nationalists and proponents of Canadian sports W. George Beers echoes the same unique Canadian spirit found in Weld's account nearly one hundred years after his

travels in Upper Canada. In his piece highlighting a few of the most pre-eminent Canadian sports at the time — lacrosse in the summer, and tobogganing and snow-shoeing in the winter — Beers remarks on the 'blood-born' and 'bone-bred love of open-air sports' and Canadian climate; especially, the specific climate that favors the freedom allowed by hardy exercise over the 'restraints and conventionalities' that were previously necessary to 'social enjoyment' in the Old World.⁷¹ Beers also comments on the centrality of a love for the outdoors 'instinctive love for outdoor life and exercise' as part of the Canadian spirit:

I think the Canadians well typify the hardiness of northern races; and nothing has perhaps helped more to form the physique of the people than the instinctive love for outdoor life and exercise in the bracing spring, winter and fall of the year. The spirit of sport is born in the blood as well as nourished by the clime.⁷²

Furthermore, Beers believes that Canadian society, proven to be tolerant and welcoming towards sports and sportsmen alike, allows Canadian sports to have a 'character of their own' through which Canadians can throw off the regulations of the overbearing European Old World and contribute to the distinct Canadian national identity.⁷³

Pre-Confederation Canada lacked this clear sense of national identity proposed by Anderson because its people remained informed mostly by their traditional European identities. However, the official formation of the Confederation and the years immediately following its establishment provided a developmentally significant time for the beginning of a unique sense of Canadian identity. Gruneau and Whiston observe that early in the country's history, there existed little reason to conceive a distinctively Canadian national identity they were simply building on the traditions they adapted from Native Americans and, more importantly, their European roots.⁷⁴ However, in seeking, yet again, to distinguish their way

of life from their European predecessors, the need for a distinct national captivated the increasingly independent young country; as the number of first-generation Canadians leading up to the Confederation and shortly after began to skyrocket, a clear drive to 'express a clear sense of their own Canadianness' became apparent throughout Canadian society.⁷⁵

Hockey is one of the strongest symbols of popular Canadian culture today. Gruneau and Whitson compare the popular symbolic power of hockey to the Canadian Broadcasting Company, the Canadian federal government, and the maple leaf itself.⁷⁶ It is no coincidence that Gruneau and Whitson connected hockey to the Canadian federal government; the relationship between the two is more than symbolic. The birth of hockey and the birth of the Canadian federal government, or the Confederacy itself, are similar in that they come out of the same point in history. Simply aligning the timeline of both Canadian government and the development of hockey can show the most obvious continuity found between the two: only eight years separate the first widely publicized game of hockey and the official establishment of the Dominion of Canada in 1867.⁷⁷ These two events occurred in such chronological proximity to one another, coming out of the same unique moment in Canadian history that created the most defining athletic pastime and the Dominion of Canada itself.

The values promised by Canadian government in the Constitution Act of 1867 and the values embodied in the sport of hockey represent a significant dichotomy in the study of hockey and its relationship to Canadian national identity. Unlike the United States' Declaration of Independence, the parallel section of the Canadian Constitution Act of 1867 regarding the division of powers explicitly promises Canadians 'Peace, Order, and good Government...' as the most basic rights afforded to the people by the federal government.⁷⁸ As a country plainly based on the ideals of 'peace' and 'order' rather

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than 'liberty' and the individual 'pursuit of happiness,' it is difficult for Canadian society as a whole to escape the idea that all Canadians are international 'peacekeepers' and, as historian Michael Robidoux argues, sometimes an 'unreasonably polite' people.⁷⁹ The most common perceptions of Canadians elicit the idea that they pride themselves solely on peaceful attitudes; however, the historical departure from more 'civilized' European games, like cricket, to sports like hockey and lacrosse shows the distinct representation of toughness in sport. In particular, through the presence of violence and confrontation often associated with hockey, Canadians are able to use sport to constructively represent this sense of resilience and ferocity in the face of challenges that has over time become so central to the greater Canadian national identity.

Even with this habitual perception of Canadian politeness and acquiescence, the sport most widely associated with life in Canada, and the Canadian experience as a whole, clearly embodies neither 'peace' nor 'order;' the Canadian national winter sport represents different and often contrasting ideals when compared to the commonly held conceptions of the Canadian personality. Hockey places high importance on aggressiveness, rugged utilitarianism, and on so many occasions violence and organized chaos. Robidoux argues that hockey's violent style separated it from other European sports such as cricket, and another rapidly growing American sport: baseball.⁸⁰ Numerous newspaper accounts of the earliest organized hockey games expressed concern for the players, and now the large crowds who looked on at their own risk. As an 1875 article from *The Daily British Whig* reports, numerous times violence on the ice caused the lady spectators to flee from the rinks in 'confusion' during the out-breaks of fights that interrupted the matches.⁸¹ The arguments often posed by newspaper reporters during this time period — especially when examining the validity of such a violent sport — show the public perception of a violent sport at that time to be unusual, shocking,

and to some extent, it shows the dangerous excitement and intrigue that helped catapult hockey to the forefront of Canadian sports.

Like the strong link between the origins of hockey and the birth of the Confederation, the beginnings of the formation of a distinct Canadian national culture parallel the development of organized hockey, adding further to the link between hockey and Canadian national identity. Gruneau and Whitson discuss the appearance and formation of a unique Canadian culture for the first time around the same era in which organized sports came about. In a time period in which the focus of the nation remained grounded in the need to establish certain political and national apparatuses rather than defining a particular nation itself, the amateur approach to sports actually encouraged the first underpinnings of the development of the unique Canadian identity through participation in sports and the idea, yet again, of universal gains through athletics. As these developing Canadian sports and the ideals that supported them began to aid the formation of this 'emergent sense of national belonging' discussed by Gruneau and Whitson, we see a symbiotic relationship begin to develop in which this same 'emergent' Canadian national identity worked to further development of these sports and the greater national culture moving forward.⁸²

In order to understand the lasting ties between hockey and Canadian nationalism, one major concern found in the discussion of Canadian sport has taken the form of a romanticized call for protection of Canadian national interest and tradition in the face of an overbearing neighbor.⁸³ While this concern itself is important in hockey history and Canadian history as a whole, it touches on a larger struggle in Canadian nationalism: distinguishing between the reality of "actually existing national popular cultures" and those "imagined national cultures" which lend themselves to more abstract concepts like democracy and conservatism.⁸⁴ With this idea of an "imagined national culture," Gruneau and Whitson draw on ideas di-

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rectly stemming from Benedict Anderson's commentary on the formation of national identity and the "anomaly' of nationalism."⁸⁵ Applying the theories found in *Imagined Communities* to Canadian history, ideas of Canadian nationalism and national identity can both be interpreted in terms of the merger of a "wide variety of political and ideological constellations" into a unified sense of identity. Anderson defines the nation as a 'community' that is 'imagined' because, whether or not exploitation or inequality resides throughout the nation, it can always be seen as a 'deep, horizontal comradeship' in which its members are willing to die for the nation itself.⁸⁶ In the case of hockey in Canada, the ties created by the widespread support of hockey throughout Canada provide a key example of this 'horizontal comradeship' discussed by Anderson. As a game, hockey is so popular throughout the Canadian nation that it continues to play a 'key role in the production and reproduction of the type of identity upon which the federal idea depends': that being Canadian is a meaningful identity apart from all others.

It is the combination of these many social and economic factors that led to hockey's rise as Canada's primary nationalistic symbol. As competition increased throughout eastern cities and expanded westward, both public and economic interest on the part of the Canadian public helped catapult hockey into a year-round venture sustained by amateur athletic associations and their socially limited membership bases. Though it proved to be ultimately marginalizing for the minority classes in Canadian society — the laborers, the women, and non-whites - the interests of the dominant elite Canadian class helped create support for the proliferation of winter activities in general, and hockey in particular, as a means of social improvement. This ideal in turn lured the Canadian population into its throes for support, and then immediately excluded large groups by restricting the visible notoriety of participation in hockey to the white elite. While initially, the organizers of amateur sport intended to extend

the universal benefits of athletic participation to members of all social classes, the strict limitations imposed by these same upper class associations sanctioned their own brand of social exclusion in sports moving forward.

Even with the prevailing focus within amateur sport that became so narrowly defined, Lord Stanley's position as Canada's Governor General gave him the ability to provide the burgeoning hockey community, and through it the Canadian people as a whole, with a common rallying point for the support of hockey: the Dominion Challenge Trophy. The birth of the Stanley Cup, however, did not signal the return of the marginalized social groups that the amateur athletic associations pushed aside to the greater hockey community; in many ways, competition for the Stanley Cup failed to include these marginalized social groups outside of the elite because Stanley made no mention of social exclusion in his donation. However, the trophy's original role as a true 'challenge cup' provided the motivation for competition for hockey's greatest prize that caused the eventual blurring of social boundaries in Canadian sports.

As a 'challenge cup' and the first national hockey trophy of its time, the earliest Stanley Cup provided the Canadian people with a rallying point for generating support for the development and spread of hockey throughout Canada, and later the United States and the world. Through the birth of the Stanley Cup, Lord Stanley provided the people of Canada with a single moment in which Canadians could come together in support of the quest for the best team representing an indigenously Canadian pursuit. By building on a pre-existing European influence, the Stanley Cup, sanctioned by the highest governmental representative in the country, created a platform for the development of a wholly unique set of traditions related to hockey, and through hockey, for the development of a greater Canadian culture. In an era of significant social and economic change throughout the young country, the Stanley Cup gave the people of Canada the

remarkable opportunity to initiate the development of a distinctly Canadian national identity that they could claim as their own moving forward, and one that they continue to define themselves by and make meaning through today.

IMAGE INDEX



Figure 1: Hockey at the Montreal Winter Carnival 1884

Playing hockey on the skating rink, McGill University, 1884 / Montreal, Quebec. Source: [<http://www.collectionscanada.ca/> Library and Archives Canada]



Figure 2: Lord Stanley of Preston, Earl of Derby

Found at the Hockey Hall of Fame's page The Stanley Cup Journal:
[http://www.hhof.com/htmlSTCjournal/exSCJ08_38.shtml]



Figure 3: Stanley's Inscription on the original Dominion Challenge Trophy

Found at the Hockey Hall of Fame's page, the Stanley Cup Journal –
[http://www.hhof.com/htmlstcjournal/exSCJ_08.shtml]



Figure 4: The Original Stanley Cup

Found at the Hockey Hall of Fame's Page, the Stanley Cup Journal:
[http://www.hhof.com/htmlSTCjournal/exSCJ08_38.shtml]

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- ⁵¹ See Image Index, Figure 1: Playing hockey on the skating rink, McGill University, 1884 / Montreal, Quebec Source: [[http://www.collectionscanada.ca/ Library and Archives Canada](http://www.collectionscanada.ca/Library and Archives Canada)]
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STANDING GIANT BY MATT KLEMSZ

THE JOURNEY OF FDR'S PUBLIC IMAGE AS THE DEMOCRATIC DICTATOR

■
BY ANDREW W. OTTON

Franklin Delano Roosevelt's (FDR) public image rose in his first term, fell in his second, and rebounded in his third. The essential focus of this paper is to examine how FDR portrayed himself to the public, as well as explain the tumultuous nature of his image over his three terms. This is significant, as other scholarship has overlooked this important part, leaving the understanding of FDR lacking. Other scholarship focuses mostly on policy and politics when concerned with FDR's speeches, specifically the fireside chats, and the potential societal, economic, cultural, etc. impact the speech might have had. Davis Houck is a good exception to that. He has a discussion of FDR trying to insert the traits of a dictator into his public image, which one will discuss later.¹ Even when looking at rhetoricians, many spend their time discussing the particular way FDR used language to be effectively persuasive. However, there is an exception to that in Mary Stuckey, who discusses how FDR combined his image and that of the government's.² Those two exceptions, which do discuss the way FDR portrayed himself, still only offer small pieces of information particular to one part of FDR's wide oratory. Houck focuses on FDR's first inaugural, and Stuckey's argues the definition of the "modern presidency," focusing on the persuasive language of FDR, the discussion of merged identities only being small and tangential.³ What is lacking is a discussion of FDR's personal motivations behind his speeches, something that could benefit all other academic work surrounding FDR. Others discuss political motivations through policy FDR wanted passed, but there is little discussion of how FDR used himself as a tool to convince the public. This paper will attempt to address that.

FDR's public image changed significantly across his first three terms, the early impetus for those changes beginning in his interregnum.

This paper will focus solely on speeches given by FDR himself, namely his first three inaugural addresses and a selection of his fire-side chats. In his first term, FDR attempted to establish a balanced image as the “democratic dictator” and that of the “people’s president.” In the second term FDR overestimated the political capital he created in his first term while establishing that image, leading him to tip the balance in favor of the democratic dictator half, which led to two significant political failures. Finally, in his third term FDR rebalanced his image between the democratic dictator and the “people’s president,” due in part to the failures in his second term and to the emergence of World War II.

Franklin Delano Roosevelt had little more than four months between the day of his election and the day of his inauguration to formulate an approach to the public. He had many things to consider in his approach, the obvious, and greatest, issue being the Great Depression. The infamous stock market crash of October 29, 1929, referred to as “Black Tuesday,” happened three years before FDR’s election, meaning the Great Depression had a great impact already: an estimated one-third of all workers lost their jobs, gross income from farming and agriculture halved, and banks foreclosed one thousand houses daily.⁴ All of those situations, which had developed in those short three years, posed problems that FDR would have to deal with directly.

In that four-month period, FDR accomplished very little in terms of fixing those problems, due in large part to the politics between himself and Herbert Hoover. FDR and his staff instead began planning for the unknown, as Adolf Berle, an aid to FDR, noted two days after the election in November 1932, “It must be remembered by March 4 next we may have anything on our hands from a recovery to a revolution.”⁵ FDR might not have known exactly what to do, but he had already decided the problem with the economy came from a domestic source, where Hoover argued an international one, essentially

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the opposite of FDR.⁶ Raymond Moley, an early speechwriter and adviser to FDR, noted that FDR might have cooperated with Hoover during those four months if not for the fact that the issue was the economy. FDR disagreed so deeply that he refused to pollute his point of view by cooperating.⁷ Unfortunately, the key issue surrounding the two administrations was not something like foreign policy, upon which FDR agreed with Hoover.⁸

Luckily, FDR agreed with Hoover on foreign policy, as much of the world changed in those four months, specifically the rise of fascism, which would have effects far into FDR's presidency. Germany selected Adolf Hitler as their new Chancellor, and Japan announced that it would be leaving the League of Nations to continue its action towards capturing Manchuria.⁹ Interestingly, FDR had his inauguration March 4, 1933, and Hitler March 5, both dying within weeks of each other as well.¹⁰ Over the next twelve years, each man ran their respective countries, while despising one another and all they stood for.¹¹ This is important to note, as the further into FDR's presidency, the more the issue of Hitler arose. Hitler, and others like him such as Benito Mussolini, became for FDR one of the biggest threats to the United States as it directly challenged democracy, which FDR believed to be the foundation of the United States.

The roots of FDR's approach to his image began when he served as New York's governor from 1929 to 1932 in the form of "fireside chats." He came into office as governor in January of 1929, and in April he gave his first ever "fireside chat," where he then continued to give them periodically throughout his governorship and into his presidency.¹² A "fireside chat," was essentially a radio address FDR prepared in advance that focused on one topic. FDR used the chats as a way to inform the people about the situation related to that topic, and then to use as a platform to attempt to convince the public of the correct solution: his. That same basic formula continued throughout his presidency. Samuel Rosenman, an adviser and

speechwriter for FDR, who served with him from his governorship throughout his presidency, suggested that the fireside chats had a significant impact on FDR's success as governor. They appealed directly to the people, bypassing debates with other politicians or discussions with the media entirely.¹³ It made certain the fact that FDR fully controlled his message, and nobody could interpret what he said, changing his intended meaning.

By addressing the people directly himself, FDR could ensure that no journalist would misinterpret and inaccurately inform the public of his message — the way he portrayed himself to the people — allowing him to receive direct feedback from the people in the form of letters. Lawrence Levine and Cornelia Levine provide a collection of letters handpicked from, by their estimation, some fifteen to thirty million letters people sent to FDR over the course of his presidency.¹⁴ It is important to note that the Levines picked the pools of letters this paper uses, limiting the selection to only a couple of dozen at most per fireside chat.¹⁵ Those letters played an extremely important role throughout FDR's presidency, as FDR believed them a key aspect of serving as president. He firmly believed that because he paid so much attention to those letters, by receiving daily mail briefs and reading letters himself, he had the best knowledge of what the public actually thought.¹⁶ The letters had a more direct affect as well, as Samuel Rosenman noted instances where FDR reversed a policy decision, or acted on a policy much sooner, due to the reaction he received from letters.¹⁷ Leila A. Sussmann, a rhetorician, even goes as far to suggest that the letters had an essential role in FDR's decision to run for a fourth term.¹⁸

FDR's relationship with the media directly affected the way he approached the public. He had a poor relationship with the media, so he used the fireside chats to avoid the media entirely, appealing directly to the people. Other than the fireside chats and the letters FDR received, he interacted with the public mainly through the

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White House correspondents. Betty Winfield discusses FDR's relationship with the correspondents essentially as FDR's attempt to control them. Winfield argues that FDR "wanted the White House correspondents to act as conveyor belts, stenographers, and accurate reporters of spot news from his perspective."¹⁹ He effectively wanted them to be nothing more than outlets to regurgitate his message, nothing more, meaning no independent interpretation of what he said that would then lead to misinformation. Winfield notes several instances of FDR both directing his control and voicing it: he would openly criticize the media for its common practice of reinterpretation, plant people to ask questions at press conferences, and he enacted the direct-quotation rule, which stated that the press could only quote FDR if the White House gave them the quote in writing.²⁰ FDR avoided those problems with his fireside chats, as Winfield notes, "with radio, FDR could be the news-gatherer, the reporter, as well as the editor."²¹ In other words, FDR had control of the information, nobody else. With his chats, FDR did not risk someone else either challenging or misinterpreting his message. Because of that, FDR made the media's only relevance the mediums they provided.

It is important to note that when one refers to "FDR" one does not simply refer to the man, but FDR himself and his advisers, all of which played a significant role in crafting FDR's speeches. Therefore, when one does refer to "FDR," one should read it as "FDR and associates." The now infamous "Brain Trust" made up the key associates through which FDR worked. FDR used them to take an initial idea of his and refine it into a more structured and sound position.²² This is important to note, as much of the core discussion found in FDR's speeches began within the "Brain Trust." Therefore, any speech FDR gave came from not just merely an effort on his part, but borne out of a collective discussion including FDR and the "Brain Trust."

Just four months following his election victory in November of

1932, FDR gave his first speech to the public as president in his first inaugural address. From the outset, he gave the inaugural the purpose of outlining his agenda for the next four years, as well as outlining what his role would be. This is a common trait shared among his inaugurals, as one would guess would be similar to other presidents as well. On March 4, 1933, Hoover handed the reins of the presidency over to FDR. Immediately, FDR attempted to dispel two falsities in his first inaugural, both of which stem from his dreadful experience with Hoover throughout the 1932 election. Hoover's campaign constantly accused FDR of being a weak man, both physically, alluding to his disability, and politically, claiming he lacked experience.²³ Hoover's administration believed FDR so weak that Hoover and his aides spoke openly about wanting FDR as their opponent in the 1932 election because they believed FDR would be an easily defeated opponent.²⁴ Second, and equally as important, FDR also had to address the characteristics ascribed to the presidency during Hoover's "lame duck" period. Many, including Hoover's Secretary of State, described Hoover as pessimistic and out of touch, and because of Hoover's unpopularity, he needed a heavier than normal police escort in some cases.²⁵ FDR's reaction to Hoover established the balanced image and traits of both the "democratic dictator" and the seemingly incongruous "people's president."

Historians agree that FDR attempted to distance himself from Hoover in his first inaugural address as an active, optimistic, and authoritative president. Disagreements arise when discussing how much power FDR assumed for himself. Most, such as James MacGregor Burns and biographer Jean Edward Smith, discuss FDR's conflict between balancing his executive powers and that of the legislature — FDR creating power through influence over Congress.²⁶ One historian, Davis Houck, entertains the idea that FDR tried to balance the image of a dictator within a democracy, while discussing the relationship between the executive and the legislature.²⁷ Houck

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includes notes from Raymond Moley, which state the early eight points FDR wanted to discuss in his first inaugural. Number six was "Dictatorship," and number seven was "No failure of Democracy."²⁸ It appears then that FDR struggled to combine the seemingly incongruous concepts of a dictator within a democracy. Specifically, he wanted the attributes and traits of a dictator applied to him, but within the realm of democracy, a "democratic dictator" in a sense — those traits being control, unquestionable leadership, and the fact that he as democratic dictator would be the one to lead the vision of the nation. Those qualities had an obvious contrast to the qualities attached to Hoover, which FDR wanted as he did not want one ounce of Hoover's pessimism to carry over into his presidency.

FDR crafted his image of the democratic dictator through his judgment on the balance of power between the three branches, specifically the legislative and executive. FDR spent most of the inaugural discussing what he planned to do as president to fix the crisis the U.S. found itself in at the time, but he did not discuss how he would do it until the end. The first step FDR took in instilling the traits of the democratic dictator in himself began cautiously:

It is hoped that the normal balance of executive and legislative authority may be wholly adequate to meet the unprecedented task before us. But it may be that an unprecedented demand and need for delayed action may call for temporary departure from that normal balance of public procedure.²⁹

With the nation as a whole at stake, FDR argued for a necessary, but temporary, suspension of the nation's delicate balance of power. One will see that essential tactic repeated in later chats as well. In many occasions, as one will see, FDR justified his actions as the democratic dictator by arguing for the sake of the nation, but he would always do so within the bounds of democracy. The "temporary" suspension served as a small means to a greater end, meaning the restoration of democracy to its previous state before the crisis. In other words, FDR

wanted to act outside the normal bounds of democracy so that he could then fix it.

FDR also acknowledged that if he saw democracy failing to accomplish what he believed necessary, he would attempt to correct it himself:

But in the event that the Congress shall fail... and in the event that the national emergency is still critical, I shall not evade the clear course of duty that will then confront me. I shall ask the Congress for... broad Executive power to wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.³⁰

In other words, FDR wanted to assume a role like that of a dictator, as long as the democracy allowed it. This is where the “people’s president” comes into play. The traits attached to the “people’s president” in its purest form — if FDR only stood on that side of the balance — would mean that FDR had one lone duty to do what the nation willed, and that all his actions had to be for the people’s right to steer him in a certain direction. In other words, FDR had no hidden agenda. Even though FDR used clear language that he wanted to increase the power of the executive branch, he did so within the bounds of democracy. That is the essential interplay between the democratic dictator and the “people’s president.” FDR would act as the democratic dictator to suggest a means to an end, but would then say the people, or some other function of democracy like Congress, had the responsibility to accept or reject his suggestion to move forward. The small price people had to pay for the disruption in the balance of power held little importance to FDR if it meant fixing the crisis of the Great Depression.

FDR began his first term in his inaugural with the strong language associated with the democratic dictator, but soon turned to a more balanced approach by suggesting that he was no more than just an American like the rest of the public. Less than two weeks after his inaugural, FDR gave his first fireside chat as president on March 12.³¹

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This chat on banking had more technical discussions than most, the intricacies of banking, but as the first fireside chat, it introduced important and common themes one will see in later chats. Buhite and Levy noticed the first theme, where FDR attempted to foster an idea of “us vs. them.”³² FDR united the people generally, while at the same time blaming a small minority, a minority that he would craft in a way for all people to universally oppose. That effort served two purposes, to unite the people and include FDR himself in the “us” as well. The nation needed a concerted effort by all, including FDR, to defeat the troublesome minority, in this case “incompetent” and/or “dishonest” bankers.³³ FDR used personal language throughout to gain that effect, for example referring to the people as “my friends.” The final line of the chat, “Together we cannot fail,” likely best represents the sentiment.³⁴ As long as the United States stood together, meaning FDR and the people, they would be successful. The implication of that being failure would be the outcome if either side did not do their part, which meant that the people had to approve FDR's decisions.

Rhetorician Mary Stuckey helps further the image that FDR served the people as an equal to them, yet still with a different role. She discusses the idea that FDR used language to make the nation appear as a family, with FDR the fatherly figure.³⁵ The nation and each individual shared the same goal, but how each individual attained that goal differed. In FDR's case, that meant being the leader. In other words, FDR led the way while the people made sure he did not go outside the bounds of democracy. In addition to that, Stuckey argues that FDR's use of language to merge his and the government's identity making it indistinguishable from one another played a significant role in his success.³⁶ If the public approved of the government, they approved of FDR and vice versa. In other words, the public would attribute success anywhere in government to FDR due to the merged identities.

One can best see the assertion Stuckey makes, as well as the ideas of FDR's image from his first inaugural, when FDR discussed the second step of his plan to fix the banking crisis, "the legislation promptly and patriotically passed by the Congress confirming my proclamation and broadening my powers..."³⁷ It is not important to our question what FDR planned to do, but how he planned to do it. This quote offers some insight into the careful messages FDR crafted. First, the democratic dictator is present. FDR specifically said that Congress confirmed "my proclamation." He, nobody else, led it, but at the same time, he worked within the bounds of democracy by going through Congress. Including "my proclamation," is "my powers." He did not say the government's powers, the executive's powers, or the federal bureaucracies, but FDR himself. He left no question to who led the country, when he discussed the government's interests, lending to that idea Stuckey expressed about FDR merging his identity with that of the government. His actions and those of the governments came from the same source, FDR himself. This made the issues personal, helping the people look to FDR instead of some unknown bureaucracy whose name came in the form of an acronym.

Lawrence Levine and Cornelia Levine offer insight into the personal level FDR brought to his speeches in their analysis of letters sent to him at the White House. The some forty million people, which the Levines consider a conservative estimate, listened to that first chat and based on their analysis, the people heard, understood, and accepted FDR at his word.³⁸ In addition to their own analysis, they provide many letters that share that same sentiment of trust in FDR. Of the 37 letters the Levines' provided, the majority discuss their surprise at the intimate nature of the speech. One letter sums up the shared sentiment eloquently, that FDR "honored every home with a personal visit last night."³⁹ The people received much of what FDR had hoped, the intimate setting and trust in his new image, which would not have happened if they still saw him as the weak

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man Hoover tried to impart on them in the 1932 election. The language of acceptance in the letters means that the people also accepted the "democratic dictator" as well, whether they knew it or not.

In another fireside chat given only a few months later in May of 1933, FDR evaluated the progress of his New Deal policies, which gave him the opportunity to further his success, and thereby the strength of his image, by essentially patting himself on the back. This speech and the following one discussed are unique in that they almost discuss FDR himself, or the government, exclusively, instead of a particular issue. With that in mind, this speech of self-evaluation became one where FDR justified his previous actions and policies. Now FDR had the opportunity to show success, where before he only discussed the potential for success. In the chat, FDR addressed the fear that his actions as president had put the balance of power between the three branches in danger, "The only thing that has been happening has been to designate the president of the United States as the agency to carry out certain of the purposes of the Congress."⁴⁰ Though it appeared that FDR gave a lot of credit to Congress and the democratic process, he still focused specifically on himself as the agent through which the government worked. Also, before FDR said this, he gave himself the credit for first giving the idea to Congress about appointing him as their agent. When discussing his plans and his worry that they may be too straining on democracy FDR said, "The Congress... fully understood this and gave me generous and intelligent support."⁴¹ By that, FDR meant the Congress recognized the need to give him more power and did it. In that light, it would appear again that it all came back to him. FDR created a complex web of his strong leadership and dictatorial qualities within the bounds of democracy. He effectively hid the stronger traits of the democratic dictator under the process of democracy and Congress. FDR did not want to be a dictator, but he wanted to be associated as one, which he did subtly and as letters will point out later, he did well.

The democratic dictator had a strong presence in this chat, but FDR also adhered greatly to the idea of the “people’s president” as well, keeping the balance intact. He did this by reinforcing the idea that he and the people share a symbiotic and interdependent relationship with one another. He already emphasized and incorporated himself as just another American in his “us vs. them” language, but here he expanded upon it to emphasize the idea of separate but equal. They shared a common goal, but the two parties had different responsibilities, meaning the people allowed and restricted FDR’s actions, and FDR acted as their agent within those bounds. He accomplished this by more than just thanking the public, but laying the reason for his successes at their feet, “To you, the people of this country, all of us in Washington... owe a profound debt of gratitude... Every ounce of strength, every resource at our command, we have devoted and we are devoting to the end of justifying your confidence.”⁴² FDR managed to meld the dictatorial qualities on one hand, and the democratic qualities of the “people’s president” on the other. He did this by reinforcing the idea of the “people’s president.” First, he gave the people a large part of the credit for his success as president so far. In a sense, FDR made them as important as himself. Second, he specifically said that every action he considered, as the representative of the whole government, attempted to justify “your confidence” — the people’s part in trusting him. FDR implied that without the people’s confidence in himself as president, the successes achieved so far would not have happened. In that same vein, FDR implied that he worked directly for the people, working toward their success.

When looking at letters sent to FDR after this fireside chat, the people accepted the idea of FDR as both a strong leader, a tool of the people, and felt that FDR had “justified their confidence.” Using the letters the Levines provide, it appears that nearly all completely took to the idea of FDR as a strong leader that they trusted one hundred percent. Though some disagree, the vast majority carried this senti-

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ment.⁴³ One in particular bought into it so wonderfully FDR could not have dreamt up a better letter to send himself, "The dictatorship myth, woven so industriously about your excellency, was knocked over the fence on Sunday night."⁴⁴ The letter also discussed how FDR accomplished that in his chat by creating a partnership with the people and Congress, something the letter claimed to be incompatible with dictatorship. This suggests that at least one individual saw the dictatorial qualities, but under the weavings of democracy, where FDR turned them into the "people's president." This is an interesting letter for another reason as well, as it began to discuss criticisms of FDR that he addressed a year later in another fireside chat.

That fireside chat offered another opportunity for FDR to discuss and justify himself, only this time within the context that he defended himself against criticism. The chat marked the increase in push back against FDR's New Deal policies, which he gave in June of 1934, barely over a year after his inauguration. The timing of the chat was no coincidence, as that year congressional elections occurred.⁴⁵ The outcomes of those elections held incredible importance to FDR as they provided verifiable and undeniable evidence of the people's support of his policies, as well as himself. The seats won or lost told him of their support, as he said later in another speech that he saw himself as the "head of the Democratic Party," meaning he led the direction of their policies.⁴⁶ The outcomes of those elections help explain FDR's motivation as to why he chose to address his criticisms at that moment in time.

FDR defended himself and his policies by turning questions of criticism to the people, rather than himself, reinforcing the image of the "people's president." FDR spent much of the speech directly addressing some concerns about agriculture, infrastructure, and reform. Then he discussed whether the nation considered the progress so far as an improvement. Obviously, he could not quantifiably answer that, so he asked a few questions of the public, "Are you better

off than you were last year?... Is your faith in your own individual future more firmly grounded?... Have you as an individual paid too high a price for these gains?"⁴⁷ In other words, have FDR's policies worked to put the people in a better place, have they worked well enough for FDR to have their continued confidence, and did they personally sacrifice anything to have these gains? His approach here differed from his previous speeches, where he justified his actions through the successes of his policies on a national level. In this chat he placed his trust in the people as the "people's president" individually.

The chat included the three primary tactics FDR used throughout his first term, the "people's president," the narrative of "us vs. them," and the democratic dictator. First, FDR utilized the idea of the "people's president" to again put himself on an equal level as the people. The questions themselves provide evidence of that. He could have turned to statistics to show how things had improved, which he had done in the previous chat, but instead turned to the individual to keep the idea of the "people's president" alive. Second, "us vs. them," which worked in tandem with the "people's president" for the purpose of incorporating himself within the public, so as not to be some separate unidentifiable entity. In this case, the "them" FDR targeted came in the form of what he called "doubting Thomases," who questioned him for their own personal interests, and not for the health of the nation, which FDR concerned himself with.⁴⁸ Finally, nearly the entire chat discussed whether FDR had overstepped his bounds to become a true dictator. FDR had every confidence that the people would resoundingly answer "no" he was not a dictator, when he asked them those questions.⁴⁹ Placing his confidence in the people helped both the democratic dictator and the "people's president." If they accepted his trust and answered the questions positively, they saw his actions as democratic dictator justifiable. The very nature of asking the questions took attention away from FDR and aided the idea of the "people's president."

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The questions posed to the people bypassed the critics to be sure, but he concerned himself only with the public's acceptance of his image. Looking at the letters provided by the Levines, the people gave mixed reviews of the chat. In previous chats, one could see a swelling majority supporting FDR, but, it may be of worth to note that in other chats, the discussed successes related to an entire nation, where here FDR asked each individual. Not many gave agreeable answers one way or another, other than some definitively saying "yes," and some saying "no."⁵⁰ FDR targeted his questions in a way that would produce the individual results; the country had too many diverse people. However, the 1934 elections offered the true test of the public's agreeableness. The normal trend for midterm elections is for the president's party to lose some seats in Congress. FDR came off a massively successful 1932 election, which gave the Democratic Party massive majorities in both the House and Senate.⁵¹ In the 1934 election, the Democratic Party did not lose seats, but gained even more to give them a three to one majority in the House, and over two-thirds in the Senate.⁵² FDR got his answer loud and clear, what he had done worked, so far at least.

The 1936 election served as further confirmation of FDR's efforts in his first term, as the number of democrats in both the House and Senate increased even more.⁵³ The people seemed not only to have accepted his meticulously crafted image as a democratic dictator and "people's president," but embraced it. In the sense that FDR reacted to Hoover and Hoover's image in FDR's first term, now in his second, FDR reacted to his own image in his second term and second inaugural. In other words, now FDR reacted to what he had established as his image so far. The election of 1936 relieved FDR of any effect that may have lingered from Hoover, meaning FDR no longer worked from a negative image but his own self-created positive. One can define FDR's second term as his attempt to capitalize on that positive image he had spent the past four years creating. One may

see that as similar to his first term, as FDR reacted again to a previously created image attached to the presidency. In his first term, FDR had to craft his image under the assumption that he had to convince the public on not only an issue, but on his own ability, as in his first term the accusations from Hoover's campaign still had relevance. In his second term, FDR had an established and successful image, so now he had only to convince the public on an issue. FDR knew the people accepted his image at this point, so now in his second term he tested the limits of that acceptance. In other words, what could FDR get away with as the democratic dictator, which as one will see, not as much as he originally thought.

One will first notice throughout FDR's second term, that the prevalence of the democratic dictator far outshines the "people's president," compromising the balance FDR created in his first term. FDR first reminded the people of the image they had just affirmed in the 1936 election, "Our covenant with ourselves did not stop there. Instinctively we recognized... the need to find through government the instrument of our united purpose to solve for the individual the ever-rising problems of a complex civilization."⁵⁴ In the preceding paragraph, FDR described that covenant, and the imagery attached to the word "covenant," is of equality and shared vision, ideas encompassed by FDR's "people's president." While equality had a big part, FDR played an even more significant role as he defined the necessary "instrument of our united purpose" as the government itself, and as Stuckey suggested in a previous discussion, FDR merged the government's identity with his own. In essence, FDR himself became the instrument.⁵⁵ In other words, the unification he had discussed in his first term, that the United States all worked toward one goal, neither he nor the people more important, had vanished.

FDR mainly discussed poverty, which FDR said the government could solve by obtaining more power and responsibility, the essential goal of the democratic dictator:

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Nearly all of us recognize that as intricacies of human relationships increase, so power to govern them also must increase... The essential democracy of our Nation and the safety of our people depend not upon the absence of power, but upon lodging it with those whom the people can change or continue at stated intervals...⁵⁶

FDR clearly stated that the government had to assume more and necessary power to fix the problems that plagued the nation, meaning the role of the democratic dictator increased with it. Then, not so subtly, he reminded the people that their will put him in place to assume that power, "the people can change or continue" with the person they gave the power. In terms of the democratic dictator, the dictatorial side increased in the sense of his assumed leadership. However, as before, FDR grounded the dictatorial side within democracy, as he left the decision and ultimate burden on the people to change what they disagree with. At this point in his second term, at the inauguration, FDR still gave attention to the "people's president," however, one will see that shift in the following discussed chats as FDR attempted to change the two other branches of government.

FDR did not clearly define what he meant by an increase in power in his inaugural address, however, he did hint at the next target of contention, the Supreme Court, as they risked halting the progress he pushed as democratic dictator. We have already seen FDR's contentions with Congress, now he added the Supreme Court as well. FDR essentially hinted at the fact that he would attempt to change one of the two remaining branches of government. In reference to the Court, FDR only said that the people "will insist that every agency of popular government use effective instruments to carry out their will."⁵⁷ Immediately those listening seemed to understand what FDR referenced, as Samuel Rosenman noted that he watched the Chief Justice when FDR delivered the line and he had "no doubt that the Chief Justice understood what the President meant..."⁵⁸ Kenneth Davis notes too that many members of the pub-

lic received the message and a debate about the effectiveness of the Supreme Court ensued soon afterward.⁵⁹

FDR's decision to take on the Supreme Court is the strongest showing of the democratic dictator, as evidenced in the coming fire-side chat. More broadly, FDR's contention came from those that disagreed with his interpretation of the Constitution. Rosenman noted FDR's thoughts on his second inaugural ceremonies:

When the Chief Justice read me the oath and came to the words 'support the Constitution of the United States' I felt like saying: 'Yes, but it's the Constitution as *I* understand it, flexible enough to meet any new problem of democracy — not the kind of Constitution your Court has raised up as barrier to progress and democracy.'⁶⁰

Congress worked well with the new seats won in the 1934 and 1936 elections, but the Supreme Court risked the potential progress that Congress could have. He as democratic dictator held the vision of the nation, leaving the Supreme Court as nothing more than a disagreeing minority group. The common trait among FDR's second term comes with the sentiment that things were the way "*he* understands it." In the first couple of years, how he understood the Supreme Court's role, in the last couple of years, how he understood Congress' role.

FDR began the chat on the Supreme Court by saying the court had risked and continued to risk the success of the nation so far, which the people had earned. That risk began when the Supreme Court nearly struck down the nullification of the gold clause, "Today's recovery proves how right that policy was. But when, almost two years later, it came before the Supreme Court its constitutionality was upheld only by a five-to-four vote."⁶¹ The entire chat reads as a heavy attack using the narrative of "us vs. them," the "them" in this case the Supreme Court. However, here it seemed most poignant as the Court not only risked progress now, but FDR asserted that they had risked past progress too. Essentially, FDR ac-

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cused them of nearly halting progress to pull the nation out of the Great Depression.

While both the imagery of both the democratic dictator and “people’s president” played a role in this chat, the dictatorial aspect received more attention from FDR. He described the branches of government as a team of three horses, the people holding the leads directing the team.⁶² FDR said that two of those, Congress and the Executive, pulled in the same direction, while the third, the Supreme Court, went their separate way. That they went against the will of the people. This imagery suggests democracy inherently as a team working together, but it appeared that the people could not direct the third horse back on course. FDR suggested in his inaugural that the best instrument to fulfill the nation’s needs would be himself, “It is my purpose to restore that balance. You who know me will accept my solemn assurance that in a world in which democracy is under attack, I seek to make American democracy succeed.”⁶³ He presented an interesting and obvious dichotomy between democracy and dictator. The ultimate goal he voiced was to be the “people’s president,” a defender and upholder of democracy, yet the means to get there came from FDR himself. In other words, FDR wanted the people to leave that instrument to one man, to FDR. Also, FDR reminded the people of what they had just accepted and elected when he said: “you who know me.” FDR relied on his past efforts of establishing his image to make this attack on the Supreme Court and his increased emphasis on his dictatorial qualities justified, instead of balancing his image itself within his speech.

The people decidedly rejected the new direction FDR took with his image when he emphasized the democratic dictator far more than the “people’s president.” He received mixed letters, ranging from, “They can call you a Dictator if they want to, but if you are a DICTATOR then power to you,” to a letter with a poem entitled “Franklinstein 1937” detailing how the people created a monster and

would let it run rampant.⁶⁴ Those come from letters provided by the Levines, but it is difficult to get an accurate measure of public response. Davis asserts that “a flood of approving letters and telegrams poured” into the White House after this fireside chat.⁶⁵ However, even if that is the case, one cannot verify it without analyzing the thousands of letters sent in. Davis concedes the fact that public opinion remained relatively unchanged. He cites Gallup polls that noted a rise from just 41 percent to 45 percent in favor of FDR’s plan. FDR might as well have considered that no effect at all. He may have received many letters showing support, but the polls and the then failure of his plan are evidence of the lack of support.⁶⁶

FDR’s failure against the Supreme Court shook his confidence to the point that he disregarded any discussion of “us” and focused solely on “me.” Rosenman noted, when discussing the Court-packing plan, that FDR “felt very confident — almost ‘cocky’ — that he would win, and was in no mood for compromise.”⁶⁷ FDR no longer had confidence at that level, leading him to make all issues personal, changing the “us vs. them” tactic into “me vs. them.” FDR emphasized “me” since the 1936 election, as one can see in a conversation FDR had with Raymond Moley, a speechwriter, in 1936, “There’s one issue in this campaign... and people must be either *for me* or *against me*.”⁶⁸ It seems as though FDR placed greater emphasis on the people’s acceptance of him as the democratic dictator, and he attempted to capitalize on that with the Supreme Court. The failure undoubtedly linked that chat with this next one.

The “me vs. them” mentality amplified in the 1938 Congressional elections, including the emphasis on the democratic dictator, as FDR saw Congress’ rejection of his proposal towards the Supreme Court as a rejection of himself. Rosenman asserts FDR reacted to his failure with the Supreme Court leading to what is now known as “Purging the Democratic Party.”⁶⁹ FDR could not place blame on the Supreme Court, but on the Congress that failed to pass the opinion FDR had

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put forth. It appeared that of those three horses, he lost control of two. He believed up until that point that he had control, more or less, of Congress, as his party had the overwhelming majority in both the Senate and House. In tandem with that, FDR saw himself as the head of the Democratic Party, separate from just president and saw it as his duty to direct their liberal agenda and profess its strengths.⁷⁰ As that leader of constructing and pushing the will of the Democratic Party, he saw their refusal to support his plan for the Supreme Court as a rejection of the Democratic Party's platform, of which many ran their election on in 1936.⁷¹ In FDR's eyes, if they rejected the platform, they rejected him as well.

FDR did not discredit the Congress for what it had accomplished, but criticized it for not doing more, specifically for not doing more to help him further his influence as democratic dictator. FDR first discussed the fact that the Congress had done nothing to aid the executive branch's attempt to reorganize itself.⁷² He referenced a bill introduced the previous year that would have expanded the power and responsibilities of the executive branch.⁷³ In other words, the Congress had halted his progress in expanding his power through the image of the democratic dictator. FDR saw the situation as so dire and so extreme that he likened his current situation then in 1938 to that of Lincoln. Reusing the term of "Copperheads," FDR claimed that never before, except during Lincoln's presidency, had there been such a concerted effort to stop progress.⁷⁴ Where in Lincoln's day the "Copperheads" wanted to stop progress in reuniting the nation, the "Copperheads" in 1938 wanted to stop FDR's progress at pushing his liberal ideas. They attacked FDR personally in an attempt to stop his efforts. His problem with the Supreme Court had now carried over to the Congress.

FDR consistently used the imagery attached to the "people's president" to justify the imagery and actions attached to the democratic dictator. FDR functioned as the tool to fix the problem of Congress,

which differed, positively to him, from his issue with the Supreme Court because he had at least some control of the process. In the case of the Democratic Party and Congress, he saw himself as separate from his presidency as the Party leader, as mentioned earlier. He would be the agent, on his own volition, to involve himself in the Congressional elections, "As the head of the Democratic party... I feel that I have every right to speak in those few instances where there may be a clear-cut issue between candidates for a Democratic nomination..."⁷⁵ FDR as democratic dictator spoke those lines. While he did take care to attempt to separate himself as the president taking this action by referring to himself as the head of the Democratic Party, FDR could not possibly believe the people would see any difference. By virtue of his position, he resigned to the fact that every action he took involved his presidency.

With his actions as democratic dictator established, FDR tempered those actions with the recognition that ultimately the people would decide and he would not do anything to jeopardize that. While his actions would have an effect, FDR said he knew "that neither in the summer primaries nor in the November elections will the American voters fail to spot the candidates whose ideas have given out."⁷⁶ It is an interesting confession, as FDR recognized that no matter what he did, short of violating the Constitution or changing it, he had no say in the ultimate decision. Again, as with the Supreme Court, FDR bet his image against what he wanted, believing it to be both strong and worth enough for the people to be both attached to it and accept what he said. FDR, as Dunn says, was "eager to exploit the precious capital of his prestige and the popular New Deal."⁷⁷ That capital had already taken a huge hit with the Supreme Court, and he had to use what he had left if he wanted to protect his ability to get what he wanted. Up until that point, the Congress almost served as an extension of his presidency, and without it, FDR would not be able to progress at the rate he would have liked.

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The public reacted similarly here as they did to FDR's attempt with the Supreme Court, rejecting the fact that he had tipped the balance between the democratic dictator and "people's president" in favor of the democratic dictator. Many letters voiced their surprise at FDR's attempted reach. The Levines provided a dozen or so letters, and only a few actually spoke to agreement with FDR. Of those that disagreed, they shared sentiment similar to this, "Don't let us down by using such a tactic so characteristic of the fascist-minded as Red-baiting."⁷⁸ The letters accused FDR of using cheap political tactics to gain votes in his favor. This seems to be another case, as with the Supreme Court, of FDR overestimating his political capital and what he could do with it. While the letters responded in that way, the Levines note that many elections that FDR involved himself and, especially those he involved himself most in, failed to go in FDR's favor.⁷⁹ The people chose to reelect those that FDR had deemed unfit for his Democratic Party.

FDR continued from his first term into the second with the narrative of both the democratic dictator and the "people's president," but failed to use them to the best of his ability. He overestimated the political capital gained by the narrative he created in his first term, which he believed the 1936 election confirmed, and attempted to expand the image of the democratic dictator while not compensating for its counterweight, the imagery of the "people's president." One might then assume that FDR would like to turn away from that image of the democratic dictator, or at least alter it in a way to be more favorable. While he did not take that action in his second term, FDR changed drastically in his third. It is difficult to determine whether the major failures in his second term had a great effect on that change; however, change still happened and in a major way.

In his third term, FDR changed the way he justified his actions as the "people's president" away from solely the United States to include the whole world. In his first and second terms, FDR focused

much of his attention on domestic issues, but he instead focused on international issues in his third term. One should note that this does not mean FDR abandoned domestic issues, as one will see in the fireside chat discussed later about coal miners striking. That change defined his third term. Before, in his first and second terms, FDR justified all his actions, end goals, and actions as necessary for the preservation of the United States. In his third term, however, FDR changed that end goal to the preservation of democracy. While FDR admitted democracy's preservation to be important for the United States as well, the United States only found itself as an implication in the far larger goal of preserving democracy in the entire world. While taking the entire world under his wing, FDR attempted to return balance back to his image and relationship with the people as both the democratic dictator and "people's president" that he had established previously in his first term.

FDR began restoring the balance jeopardized in his second term in his third inaugural, which contained no significant trace of the democratic dictator. He reduced his image so far, the speech contained only one instance where FDR spoke about himself by using first person language. The speech surrounded that one lone instance of "I" with FDR's use of "we." The use of "I" came where FDR said that he hoped the last few fruitful years, the years after the Great Depression, had removed people's great attachment to materialism.⁸⁰ That formed an integral part to democracy for FDR as for someone to wholly accept democracy, they had to reject greed and materialism otherwise they could not totally engross themselves in a common cause, which democracy needed. FDR said so in this inaugural, "We know [democracy] cannot die — because it is built on... an enterprise undertaken and carried through by the expression of a free majority."⁸¹ Democracy needed a concerted and collective effort by all, including everyone, even himself. As mentioned earlier, FDR used "we" instead of "I" throughout his entire address. He either

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spoke of “we know” or “the nation knows.” That language connected FDR and the people, something essential to the “people’s president.” That rounds out the essential theme of the inaugural: democracy thrived, however, external forces now threatened it, and the American people, out of a collective desire, had to come to democracy’s defense for the sake of men and freedom everywhere.⁸²

World War II began September of 1939, and with it the rise of fascism, communism, and others, which may help explain FDR’s near total rejection of the democratic dictator when he gave his inaugural a little over a year later.⁸³ FDR did not then begin to spout the importance of democracy in his third term, but one has seen that before, as FDR always appealed to the function of democracy as the final decision of what should happen, regardless of his personal belief. In every speech, he clearly stated the importance of democracy and his faith in the American people to use it correctly. The situation differed in his third term as now FDR had an identifiable group to point out as threatening democracy. In his first two terms, internal exploitations threatened democracy’s integrity, where now in his third an outside group stated they wanted to remove democracy in any form and replace it with their decidedly undemocratic systems.⁸⁴ In the first two terms, democracy itself still functioned, albeit poorly, in his third, those outside forces wanted to destroy it entirely. Therefore, even if in his inaugural FDR intended to turn away from the image of the democratic dictator for the time being, the events of World War II heightened his response, likely leading to the greater focus FDR gave to discussing democracy.

FDR returned to a more balanced image, like in his first term, beginning with a chat given after the attack on Pearl Harbor, which discussed the threats to democracy, allowing FDR to present himself as the agent to quell the threat for the people, and the world’s, sake. He first turned back to using the “us vs. them” tactic. It came in a different form than one previously saw, “Powerful and resourceful

gangsters have banded together to make war upon the whole human race.”⁸⁵ The “us” included the “whole human race,” whereas before it only referred to the American people. The “gangsters” attacked democracy, an inherent trait to human nature; therefore, the attack included the entire globe.⁸⁶ The “them” changed drastically as well. The purpose remained similar, to single out a group to lay blame on, but FDR’s approach to how he did it changed. He gave the outside attackers a far more deleterious image than he had given others in previous chats, referring to them as not just immoral or greedy but as “gangsters.” The group’s composition had changed drastically from previous chats as well. In his other chats, FDR targeted small sects of society, but now he contended with whole countries like Germany and Japan. One could argue those countries represented only a small sect of the world, but one cannot deny that the scale of FDR’s targeting had far larger implications than any time before. Always though, as one will see, FDR placed the American people at the heart of his efforts. However, FDR undoubtedly included the entire free world in his discussion. In a way, FDR laid far more responsibility at the feet of the people than ever before, as before a single nation was at stake — now the freedom of the world.⁸⁷

Within that framework of a clear, “us vs. them,” FDR returned to the images of himself, and the relationship he had with the people that he established in his first term, meaning that he returned to the balanced image between democratic dictator and “people’s president.” FDR had no doubt the government had to dictate the people to the best course of action in this time and reminded each individual of their duty to follow that direction, as to do so would be to protect democracy. With that said, FDR did not completely separate himself from the people as he specifically said in many occasions something similar to this, “the whole future of this nation — depend[s] upon the manner in which each and every one of us fulfills his obligation to our country.”⁸⁸ All people of the United States shared that effort; each

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assigned a set of roles to follow to ensure the future of the nation. While FDR names specifically the “nation,” meaning the United States, he undoubtedly included the entire world, as he had made clear earlier the situation put all nations at risk.

FDR always made it clear that the government, including himself, and the people had separate functions, but never rejected the image of the “people’s president,” as he created a dialogue of trust between the two parties working toward the same goal. Remembering what Stuckey says about FDR merging the identity of the government within himself, one can see the interaction between the two parts of FDR’s self-created image. FDR described a relationship of trust between the two parties, the people and the government, where the people held the ultimate power, “The government will put its trust in the... American people,” and if the people disagree with the government they “have every right to say so,” but FDR did not think “any American has any doubt of our ability to administer proper punishment...”⁸⁹ Again, FDR claimed himself, as the government, to be the tool the people chose to mete out justice. And as seen many times before, FDR reminded the people that they had the ability to rescind that choice, but ultimately, FDR had every confidence they would allow him to continue down his path. In essence, that example provides the perfect balance between democratic dictator and “people’s president.” FDR clearly had control of the direction the nation would go in, but at the same time, the people could show their disagreement and remove FDR — if they truly wanted to. The “people’s president” shines through when FDR conveyed his belief that the people have their trust in him anyway. In other words, he trusted them to trust him.

The people welcomed FDR’s attempt to rebalance his image, as many wrote accepting messages to the White House using similar language that FDR had used in his speech.⁹⁰ Of the twelve letters provided by the Levines, only one had something inherently negative to

say about FDR's speech, which expressed outrage about the fact that FDR gave no information to the particulars about the attack on Pearl Harbor.⁹¹ All of the other letters expressed positive reactions, many returning similar language that FDR used, "Your great speech last night prompts me to write to you and say how much I trust you..." and "I want you to know that your wish is our command."⁹² Another letter even detailed how when she listened to the speech, it sounded as if her father spoke to her and not the president, which points to what Stuckey discusses about how FDR gave himself a paternal role as leader of the government.⁹³ The people trusted FDR as the people's president and gave him the authority of the democratic dictator. FDR effectively persuaded them as he reestablished his image and easily transitioned the people from domestic to international issues, both of which had key roles in the protection of democracy.

FDR furthered that balanced image when he addressed the nation in another fireside chat in May of 1943 about striking coal miners. This chat offers unique insight into FDR's third term as it addressed a particular domestic group, the only fireside chat to do so of the fifteen he gave in his third term. Other chats discussed domestic issues, but they served as a way to inform the people of the war situation at home and abroad. This chat related directly to the war effort, but in a different way, as it discussed the risk of progress to the war. FDR showed his commitment to this new goal established in his third term of protecting democracy, as he would not even let a domestic threat go by. In doing so FDR offered a far more telling sign of his commitment to protecting democracy, as when targeting a domestic issue, as one saw in his second term, he risked the balance he had struck with the people. In the previous chat, and the inaugural before it, one could see that FDR put the people on a level playing field so they could collectively work toward his proposed end goal. Singling out a group could risk that balance, if FDR let the democratic dictator imagery tip the scales again. The chat differed from others

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in another way as well, because the issue did not matter. The chat served only to further FDR's rebalanced image, as before he gave the chat, the miners indicated they would go back to work, but FDR decided to go through with the speech anyway.⁹⁴ That gave FDR an enormous advantage, as he already knew the outcome to be decided, where the people might only assume that FDR's speech had convinced the mines to go back to work.

FDR also returned to the tact of using the traits of the "people's president to justify his actions as democratic dictator. FDR opened the chat by praising the American people for all the progress so far in the war effort. Following that, FDR condemned the miners, comparing their strike to that of the international threats, "This tremendous forward movement of the United States and the United Nations cannot be stopped by our enemies. And equally, it must not be hampered by any one individual or by the leaders of any one group here back home."⁹⁵ The miners had the potential to harm the war effort as much as the international groups. In other words, they threatened a crucial part of democracy, the collectivity of the nation. Then, in an interesting move, FDR used the traits of the democratic dictator to restore further balance with the "people's president." FDR said that the government had done all it could do to fix the problem, through things like wage fixing, but even they could only give the problem limited attention due to the war effort.⁹⁶ FDR interfered with the miners the most when he ordered the government to take over the mines, but the government could go no farther, meaning the people had to sort out the situation.⁹⁷ FDR turned the "us vs. them" strategy on its head. Before, he used it to gain the people's support in his solution, now he used it to give his support to the people. He put his trust in the American people to do the right thing by heeding "the clear call to duty..." and marching "shoulder to shoulder with our armed forces to victory."⁹⁸ FDR continued the mutual relationship with the people, implicating they served equal importance to those serving in

the military. In other words, he had confidence he would receive their trust back.

The letters the Levines provide offer no indication of whether the people received FDR's new balanced image in this chat or not. However, Buhite and Levy offer some kind of indication to the outcome in their brief introduction to the fireside chat. They portray the issue of the striking miners as a quarrel between FDR and a man named John L. Lewis, who led the United Mine Workers at the time. Buhite and Levy contest that the chat led to Lewis' ultimate loss to Roosevelt over the strike issue, as soon after FDR gave his chat, polls indicated "Lewis was one of the most hated men in America."⁹⁹ The chat's ultimate goal served to boost FDR's popularity essentially, as the issue was resolved before he gave the chat. Being able to defeat a major labor leader, it appears as though FDR garnered a reasonable amount of support.

FDR's balanced image in his third term serves as evidence to the fact that he learned from the mistakes he committed in his second term. World War II also played a significant role in how FDR approached his image as well. This made FDR's third term closely resemble his first, by creating the concurrence of his two seemingly separate images. They only differed in the separate means they served to fulfill to allow FDR to achieve whichever goal he wanted at the time. As in his first term, FDR returned to the tactic of using the democratic dictator as the agent through which the government would act, but then used the traits of the "people's president" to justify those actions. FDR had an easier time pointing to the "people's president" in his third term though, as he had created an end goal of democracy. At its very core, the idea of the "people's president" served to protect the idea of democracy; FDR turned to that reason for why what he proposed should happen. Coupled with the fact that in every speech FDR turned to the public and said he trusted them to choose the right path, to decide democratically the correct course of

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action, he had created a powerful counterweight for the actions he proposed as democratic dictator.

The journey explained here through FDR's image in his first three terms as president help to explain how FDR changed what it meant to be president and how he left a lasting legacy that still affects the United States today. In his first two terms, FDR had clear end goals in mind on specific policy issues, but in his third he concerned himself only with democracy, unaware of what the policies looked like. This forced FDR to have to adhere to the image he created far more than before, as his persuasion came almost entirely from the image he created. Specific policies grounded the first two terms with which he could use to persuade the public. In other words, FDR ultimately had something to fall back on besides just his image to persuade the public. His third term differed in that FDR did not necessarily have a particular issue to fall back on, as World War II defined the entire term as the sole issue, meaning that the people consistently looked specifically to FDR as an authoritative figure to lead the defense of democracy. Everything he discussed had to do with the war effort in some way. One can define FDR's first term as the rise of the balanced image of the democratic dictator and "people's president," his second as a rejection of that balance in favor of the democratic dictator, and third as the return and rebound to accepting the balanced image, where one sees it more completely than any other time he served as president. That journey and ultimate end result of balanced imagery proposed by FDR serve as a significant part in his lasting legacy, as many attribute the way we understand the presidency today to FDR's actions as president.

NOTES

¹ Davis W. Houck, *FDR and Fear Itself: The First Inaugural Address* (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), 61.

²Mary E. Stuckey, "FDR, the Rhetoric of Vision, and the Creation of a National Synoptic State" *Quarterly Journal of Speech* 98 no. 3, (Jul 2012), 307-308, 310.

³*Ibid.*, 297-298.

⁴ Jean Edward Smith, *FDR* (New York: Random House, 2007), 289-290.

⁵ David M. Kennedy, *Freedom From Fear: The American People in Depression and War, 1929-1945* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 117.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 290, 106-107; see also Conrad Black, *Franklin Delano Roosevelt: Champion of Freedom* (New York: Public Affairs, 2003), 264-267.

⁷ David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 107.

⁸ Jean Edward Smith, *FDR*, 291.

⁹ David M. Kennedy, *Freedom from Fear*, 104-105.

¹⁰ Conrad Black, *Champion of Freedom*, 258.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, 258-259.

¹² Jean Edward Smith, *FDR*, 238.

¹³ Samuel I. Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1952), 38-39.

¹⁴ Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine, *The People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR* (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), ix-xii.

¹⁵ It is difficult, then, to accurately assess the provided selection as an accurate representation of the public's reaction to any particular speech. Instead, one is often left accepting the Levines' analysis of the letters as they analyzed far more than the letters they provide.

¹⁶ Lawrence Levine and Cornelia Levine, *The People and the President*, 10.

¹⁷ Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 165-168, an example of FDR reversing his decision to pursue Chicago lawlessness; see also 195-198, where FDR received such a positive reaction to advocating advanced military preparedness that he addressed Congress much earlier than he would have without the reaction.

¹⁸ Leila A. Sussmann, "FDR and the White House Mail," *The Public Opinion Quarterly* 20 no. 1, (Spring 1956), 11.

¹⁹ Betty Houchin Winfield, *FDR and the News Media* (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 231.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, 40-42; 30; 35; see also Graham J. White, *FDR and the Press* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979), 132-133, where FDR publically attacked a Chicago newspaper editor that criticized one of his inaugurals as empty, dull, and simple, which the editor argued could be a sign of the coming term.

²¹ Betty Winfield, *FDR and the News Media*, 104.

²² Jean Edward Smith, *FDR*, 262-263.

²³ Davis W. Houck, *FDR and Fear Itself*, 102.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 50-51.

²⁵ Jean Edward Smith, *FDR*, 285-287.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, 302-303; see also James MacGregor Burns, *Roosevelt: The Lion and the Fox* (New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, Inc., 1956), 164.

²⁷ Houck, *FDR and Fear Itself*, 63.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, 61.

²⁹ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "First Inaugural Address" *bartleby.com*, <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres49.html>, para. 20.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, para. 22.

³¹ Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy, *FDR's Fireside Chats* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 12.

³² *Ibid.*, xviii.

³³ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Banking Crisis," in *FDR's Fireside Chats*, eds. Russell D.

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Buhite and David W. Levy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 16.

³⁴Ibid., 17.

³⁵Mary Stuckey, "Rhetoric of Vision," 311.

³⁶Ibid., 307-308, 310.

³⁷Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Banking Crisis," 13.

³⁸Lawrence Levine and Cornelia Levine, *The People and the President*, 34-35.

³⁹Mr. and Mrs. F.B. Graham, personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 13, 1933, in *The People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR*, eds. Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 36.

⁴⁰Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The New Deal's First Two Months," in *FDR's Fireside Chats*, eds. Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 21.

⁴¹Ibid., 20.

⁴²Ibid., 27.

⁴³Lawrence Levine and Cornelia Levine, *The People and the President*, 67-77.

⁴⁴James J. Dunn, personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 16, 1933, in *The People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR*, eds. Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 68.

⁴⁵Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy, *FDR's Fireside Chats*, 45-46.

⁴⁶Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Purging the Democratic Party," in *FDR's Fireside Chats*, eds. Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 134.

⁴⁷Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Answering the Critics," in *FDR's Fireside Chats*, eds. Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 48-49.

⁴⁸Ibid., 49.

⁴⁹Ibid., 49.

⁵⁰Lawrence Levine and Cornelia Levine, *The People and the President*, 97-107.

⁵¹Jean Edward Smith, *FDR*, 287.

⁵²Ibid., 349.

⁵³Ibid., 374.

⁵⁴Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Second Inaugural Address" *bartleby.com*, <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres50.html>, para. 2.

⁵⁵Mary Stuckey, "Rhetoric of Vision," 307-308, 310.

⁵⁶Ibid., para. 8.

⁵⁷Ibid., para 31.

⁵⁸Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 144.

⁵⁹Kenneth S. Davis, *FDR: Into the Storm 1937-1940* (New York: Random House, 1993), 42-47.

⁶⁰Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 144.

⁶¹The nullification of the gold clause was important to FDR's actions with the Banking Crisis, which his first fireside chat covered. It forced privately owned gold, specifically from the banks, to be surrendered to the federal government in return for U.S. dollars; see also Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Defending the Plan to 'Pack' the Supreme Court," in *FDR's Fireside Chats*, eds. Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 85.

⁶²Ibid., 86.

⁶³Ibid., 95.

⁶⁴Eugene S. Simmons, personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, March 17, 1937, in *The*

People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR, eds. Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 177; see also Erwin Clarkson Garrett, personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, in *The People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR*, eds. Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 184-185.

⁶⁵Kenneth Davis, *Into the Storm*, 75.

⁶⁶*Ibid.*, 95-96.

⁶⁷Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 160.

⁶⁸Susan Dunn, *Roosevelt's Purge* (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 29.

⁶⁹Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 178; historians agree as well, see: Dunn, *Roosevelt's Purge*, 29; see also: Jean Edward Smith, *FDR*, 411.

⁷⁰Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Purging the Democratic Party," 134.

⁷¹Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 178-179; see also, Dunn, *Roosevelt's Purge*, 29-30.

⁷²Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Purging the Democratic Party," 126.

⁷³Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy, *FDR's Fireside Chats*, 126 n. 2.

⁷⁴Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Purging the Democratic Party," 130.

⁷⁵*Ibid.*, 134.

⁷⁶*Ibid.*, 135.

⁷⁷Susan Dunn, *Roosevelt's Purge*, 30.

⁷⁸Timothy Burr and Mary Burr, personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, June 24, 1938, in *The People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR*, eds. Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 261.

⁷⁹Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine, *The People and the President*, 255-256.

⁸⁰Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Third Inaugural Address" *bartleby.com*, <http://www.bartleby.com/124/pres51.html>, para. 10.

⁸¹*Ibid.*, para. 15.

⁸²*Ibid.*, para. 34-38.

⁸³Jean Edward Smith, 434.

⁸⁴Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 269. Rosenman notes that FDR's initial motivation was due mainly to the rise of the Nazis. FDR believed their actions were an attack on democracy.

⁸⁵Franklin D. Roosevelt, "War with Japan," in *FDR's Fireside Chats*, eds. Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 134.

⁸⁶Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Third Inaugural Address," para. 24.

⁸⁷Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 313, "The war was not about Pearl Harbor; it involved matters more fundamental than Pearl Harbor; it involved civilization itself."

⁸⁸Franklin D. Roosevelt, "War with Japan," 201.

⁸⁹*Ibid.*, 200, 201, 204.

⁹⁰Kenneth S. Davis, *FDR: The War President 1940-1943* (New York: Random House, 2000), 349.

⁹¹J. T. Dahlstrom and N. N. Quinn, personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 9, 1941, in *The People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR*, eds. Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 405.

⁹²James W. Densford, personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 10, 1941, in *The People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR*, eds. Lawrence W.

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Levine and Cornelia R. Levine (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 401; see also Marilyn Schissel, personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 10, 1941, in *The People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR*, eds. Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 402.

⁹³ Mamie O. Tew, personal letter to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 10, 1941, in *The People and the President: America's Conversation with FDR*, eds. Lawrence W. Levine and Cornelia R. Levine (Boston: Beacon Press, 2002), 403-404; see also, Mary E. Stuckey, 307-308.

⁹⁴ Samuel Rosenman, *Working with Roosevelt*, 380.

⁹⁵ Franklin D. Roosevelt, "Dealing with Striking Coal Miners," in *FDR's Fireside Chats*, eds. Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2010), 251; see also 253, "There can be no one among us — no one faction — powerful enough to interrupt the forward march of our people to victory."

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, 254-255.

⁹⁷ *Ibid.*, 252-253.

⁹⁸ *Ibid.*, 256.

⁹⁹ Russell D. Buhite and David W. Levy, *FDR's Fireside Chats*, 250.



CITY OF INDUSTRY: PORTLAND GASCO BUILDING BY HARRY BLAKEMAN

**SOCIALISTS VS. SOCIALITES:
THE CLASS AND IDEOLOGICAL DISPUTE DURING
THE SHIRTWAIST MAKERS' STRIKE OF 1909**

■
BY VICTORIA BANDA

In the Fall of 1909, 20,000 working women stood on the brink of one of the largest strikes in New York garment district history. They grew tired of the horrible factory conditions and of unfair wages and hours. Factory owners took advantage of them for cheap labor, and most unions in the garment district were male-dominated and did not support the idea of women's labor reform. On November 22, 1909, with the backing of the Socialist Party of New York and the Women's Trade Union League (WTUL), the 20,000 shirtwaist makers, representative of hundreds of companies, joined together to fight until their demands were met. The unfortunate timing of the strike meant that many spent their holiday season with less income and no results. However, in cooperation with the Socialist Party, the Women's Trade Union League, and an unlikely supporter — New York's upper-class women — the shirtwaist makers settled with factory owners the following February.

Historians have studied the relationship of New York's upper-class women and the Socialist Party in the past, but most have argued that class and ideological differences were set aside for solidarity in the cause. Other historians often side with the Socialist supporters of the strike, discrediting the upper class for their involvement. This dynamic is what first attracted my attention to the topic, however, after extensive research I developed a view of these two groups that was different from anything I had read. Although some historians have argued that it was the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 that broke down class and ideological differences for a common goal, the strike brought the underlying class tensions to the surface through the dispute between the Socialists and the upper class. The magnitude of media coverage and public spectacle of the strike brought ideologically opposite supporters, Anne Morgan and the Socialist Party, face

to face. Despite Socialists' negative attitudes toward her, Anne Morgan continued to help the Shirtwaist Strikers until the very end. Her unceasing support proves that she cared more about the strikers and their efforts than she did about others' opinions of her.

The Industrial Revolution in the United States (roughly 1820-1870) brought new innovation to almost every industry starting with agricultural innovations and eventually reaching large cities in terms of textiles and other personal luxuries. Prior to the vast availability of factory jobs in the early 1900s, the most common job for young women who wished to postpone or decline their family claim was domestic service.¹ However, as cities continued to grow and as young women left home without being married, their interest in factory work spiked. Factories opened a new door for young women who did not want to start a family or work as a servant in someone else's home. With the turn of the twentieth century also came large waves of immigrants, mostly from Eastern Europe.² New York's garment district flourished during this time period. However, as the textile factories grew, so did the crowded tenement housing in poor areas of the city. Conditions worsened and many middle-class young women who wished to pursue occupations outside of domestic work followed in the footsteps of Jane Addams, one of the first women to start and run a settlement house in the slums of Chicago.³ The Settlement House Movement that arose from her example began an era of charity houses run by unmarried women seeking to help those who lived in the poorest and most unsanitary areas of the largest cities in the United States. But the longer the settlement women stayed with these poor communities, they came to the realization that they must initiate structural changes on a larger scale to help them. From the settlement houses came the first attempts at labor reform. Some changes saw success, some did not, but nonetheless their goals demonstrated progressive ideas.

The Progressive Era, which spanned from the 1890s through

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World War I in 1914, began as a response to the political and economic corruption that had come with industrialization. Businesses no longer reflected what was once regarded as family owned and operated in the past, but had grown into monstrous machines of cheap labor and corporate profit. In April of 1901 the world witnessed the creation of the largest corporate entity on Earth; the first billion-dollar corporation, United States Steel.⁴ Many other companies rapidly grew with the turn of the twentieth century, but the conditions in which their employees worked and lived remained the same or declined. The motives of the Progressive Era encompassed ideals such as fair wages, fair hours, and the right to unionize in pursuit of such goals. Many of the women who dedicated their time to settlement houses in the late 1800s and through the beginning of the twentieth century followed the Progressive Era into the public sphere. The New York Shirtwaist Makers' Strike took place in 1909, at the height of the Progressive Era, and brought together two groups that differed greatly in ideologies.

The most interesting aspect of the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike, and the focus of my paper, lies in the relationship between the Socialist Party and the wealthy upper-class supporters. The very definition of Socialism set the stage for class struggle in the impending strike. Socialist writer H. Quelch of *The New York Call* described Socialism in his 1910 article "What is Socialism," stating, "Socialism means that the land, the railways, the shipping, the mines, the factories and all such things as are necessary for the production of the necessities and comfort of life should be public property."⁵ Socialists, in this context, believed in cooperation and equal work and reward for everyone in terms of the production of a product from start to finish. By contrast, Capitalism promoted the idea of private ownership in order to gain wealth. Nineteenth-century Capitalism encountered almost no government intervention. By the turn of the twentieth century, only a handful of wealthy families in the United States owned an

overwhelming majority of existing companies.⁶ Socialism, as a general ideology, resulted as a response to the inequities of the expanding Capitalist society and the subsequent growing gap between the very rich and the very poor.⁷ Socialist thought responded to these problems through the belief that the government should own all means of production and distribution. Ideally, public possession of companies would allow for fair wages and fair hours because employees would be under government regulation instead of private possession and control. These ideas stood in stark contrast to the lifestyles of the upper-class women who joined in the efforts of the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike. One woman in particular, Anne Morgan, joined the Women's Trade Union League to lend her support early in the strike. However, to the majority of the Socialist Party, Anne Morgan epitomized Capitalism and its corruption.

Anne Morgan, born in 1873 in Manhattan, was the daughter of wealthy financier J.P. Morgan and his wife, Frances Tracy. Known as the founder of J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, J.P. Morgan made the majority of his wealth through financing the consolidation of the United States' largest steel and electric companies.⁸ Anne Morgan, educated privately at home in New York with her sister, was greatly shielded from the outside world. From an early age she disagreed with her father on many topics including the division of parishioners in their church by class.⁹ As a young woman she admired the lives and work of the settlement house women. For Anne's place and time, the example that these women set gave a refreshingly new view on class and gender roles. However, due to her family's wishes and status she took a more hands off approach to philanthropy. Like many other wealthy young women, the majority of her help was monetary. The fortune of her successful Capitalist father acted as both her safeguard and hindrance. Although intrigued by a fully philanthropic lifestyle, never marrying meant that Anne Morgan depended on her father's financial support. Subsequently, her actions reflected on the Morgan

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family as a whole, greatly influencing her words and actions. Anne Morgan's involvement in the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike revealed the conflict of her family's Capitalistic lifestyle with her own philanthropic values as well as with the Socialist Party.

The Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 was a significant event within the Progressive Era, however the works that have been written about the strike often provide the same general theses. As one of the better-known historians focusing on the Progressive Era, Nancy Schrom Dye wrote many books discussing the roles of race, gender, and class within the reforms of the era. However, like many of her colleagues, Dye's work *As Equals and As Sisters* analyzes the roles of the working class, the upper-class women, and their solidarity.¹⁰ Dye makes compelling arguments about this dynamic in the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909, but her work left me questioning the role of the Socialist Party. Though her notes indicate some use of Socialist sources, she uses them without questioning or acknowledging the bias in such sources. Her analysis demonstrates a good understanding of two of the major groups involved in the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike, but begs the question of the role of the Socialist Party.

Mari Jo Buhle, another well-known Women's Historian, focused on the role of Socialism within the Progressive Era in her book *Women and American Socialism, 1870-1920*.¹¹ However, because Buhle covers a fifty-year span in her book, the amount of analysis dedicated to the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike is small. She paints a picture of the Socialist Party as a servant to the strike rather than a leader.¹² Nevertheless, Buhle *does* offer a Socialist point of view. Her analysis uses a majority of Socialist sources, including *The New York Call*, but similar to Dye's book, she does not consider the bias of Socialist sources. Both books offer interesting ideas about the Progressive Era and the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike, but left me asking about the roles of *both* the Socialist Party and the upper class as well as how each was depicted during the strike.

The Women's Trade Union League not only contributed greatly to the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 through generous investment of time and money, but it also encouraged and invited the upper-class women of New York to join the cause. On a national level, the Women's Trade Union League was founded in Boston in 1903.¹³ Men dominated most industries and women's labor reform interests were discriminated against and seen as unimportant. The necessity for women's labor reform invoked the inception of the Women's Trade Union League. The women who founded the Women's Trade Union League were all too familiar with the disadvantages women faced. The women in charge of the creation of the league encompassed those who had been involved in the Settlement House Movement, middle and upper-class advocates of social justice, and working union women.¹⁴ This previous alliance carried into the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909. By February of 1904, the Women's Trade Union League established the New York branch. Only five years after its establishment, New York's WTUL became a driving force behind the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike.

Although the Women's Trade Union League of New York experienced many leaders in its fifty-year run, Mary Dreier led the league through the landmark Shirtwaist Makers' Strike and set the tone for the WTUL's success. Her sister, Margaret Dreier Robins, assumed the role of president for the New York branch from its inception until 1906, when she relocated to Chicago and became president of both the Chicago branch and the National Women's Trade Union League.¹⁵ Mary Dreier took over the responsibility of president for the New York branch in 1906 and held that title until 1914. Before she filled the position, Mary Dreier participated in a number of philanthropic activities, but never gave herself fully to one cause. In 1904 she enrolled as student at the New York School of Philanthropy and two years later she took over her sister's role as president of the Women's Trade Union League of New York.¹⁶ Her time as president envelopes

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one of the most important labor reform efforts of the early twentieth century, the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909. Her role in the strike was crucial. Among other things, Mary Dreier collected donations for the cause, escorted girl strikers to special events, and organized arbitration meetings. She played a key role in the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike and her presence during that crucial year cannot be overstated because she committed herself whole-heartedly to one cause for the first time in her philanthropic career.

Unlike Mary Dreier, Leonora O'Reilly played a dual role in the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike. She brought preexisting Socialist ideals to her role as vice president of New York's WTUL. She served with Mary Dreier throughout the strike, but was only elected months before the pickets began. Once a shirtwaist maker herself, she fell victim to long 10-hour workdays and longed for changes in factory wages and conditions.¹⁷ In her early pursuit of labor reform, O'Reilly turned to the Henry Street Settlement, a settlement house in Manhattan run by middle-class women and nurses with financial support from wealthy benefactors. It was in that settlement that O'Reilly began to make connections with and befriend middle and upper-class social reformers. They paid for her to receive an education and when O'Reilly graduated in 1900, she was equipped with both the passion for change and the education necessary to continue in labor reform.¹⁸ She assumed the role of vice president of New York's WTUL in 1909 and remained in that position until 1914.¹⁹ Her motivation and enthusiasm while vice president was not subtle. A great orator in her own right, she attended and spoke at nearly forty events on behalf of the New York's WTUL in less than a year.²⁰ Leonora O'Reilly became one of the more interesting characters of the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike in that her past had led her concurrently to Socialism and to alliance with the women of higher socio-economic standing. The Shirtwaist Makers' Strike challenged the coming together of O'Reilly's ideals and past mentors. Although in O'Reilly's

past, Socialist ideals and upper-class benefactors worked together in her favor, the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 and overall progressive climate brought underlying tensions to the surface.

The Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 began with a single incident of unrest. No worker or employee imagined that a small division in the Triangle Shirtwaist Company would lead to the first successful uprising of women's labor reform in New York. Women within the shop were most divided by union women and women in the company's "Employee Association for Loyal Workers."²¹ The union women, however, posed no large threat. Most belonged to the Local 25, a local division of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, but the small union division "had never really gotten off the ground among New York shirtwaist makers."²² Shortly after a disagreement between the Employee Association and the Triangle Shirtwaist owners, the women were told that the company would like to cooperate with the union and asked which women belonged.²³ About 150 women came forward and were subsequently fired, but told that the industry demand had dropped and they were no longer needed. Soon after, however, help wanted ads were placed in search of new shirtwaist makers and the women knew their positions had been wrongfully terminated based on their union membership.²⁴ Similar situations began happening at other factories in the city and small pickets became commonplace outside many factories. An opportunity presented itself to bring all shirtwaist makers together in a common goal, but the support offered by a wide array of the public was unprecedented.

New York's Women's Trade Union League stepped in to help during the crucial point between small pickets and full strike. Not only did the WTUL women offer their own money and support, but also their appeal to upper-class society garnered more money and resources for the strikers. They immediately became a valuable resource for the strikers. On November 22, 1909, all those who had

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already picketed and those who had since joined the Local 25 gathered at Cooper Union meeting hall. After many hours of anticipation on the part of union members, Clara Lemlich, a 19-year-old shirt-waist maker, “asked for the floor and called for a strike vote.”²⁵ This event, nicknamed the Uprising of the 20,000, began on November 24, 1909.²⁶ The walkout and subsequent strike resulted from a culmination of dissatisfaction with long hours, poor wages, and anti-unionism of factory owners. New York’s WTUL became the lead organization in support of the Shirtwaist Makers’ strike due in large part to the membership and funds of Anne Morgan as well as other wealthy society women.

Although the WTUL emerged as the head of the strike, the Socialist Party proved to be another key entity in the effort. However, unlike the WTUL, the Socialist Party disagreed greatly with upper-class involvement because they believed the working class alone must accomplish labor reform. The Socialist Party, though heavily involved in labor reform did not have a public voice until 1909. *The New York Call*, which had been in business for only about one year before the strike, published many articles similar to those in *The New York Times*, *The New York Tribune*, and *The New York Sun*, but with an appeal to Socialists and the working class. Vital to Socialist ideals, *The New York Call* thrived during the Shirtwaist Makers’ Strike. However, the newspaper’s motto alone set the stage for class and ideological dispute. On the front page of every *New York Call* newspaper read: “The emancipation of the Working Class must be accomplished by the workers themselves.”²⁷ This statement alluded to the idea that if the working class wanted success, they would have to work together, but only within their own class. The general tone of *The New York Call* did not favor upper-class involvement and their articles reflect disdain and distrust, but that did not stop Anne Morgan from entering the strike through her membership in the WTUL.

The New York Call’s coverage of the Cooper Union Meeting ex-

pressed a stronger Socialist tone than that of the newspapers more readily available to the public. Though their general information was the same, certain tactics were used to appeal to Socialist interest and public sympathy. During the strike, *The Call* was sold by strikers on the street as a way of raising money for the cause. By selling the paper on the street, *The Call* was subjecting itself to public and not just Socialist eyes. The result was a newspaper that published both factual and heart-pulling accounts of events. The *Call's* first widely publicized article, "The Cooper Union Meeting," started like many of the other New York papers' articles, but took a turn for public sympathy in the end with comments on Clara Lemlich.²⁸ She was described as a "frail little girl" with a "tremulous voice" who had to be lifted onto the stage.²⁹ This was a far cry from the *New York Sun's* article, in which Lemlich was described as a 19-year-old young woman who stood up and asked that a vote be taken immediately. The *Call's* appeal to sympathy was at play in their carefully worded passages. If they could get at least some portion of the general public to read their paper, then the likelihood of public opinion being in favor of the strike would be drastically heightened by how their articles were phrased. If they portrayed the strikers as strong women, readers would perceive them as less innocent and able to fend for themselves. Portrayed as children, Socialists grasped a larger audience willing to support the strike. *The New York Call* used its powerful messages not only to paint the strikers as desperate children, but also to fight against the upper-class women involved.

Socialist presence within the strike became clearer as the picket lines continued. Within the first three weeks of the strike, the first arbitration meeting took place between representatives of the manufacturers and of the strikers. Morris Hillquit, a prominent member of the Socialist Party and labor lawyer, was chosen as one of the men to represent the strikers in their arbitration.³⁰ Immediately, the Women's Trade Union League was offering what they could, includ-

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ing “giving up its entire building for the use of the uptown strikers.”³¹ While working class shirtwaist makers picketed, members of the middle and upper class mustered money and sympathy from the general public. Anne Morgan first entered the Shirtwaist Makers’ strike when she and other upper-class society women of New York invited strikers to come to the Colony Club and give first-hand accounts of their experiences.³² Though the initial arbitration did not accomplish anything, the first public meeting of all those involved in the strike took place on December 13, 1909 at the Grand Central Palace.³³ In the few days between the initial arbitration meeting and this larger meeting, more than \$1,500 had been collected for the strike, mostly large donations from the wealthy. With the meeting at the Colony Club scheduled for December 15 and donations of wealthy benefactors on the rise, Anne Morgan’s importance had yet to be defined, but the public would soon witness her desire to help.

Socialist fears about the strike began on December 14, 1909 when the first newspaper article to feature Anne Morgan as an involved member in the strike was published in *The New York Times*. Entitled “Miss Morgan Aids Girl Waist Strikers,” the media focused on her contribution and support.³⁴ This was Anne Morgan’s big ‘coming out’ as a supporter of both the strike and the WTUL. Many other wealthy supporters had given their donations and were publicly recognized in *The New York Tribune* along with the amount of their donations. Very generous donors, including Mrs. C.P. Huntington, who gave \$1,000 to the cause within its first few weeks, never seemed to be involved or mentioned except in small publicities of their donations.³⁵ Anne Morgan, however, stood out among her peers when it was publicized that she had become “a recent applicant for membership in the Women’s Trade Union League.”³⁶ Before the strikers had an opportunity to speak at the Colony Club, Anne Morgan gave herself to the cause. Public opinion of her would have been swayed through the publication of this article. The article continues to praise Anne

Morgan, stating “[her] application for membership means that Miss Morgan is interested in the attempt these girls are making for their own betterment.”³⁷ From a Socialist point of view, this was not ideal. Anne Morgan, a Capitalist by blood and a public philanthropist, was getting the first and most noticeable credit for being in support of the strike. As a collective group, the Socialist party would have to be careful how they related to Anne Morgan. If they made public sentiments of disdain, it could sway wealthy sympathizers to stop contributing. Because Anne Morgan was being viewed by the public as a ‘first responder’ to the strike, members of the Socialist Party had to keep their potential negative sentiments out of the hands of the general public, those who would be reading *The Times*, *The Tribune*, or *The Sun*. However, the general public would have seen this article, its praise of Morgan, and Anne Morgan’s own words regarding the strike:

I have only known something of this strike for a short time and I find other people to whose attention it has not been brought do not know anything about it. If we come to recognize these conditions we can’t live our lives without doing something to help them, bringing them at least the support of public opinion.³⁸

As the daughter of a wealthy and successful banker, Anne Morgan knew the power of public opinion. She was mentioned in countless newspaper articles throughout her life even if just to mention her attendance at a play or public event. Where she went and what she did seemed to matter to the general public and publication of “Miss Morgan Aids Girl Waist Strikers” fed readers the entertaining information they desired with the added plug of sympathy for the Shirtwaist Makers’ Strike.

Anne Morgan continued her crusade for strike sympathy by inviting girl strikers to come to the Colony Club and tell members first-hand accounts of their treatment in both factory and picket line settings. The goal was to gain more upper-class support for the Shirt-

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waist Makers' Strike and ultimately bring in more donations. Anne Morgan was all too familiar with the mindset of wealthy women. She knew that if they could be convinced that the strike was a just cause, their donations would be very generous.³⁹ After all, the women of the Colony Club were some of the richest women in the country. The Colony Club opened in March of 1907 as a women's socialite club, replicating the many gentlemen's clubs that had come before it. When it opened, it drew much attention from the press. *The New York Times* went so far as to describe the detailed interior features, the meal that was prepared for the opening, and the dues expected of members — \$150 initiation fee and \$100 annual dues.⁴⁰ In the two years that the Colony Club existed before the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike began, the knowledge of its members and their socio-economic statuses would have been commonplace. When the girl strikers were invited to the Colony Club to share their experiences, the gesture would not have been seen as small. New York newspapers had already written about the invitation itself in many articles. The Colony Club, the Women's Trade Union League, strikers, and onlookers had waited in anticipation for the event and the afternoon had finally arrived.

On December 15, 1909, WTUL President Mary Dreier did what was considered unthinkable to the Socialist Party; she personally escorted twelve strikers to the exclusive Colony Club. During the strike, public perception was crucial. The various groups involved in the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike were co-dependent whether it was realized or not. If Socialists were too harsh towards the upper class, the loss in funding could cause the strike effort to fail. If the upper class was not careful, their words or actions against Socialists could deter many strikers in favor of Socialism, tarnishing their philanthropic images. Media presentation and public opinion affected how these groups related to the strikers. When the strikers arrived at the Colony Club gymnasium, which was set up for the event, they were

ushered to the front row where special seats had been reserved for them.⁴¹ General public opinion would have viewed this as a sign of solidarity between the classes, but Socialists would have seen right through it; in any other setting, the strikers would have been considered second class citizens to these types of women, but because of the circumstances and public eye on the event, solidarity and union was the best message to send. Once seated and introduced by strike arbitrator John Mitchell, Mary Dreier nudged a girl striker sitting next to her. It was Clara Lemlich, the same young woman who had stood up at the Cooper Union Meeting to call for a vote for the strike.⁴² A stout, younger girl, who made a short and concise statement about her wage, followed. The others followed suit and each story, regardless of length or detail, was heard. After they had finished speaking, a collection was taken by passing around baskets. Before the strikers left the Colony Club that day, they had raised \$1,300 just from the women present at the event, proving, at least monetarily, that the strike had support from the upper class.⁴³

In the opinion of popular newspapers, the meeting of upper-class society women and working-class women at the prestigious Colony Club had gone off without a hitch. The women were cordial and ideological class differences did not seem to matter. To the Socialists, however, they made a world of difference. New York's Socialist newspaper, *The Call*, also published an article about the events at the Colony Club. Their article offers a different view of the event on December 15. Within the first line of the article, the meeting is deemed as having been "one that was as peculiar as it was interesting, and as unique as it was pathetic."⁴⁴ This line sets the tone for the remainder of the article. They mention four socialite women by name, including Anne Morgan, but as a whole the group was referred to as "the cream of the 400," referring to those in the upper reaches of the 400 most wealthy families in America.⁴⁵ Compared to the descriptions of the event given by general interest newspapers,

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The Call, was not afraid to use theatrical language in order to get their point across, calling the strikers “enslaved by Capitalism.”⁴⁶ This phrase referenced the idea of wage slavery, which described the working class as quasi-slaves in their livelihoods due to poor wages. After comparing the plainness of WTUL president Mary Dreier to the embellished audience of the Colony Club, wage slavery is mentioned again, but more directly in the context of the working class girls being “wage slaves” of the current system.⁴⁷ Surprisingly, *The Call* article does not mention Clara Lemlich’s presence and participation as did *The New York Sun* article did. What was the purpose of omitting her name? Had she made such a name for herself in the strike that if she had been mentioned as having attended the meeting at the Colony Club, it would have made the event less easy to mock? Socialists were clearly skeptical of upper-class women’s intent. While the women of the Colony Club and Anne Morgan herself were trying to portray themselves as transcending class boundaries for the cause, the Socialists at *The Call* made it a point of their article to emphasize the “struggle between the classes,” including differences in general appearance.⁴⁸ However, the biggest statement made by the article came in the form of a simple sentence: “After the meeting the girls and the women of the league were taken down to tea.”⁴⁹ Though seemingly uncomplicated, this statement at the end of their article is the most subliminal accusatory sentence. Both *The New York Times* and *The New York Sun* printed their articles on the same day as *The Call*, but each of the general interest papers mentioned that \$1,300 was collected at the Colony Club meeting to benefit the strikers.⁵⁰ *The Call*, however, mentions no baskets filled to the brim or open purses. Socialists disdained the upper class and thus publishing the generous donations of the Colony Club women would not only praise the upper class, but would also make the members of the Socialist Party out to be critics of good people. Omitting the Colony Club’s large donation was one of the ways in which Socialists

could influence public opinion against the women. Published propaganda was the most powerful tool for the Socialists since New York's WTUL was the dominant figure in all other newspapers, but they also had to be somewhat censored. They, as well as the general public, knew that a large portion of donations came from the upper class. Regardless of class differences, if *The Call* were to chastise them for their donations, then the Socialist Party would have been viewed in a negative light. The admission that strikers had been invited to the Colony Club was enough. By omitting the donations given, the Socialists at *The Call* began to form an idea of the upper-class women as generous to a point, but given the chance, they would rather give strikers tea than money.

The Socialist Party simultaneously helped the Shirtwaist Makers' efforts and discredited Anne Morgan's involvement through their newspaper publication, *The New York Call*. While many general interest papers such as *The Times*, *Sun*, or *Tribune* portrayed more neutral views of strike events, *The Call* appealed to Socialists and potential Socialist sympathizers alike. Arguably the best source of Socialists' negative sentiments toward Anne Morgan, Theresa Malkiel's *Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker* details the everyday events of the strike in a propagandized fashion.⁵¹ Until recent decades, Malkiel's diary was dismissed as nothing more than propaganda, but as it remains in the public eye of many historians, its underlying Socialist message and meaning has become more clear.

Theresa Malkiel possessed particular resentment toward upper-class Capitalists. Prior to her days as a Socialist leader and propagandist, Malkiel worked in a textile factory.⁵² She fulfilled what I consider a Socialist American dream: she rose from the factory to become a Socialist leader able to help those still under the plight of Capitalism. During the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 Malkiel was not a factory worker, nor was she on the picket line. However, in *The Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker*, she takes on the persona of a young, dis-

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advantaged factory worker. Originally published in the daily editions of *The Call*, these diary entries pulled at the heartstrings of those who read them.⁵³ Malkiel's striker persona spoke of hardships faced during the strike with Socialist messages throughout, some more subtle than others. Nevertheless, *The Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker* held powerful messages that, if not read with caution, could easily misinform both Socialists and strike sympathizers.

Although the strike had only been called on November 22, 1909, evidence from the diary entry on November 26 shows that already many Socialists were uneasy about initial publicity, but ultimately had no qualms about the upper class. In the first half of the entry, Theresa Malkiel's striker persona questions the presence of college-educated and wealthy women on the picket line. However, in stark contrast to later months, her comments are not entirely negative. She asserts that the women came out to help because "their conscience pricks them a bit" and they feel bad for having money while others are less fortunate.⁵⁴ From these first sentiments of allied help, there appears to be no recognition or resentment of women who are pompous or unwelcome in the strike effort. However, only four days into the strike, alliance with the most wealthy, including Anne Morgan was not yet established. *The New York Times* publicly recognized Anne Morgan's involvement on December 14 with the article entitled "Miss Morgan Aids Girl Waist Strikers."⁵⁵ With almost three weeks standing between Malkiel's initial reaction and the announcement of Anne Morgan's support, what is written seems rather subdued. On November 26, the biggest problem according to the diary entry was that general New York newspapers were not reporting the picket line events correctly and that was most likely because the owners of the newspapers wanted to remain on the "good side" of factory owners and bosses.⁵⁶ Despite Socialist views of the upper class, no evidence appears in this early entry from *The Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker* that supports that educated and wealthy women

were unwanted.

Although not perceived as unwelcome to the strike effort in the first week, the following weeks seemed to weigh heavily on Theresa Malkiel's striker persona, and Anne Morgan's emergence into the strike does not sit well with her. On December 17, an entry appeared in which the fictional striker had attended the meeting at the Colony Club. Immediately, the entry shows discontent with the idea of having even been there. The entry mentions tables of food and Anne Morgan by name (a first occurrence), stating that her presence did not add anything special to the event.⁵⁷ Depending on the readership of *The Call* at the time, this statement had two possible objectives. First, for a Socialist audience, this statement appears as a cautionary tale. For strikers compelled by Socialist ideals, but awed by the funding of the wealthy, the statement offers a "first hand" view of the upper class. Essentially, the message that the Socialist Party wanted to get across to its members was that the upper class had nothing of lasting value to offer the strike. For those who were not members of the Socialist Party, but were buying the paper in support of the strikers, the message is also cautionary, but in a different way. To those simultaneously reading *The Call* and *The Times* for example, *The Call's* underlying message was to avoid being fooled by the other newspaper's portrayal of the upper class; in reality, they were nothing special.

The Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker also contains messages of guilt for those who actually attended the meeting at the Colony Club or those who remained unbothered by the presence of the upper class in the strike. Malkiel's striker persona admits, "I couldn't forgive myself for sitting at this rich board; my place was with the girls who can't even afford a bit of butter to moisten their bread."⁵⁸ This message directly speaks to those who attended the lunch. Holding tight to Socialist ideals, Malkiel believed in working class solidarity against the capitalist mentality of the United States. To associate with the upper

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class, according to the entry's statements, threatened strikers' Socialist credentials, even doing more harm than good toward the effort. In fact, she goes on to say that the gap between the strikers and the upper-class women cannot be filled with their pathetic donations *and* that if the girls were to refuse the donations, then the upper class would leave the strikers to their own devices. However, her thoughts on the matter never became reality. Many wealthy women, including Anne Morgan, continued to donate money, the strikers continued to accept it, and the pressure between the Socialist Party and Anne Morgan continued to build.

Tension grew between the Socialist Party and Anne Morgan most rapidly after January 3, 1910 when a large strike meeting occurred at Carnegie Hall. According to Mary Jo Buhle, the pageantry of the occasion was the manifestation of Socialists' fears.⁵⁹ Though Buhle mentions that the upper-class women forbade Socialists to speak at the event, I have found no evidence within *The New York Sun*, *The New York Times*, or *The New York Tribune* to prove that was the case. Her information on the events of the Carnegie Hall meeting is cited from Socialist newspapers and *The Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker*, which contains highly propagandized information. On January 4, the morning after the meeting, *The New York Sun* published an article giving some of the first direct and widely published upper-class displeasure. "Miss Morgan Is Displeased with the Socialistic Ideas of Strikers" subtitles the main title of the article, "Still Talk of Ending Strike."⁶⁰ The article continues to say that no arbitration had been reached prior to the Carnegie Hall meeting, but clarifications regarding strike requests had. Anne Morgan was present at the meeting along with some of her peers, but unlike the information given in *The Call*, there is no report of Socialists being forbidden to speak. If they were silenced, how was that fact unknown to reporters of three major newspapers? Despite the lack of factual consensus, Anne Morgan accused Morris Hillquit and Leonora O'Reilly of indoctrination.

As quoted in *The New York Sun*, Anne Morgan stated:

I am heartily in favor of the strikers and I believe they have been very badly treated by the courts. A protest along sane and reasonable lines was justifiable, but I deplore the appeals of Morris Hillquit, Leonora O'Reilly and others. It is necessary to appeal to reason and sound judgment, but it was dangerous to allow this socialistic appeal to emotionalism and it is reprehensible for the Socialists to take advantage at this time to preach their fanatical doctrines.⁶¹

Anne Morgan's beliefs rushed to the surface after the meeting at Carnegie Hall. For months the Socialist Party not only preached Socialist ideals, but also made specific allegations against Anne Morgan's presence. The culmination of tension between the two came to a head after that meeting. Anne Morgan's statement publicly shamed the Socialist Party. Readers of the newspaper were aware, at least in some small part, of the events surrounding the strike. To use words such as "sane" and "reasonable" to describe the strike without Socialist ideas infers that Socialism was "insane," "unreasonable," and "unjustifiable." However, Anne Morgan makes these statements against the strike and its Socialist leaders, not the Women's Trade Union League or the strikers themselves. In contrast, Socialist leader Theresa Malkiel made it a point of her persona-written diary entries to attack Anne Morgan and her peers directly with little consideration for the fact that they had been born into that type of lifestyle and had not created it for themselves. Anne Morgan's statement concluded *The New York Sun* article. There was not initial reaction to what she said, it was simply stated. Her reaction to the meeting at Carnegie Hall left the floor open for dissent and upset among the Socialist Party. In the following days, Anne Morgan's statements against Socialist leaders were countered with equal fervor.

Morris Hillquit's long-winded response, printed the next day, expressed his pent-up frustration throughout the strike. Unlike many previous reports given by the differing newspapers, Hillquit's re-

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sponse is a quoted statement and does not allow for creative changes to be made in favor of either party. As a result, *The New York Times* and *The New York Call* reports are almost identical. In his response, Morris Hillquit accused Anne Morgan of several things including being “ill informed on the doctrine of Socialism” and “being to recent to the labor movement to qualify her as a judge.”⁶² However, Hillquit continued to tell Anne Morgan:

In this strike all supporters and sympathizers of the struggling shirtwaist makers, Socialists, trade unionists, settlement workers, suffragists, suffragettes, and good people generally, have been working harmoniously with the sole aim in view — to help the striking girls to victory. The movement has been entirely free from partisan politics or controversies, and the attempt to introduce such controversies while the struggle is still in progress is, to the least, rather injudicious.⁶³

These last two sentences of Hillquit's response give great insight into a Socialist mind. He first alluded to the fact that *all* the supporters of the strike had worked harmoniously until this point when Anne Morgan spoke her mind. However, considering that ‘harmonious’ in this context means free from disagreement or dissent, Hillquit's statement denied both the natural tension between Socialism and Capitalism that permeated the general labor movement and the propaganda previously released by fellow Socialist leader Theresa Malkiel that disdained even the slightest notion of upper-class involvement. Secondly, Hillquit stated that the movement had been *entirely* free of partisan politics until Anne Morgan made her statements. As long as Socialist supporters of the strike continued to hold their beliefs while involved in it, it is not likely that their beliefs were separated from their labor reform opinions. The phrasing of Hillquit's last sentence also alluded to Anne Morgan as introducing controversial ideas into the strike before it was finished. The statement is presented in such a way that puts Anne Morgan aside as a possible scapegoat if the strike effort should fail. Although Hillquit's state-

ments are in error, they provide a look at the release of mounting Socialist frustration during the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike.

Morris Hillquit provided the official response to Anne Morgan's accusations, but six days later, Theresa Malkiel published an even harsher critique of Anne Morgan. Entitled "The Danger of Socialism," Malkiel wrote the article in a rather sarcastic tone. Having first explained how Anne Morgan saw Socialism, she continued on to say that "the real danger to the working girls lies in the pretend friendship of the Miss Morgans, who come down from the height of their pedestals to preach their own interests and sham sympathy."⁶⁴ Malkiel's statement further exhibited the frustrations of the Socialist Party. However, unlike Hillquit, Theresa Malkiel had been writing anti-upper-class propaganda from the beginning of the strike. She personally wrote with great contempt for Anne Morgan and the rest of the upper class. Morris Hillquit's statements were in response to Anne Morgan, but Theresa Malkiel's writing was extremely emotional for someone who was not directly accused. She concluded her article stating, "Miss Morgan's condescending entrance as the champion of the working woman was not met with brass bands. Her bombastic exit is not seasoned by tears of regret."⁶⁵ This strongly worded sentiment summed up Malkiel's opinion of Anne Morgan. She strongly opposed her entrance in the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike and the sooner she left, the better. Malkiel's statement alluded to the fact that Anne Morgan exited the strike effort before it concluded. It is unknown if Anne Morgan ever saw this article, but there is no record of a public response to it. Both Morris Hillquit's and Theresa Malkiel's statements served as a caution for the upper class, the Socialist Party did not hold enough power and influence to truly tarnish reputations. At first glance of New York primary sources, it seemed as though Anne Morgan *did* exit the strike movement altogether, but a further search proved that false.

Anne Morgan's last stand for the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike ap-

peared in the form of two very small news blurbs, one in *The New York Call* and one in *The New York Sun*. First, in *The Call*, a small and untitled article appeared preceded by “Wellesley, Mass., Jan. 19.”⁶⁶ Within the two paragraphs emerged the evidence I needed. Although Anne Morgan’s name nearly vanished from all newspapers after the Carnegie Hall meeting controversy, two weeks later her support continued. As the article stated, Anne Morgan agreed to “build, equip and finance a shirtwaist shop” contingent on an order of 1,000 shirtwaists placed.⁶⁷ Although I found no specific article on the fulfillment of her agreement, articles published later that year evidenced her building a new all girls’ high school in New York. This evidence does not speak to her specific role in the Shirtwaist Makers’ Strike, but it does acknowledge her unwavering support behind the success of young women. Anne Morgan’s persistence in the Shirtwaist Makers’ Strike identifies her as a strong supporter of the cause. Although union recognition played a key part in the Shirtwaist Makers’ Strike of 1909, many supporters including Anne Morgan never publicly claimed to have a stance in favor of or against trade unions. Many upper-class supporters of the strike did not understand the importance of union recognition and therefore many did not support it. Although I did not encounter any evidence of Anne Morgan’s opinion in sources written during the strike, I was able to find a later statement in her own words. In 1915 Anne Morgan published a book entitled *The American Girl* in which she gives advice about the education, responsibility, recreation, and future of young American women. When discussing the future responsibility of women in a more public arena, she addressed trade unionism in the following way:

To accomplish what the twentieth century should produce in womanhood we must cultivate every side of group activity that is possible under present social and industrial conditions. That modern trade-unionism is developing into a mistaken attitude of class war and class consciousness, in no sense does away with the funda-

mental truths inherent in the principles of collective bargaining and organized effort.⁶⁸

She published this statement in her book only five years after the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 had ended. Undoubtedly, her experiences from the strike influenced her writing. First, she *did* acknowledge the twentieth century and that it should produce a new type of woman different from those in the nineteenth century. She argued that in order to produce this new ideal of womanhood, group activities are encouraged. By this point in time, Anne Morgan had experienced many different types of groups including her own Colony Club, the Women's Trade Union League, the Local 25 division of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union, and witnessed the rise of the NAWSA.⁶⁹ Between the dawn of the Progressive Era and the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment, Anne Morgan saw the necessity of group activity. According to her, trade unions were also necessary for twentieth-century industrial conditions. From her experiences in the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909, she saw the advantages of such a collective effort, but her statement also offers some critique. Her statement alluded to the climate of "class war and class consciousness" in twentieth-century trade unions. Undoubtedly, these reservations resulted from her experiences with the Socialist Party during the strike. As she saw it, collective bargaining and organized effort were simple qualities of trade unionism that resisted the influence of class-consciousness, but other qualities existed that could not. These types of opinions never appeared in publications during the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike, but retrospectively, Anne Morgan made her opinion known with clear reference to the class dispute that had taken place.

The Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 saw partial victory on February 15, 1910. Shirtwaist Makers from across New York's garment district came together for "better conditions, a shorter work day and the recognition of the union," but not all shirtwaist companies were will-

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ing to fulfill these needs for their employees.⁷⁰ The coverage of the strike's end differed greatly among New York newspapers. *The Call* published nearly a two-page spread detailing what they claimed to be an immense success. According to *The Call*, all shops settled with the Local 25 division of the International Ladies' Garment Workers Union with the exception of thirteen companies. As a result, each of the remaining shops would be further pursued in hope of settlement.⁷¹ However, the other newspapers' reports, and lack thereof, provided a different view of how the strike ended. After much time spent in search of similar articles, I came to the realization that *The Call* stood alone in its interpretation of the strike's victory. *The New York Tribune's* article, entitled "Miss Dreier Tells About Shirtwaist Strikers," had a less enthusiastic tone compared to *The Call*. Mary Dreier discussed the consumer power of buying union-made clothing and how their decisions can have a positive influence in the factories.⁷² Without going into any detail, she mentioned that the strike accomplished many things, but her overall tone showed less enthusiasm compared to what was written in *The Call*. Any victory in the strike proved important for both the shirtwaist makers and their supporters. Success, in any amount, took pressure off the Socialist Party and the Women's Trade Union League, both of which committed large amounts of time and money to the cause. In turn, Anne Morgan and other upper-class women were able to say that their involvement and funds helped the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike to a successful outcome.

Although some historians have argued that the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 broke down class and ideological differences for a common goal, the strike brought the underlying class tensions to the surface through the dispute between the Socialist Party and Anne Morgan. From the first meeting of strikers with upper-class women at The Colony Club, Socialists simultaneously criticized and undermined the role of the wealthy in the strike with special criticism

given to Anne Morgan. Throughout the beginning of the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike, the criticism was largely one-sided and from the point of view of the Socialist Party. However, the events of the Carnegie Hall meeting resulted in the first public accusation of Socialists by Anne Morgan herself. The Shirtwaist Makers' Strike was unlike any before it. Women's labor reform as a whole suffered from both shop owner oppression and the opposition of male-dominated unions. Not only was the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike the first to be overwhelmingly female driven, but it also remains one of the largest strikes ever to take place in New York. The magnitude of media coverage and public spectacle of the strike and its meetings brought Anne Morgan and the Socialist Party face to face. The tensions that had grown between them throughout the strike culminated in public dispute. Despite Socialist attitudes, however, Anne Morgan dedicated herself to help the Shirtwaist Makers until the strike ended. Her role in the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike of 1909 is still judged harshly by some historians, but her presence revealed the underlying class struggle and blatant inequality that grew out of industrialization. She was a faithful supporter of the strikers from the beginning, and keeping with the cause, despite Socialist urging to leave, strengthened her ties to the Shirtwaist Makers' Strike.

NOTES

¹ Rosalind Rosenberg, *Divided Lives: American Women in the Twentieth Century* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2008), 20.

² Theresa Malkiel, *The Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker* (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1990), 4.

³ Rosenberg, *Divided Lives: American Women in the Twentieth Century*, 25.

⁴ *Ibid.*

⁵ H. Quelch, "What is Socialism?" *The New York Call*, January 4, 1910.

⁶ Michel Beaud, *A History of Capitalism, 1500-1980* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1983).

⁷ Rosenberg, *Divided Lives: American Women in the Twentieth Century*, 38

⁸ *Encyclopædia Britannica Online*, s. v. "John Pierpont Morgan."

⁹ Alfred Allan Lewis, *Ladies and Not-So-Gentle Women* (New York: Viking, 2000), 58.

¹⁰ Nancy Schrom Dye, *As Equals and as Sisters: Feminism, the Labor Movement, and the Women's Trade Union League of New York* (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1980).

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¹¹ Mari Jo Buhle, *Women and American Socialism, 1870-1920* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1981).

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ Edward T. James, ed., *Papers of the Women's Trade Union League and its Principle Leaders: Guide to the Microfilm Edition* (Woodbridge, Connecticut: Research Publication, Inc., 1981), 11.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, 180.

¹⁶ Dye, *As Equals and as Sisters: Feminism, the Labor Movement, and the Women's Trade Union League of New York*, 37

¹⁷ Buhle, *Women and American Socialism, 1870-1920*, 189

¹⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁹ James, *Papers of the Women's Trade Union League and its Principle Leaders: Guide to the Microfilm Edition*, 188.

²⁰ The Women's Trade Union League of New York, *Annual Report 1908-1909* (New York: 1909).

²¹ Donna Ippolito, *The Uprising of the 20,000* (Pittsburgh: Motherroot Publications, 1979), 9.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ *Ibid.*

²⁴ *Ibid.*

²⁵ "40,000 Women Strike Today," *The New York Sun*, November 23, 1909.

²⁶ Dye, *As Equals and as Sisters: Feminism, the Labor Movement, and the Women's Trade Union League of New York*, 88

²⁷ *The New York Call*, 1909.

²⁸ "The Cooper Union Meeting," *The New York Call*, November 23, 1909.

²⁹ *Ibid.*

³⁰ "Arbitrating the Strike," *The New York Sun*, December 11, 1909.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² *Ibid.*

³³ "Standing by Union," *The New York Tribune*, December 14, 1909.

³⁴ "Miss Morgan Aids Girl Waist Strikers," *The New York Times*, December 14, 1909.

³⁵ "Standing by Union."

³⁶ "Miss Morgan Aids Girl Waist Strikers."

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ *Ibid.*

³⁹ Lewis, *Ladies and Not-So-Gentle Women*, 257

⁴⁰ "Women's New Club, the Colony, Opened," *The New York Times*, March 12, 1907.

⁴¹ "Colony Club Purses Open," *The New York Sun*, December 16, 1909.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ *Ibid.*

⁴⁴ "Tea at the Colony Club," *The New York Call*, December 16, 1909.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ "Girl Strikers Tell the Rich their Woes," *The New York Times*, December 16, 1909.

⁵¹ Theresa Malkiel, *The Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker*, ed. Françoise Basch (Ithaca: ILR Press, 1990).

⁵² Ibid.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ Ibid.

⁵⁵ "Miss Morgan Aids Girl Waist Strikers."

⁵⁶ Theresa Malkiel, *The Diary of a Shirtwaist Striker*.

⁵⁷ Ibid.

⁵⁸ Ibid.

⁵⁹ Buhle, *Women and American Socialism, 1870-1920*, 200

⁶⁰ "Still Talk of Ending Strike," *The New York Sun*, January 4, 1910.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² "Morris Hillquit Issues Reply to Anne Morgan's Criticism of Socialists," *The New York Call*, January 5, 1910.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Theresa Malkiel, "The Danger of Socialism," *The New York Call*, January 11, 1910.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

⁶⁶ "WELLESLEY, Mass., Jan. 19," *The New York Call*, January 19, 1910.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Anne Morgan, *The American Girl: Her Education, Her Responsibility, Her Recreation, and Her Future* (New York: Harper & Brothers Publishers, 1915), 28-29.

⁶⁹ NAWSA (The National American Woman Suffrage Association) emerged in 1890 out of two already existing woman suffrage organizations. NAWSA and a group that later split from it, the National Woman's Party, pushed the Nineteenth Amendment for Woman Suffrage until its passage in 1920.

⁷⁰ "Shirtwaist Strike Won," *The New York Call*, February 15, 1910.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² "Miss Dreier Tells About Shirtwaist Strike," *The New York Tribune*, February 18, 1910.



RUSTIC SUNSET BY MATT KLEMSZ

THE MADRES DE PLAZA DE MAYO:
MOTHERHOOD'S SEARCH FOR ANSWERS
DURING THE DIRTY WAR IN ARGENTINA

■
BY COLLEEN MCCORMICK

I do not go down to the hellfires /
I go up to my son cloistered
in his goodness / beauty / flight /
and tortured / concentrated /

assassinated / dispersed
by the suffering of the nation /
is some small flame growing out of the great silence of your eyes? /
I hear the night walking through your bones/ they hurt / they smell
of your trampled youth / of
the pigeon that you kept

iridescent like your voice
of a little son alone through the war /
throughout the half / the provinces
deserts of pure pain /

son whom nobody can ever make again /
I beat on the doors of death
to get you released from
these facts that don't fit you¹

In this poem, the famous Argentine poet Juan Gelman expresses the grief of losing a child to the Dirty War. Words like “tortured,” and phrases like “suffering of the nation” and “trampled youth” express the loss of thousands of young people to this tumultuous time in Argentine history. Many parents lost their children, including a group of mothers that would become known as the Madres de Plaza de Mayo. This group of women began to question the dictatorship

about the location of their children who had been kidnapped by the military government.

In order to understand these women it is first important to acknowledge the history of women and feminism in Argentina that set the stage for their lives and their movement. From its Spanish roots to Eva Perón, the society of Argentina was influenced by forces that suggested that women belonged in the home. Their most important roles were perceived to be as mothers and moral leaders. The children of the mothers that made up the Madres, however, were being abducted by the government, and no one was attempting to stop it. In order to sustain their roles as mothers they had to step up and act against the government. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo began to act, using maternalist politics as a tactic for change. They used their role as mothers to their advantage, using what they knew as mothers to appeal to the public for help and answers to where their children were. Many of their children had either been killed or were suffering in concentration camps. Even the families of the people in these camps were being attacked as well. Despite the fact that it put them in great danger, the repressive military dictatorship of the Dirty War in Argentina presented an opportunity for the women of the Madres de Plaza de Mayo to break free from the confined world of home-making. They were able to create a strong human rights organization because their history led them to strongly identify as mothers, because they used their identities to take action, and because they refused to stop fighting until they had answers

Argentina's Dirty War of 1976 to 1983 defined a period of violent disregard for human rights in a society overwhelmed by unrest and instability. Throughout the twentieth century Argentina underwent many changes politically, experiencing a variety of governments, both democratic and dictatorial. Economically its per capita income fell from fifth in the world to below fortieth.² The combination of these two problems of volatility led to social turbulence and violence

because of the government's inability to handle the basic needs of the population. Poverty struck and much of the population struggled to find housing and food. Guerilla forces sprang up to try to bring about changes in Argentina to solve the problems that the government was not addressing. Donald C. Hodges argues that these social problems were the most important factors contributing to the point of departure for the Dirty War.³ Had the people been able to feed their families and buy shoes for their children, they would not have needed to form antigovernment organizations to create change. Guerilla groups such as the Montoneros and the People's Revolutionary Army began to instigate attacks on the government.⁴ They intended to weaken the government, promote resistance, and immobilize the country to the point where a revolutionary strike was necessary.⁵

The Argentine government began to use its military to respond to the guerillas. Isabel Perón, the wife and Vice President to Juan Perón, took office when her husband died in 1974. She greatly increased the power that the military had, giving them the ability to deal with the guerillas by any means necessary.⁶ Because of the authority that they were given, they had the opportunity to implement the changes that they thought were necessary to address the unstable and failing Argentine government. But this backfired when in March of 1976 Perón's own military, led by General Jorge Rafael Videla, ousted her from the Argentine presidency.⁷ Thus began the Dirty War.

The dictatorship established a regime of unspoken violence. The Dirty War gets its name from the tactics used by the military junta to try to suppress the subversives. They implemented a system of terror known as the Process of National Reorganization, in which the Argentine people lost all rights while many were kidnapped and subjected to torture and murder. Up to 30,000 people were kidnapped by the government, an act which would become known as being "disappeared."⁸ As the disappearances progressed, the military no longer

only disappeared the subversives who they had originally aimed to eliminate. The government began to target anyone that might be considered a threat to the dictatorship, including leftists, intellectuals, journalists, and students. As the number of disappeared grew, a silence spread across the nation. From political parties to trade unions to modes of communication, no one spoke out against the atrocities. Down to the general population, no one wanted to get involved where they did not belong because of a fear of the repercussions but also because of a hope that the dictatorship might finally bring stability to their country.⁹ Even the Catholic Church, an important and influential presence in Latin America and Argentina, did not take steps towards protecting the citizenry from such violence despite the fact that killing and torturing clearly contradicted the tenets of Christianity. Few members of the Church made a stand against the Process and in fact many members tended to be conservative. The military junta even promoted a vision of themselves as defending Western Christian Civilization.¹⁰ Through this slogan they hoped to assure the public not only that they were doing nothing wrong, but that in fact they were protecting positive ideals. This vision shed an affirmative light on what was becoming a destructive situation, and created an excuse for ignoring the events of the Process. In this way, the Church and other people who turned a blind eye could refrain from acting against the junta and feel validated in their position.

Although many people kept their silence, there were still thousands of people disappearing and thousands more family members who mourned their absence. With the silence of the entire Argentine community, answers about the disappearances were not clear. They watched as their loved ones were taken from their houses or waited when their children did not return home from work.¹¹ They did not, however, know where they went or what their fates would be. Many mothers ached with the losses of their children — the many young

adults who were being disappeared. Some of these women began to search for answers. They went to their local police stations and prisons, trying to see if anyone would talk to them or give them answers on the whereabouts of their children.¹² But no one talked.

A number of mothers eventually made their way to the Ministry of the Interior to make complaints about their missing children and, although they did not find answers there, they began to find each other.¹³ Upon realization that they were all working toward the same goal, a group of mothers began to share ideas and work together. On April 30, 1977, the Madres de Plaza de Mayo met for the first time at their namesake location, led by Azucena de Villaflor de Vincente.¹⁴ It was there that the mothers found comfort in their shared losses and began their journey to military resistance and a level of social involvement that none of them had ever experienced before.¹⁵

The role of women in Argentina dates back to the country's beginning as a Spanish colony, the standards of which would affect Argentine life for hundreds of years to come. In order to understand the Madres de Plaza de Mayo it is essential to understand the background of women in Argentina and how the country's history shaped the society in which they lived. The beginning of this story starts in Spain. To define the significant cultural influences on Spanish culture, Marifran Carlson highlights the importance of both Roman and Muslim cultures, where Roman law considered women the property of men and Islamic practices promoted the separation of women in society.¹⁶ Since both of these cultures were main building blocks for Spanish culture, women in Spain were not considered fully independent or able as a result. Their status was that of second class citizens and their realm was separate from that of the male population. Gertrude M. Yeager even points out the fact that:

In Spanish the verb 'to marry,' *casarse*, literally means 'to put oneself into a house.' A married woman is referred to as *casada* (housed in) not only because of a perceived biological tie to childrearing or because she may not be phys-

ically or mentally suited for other labor, but also because, under the patriarchal system, family honor resides within her.¹⁷

This underscores the fact that the woman's place in Spanish culture was always in the home with the children. This defined her and her role as separate from men. Although this role was important, it was not valued as highly as the male's more public role. Men were a part of the political and economic sphere, but women were confined to the domestic. Women were vital in the home and in childrearing but not considered very significant in the rest of society. This same mindset was taken to Argentina and reflected in the *Código Civil*, the law code of 1870 that still considered women second class citizens without legal rights, such as the right to divorce.¹⁸ The influence of Spanish culture left Argentine women in the same predicament as Spanish women; they were traditionally thought of as separate-from and less-than men.

Men and women in Latin America were thought of as fundamentally different, their differences sometimes described with the ideas of machismo and marianismo. Machismo describes the dominance that males in Latin America demonstrated toward women. The term encompasses a variety of ways that this is expressed such as placing a strong importance on masculinity and courage, limiting the autonomy of women, and even validating physical abuse. This type of male stereotype is reinforced culturally and through class and ethnicity.¹⁹ This attitude of control and forcefulness toward women describes the reasons that they were often repressed in society. Marianismo illustrates the idea that women, as mothers, should be morally and spiritually superior to men. This comes from the influence of the Virgin Mary, the major female Christian influence in Latin America. Some scholars, such as Evelyn P. Stevens who introduced the study of marianismo in 1973, however, argue that marianismo gives women their own advantage in society. Stevens goes so far as to call marianismo, "Female chauvinism," a declaration that is

certainly exaggerated because women did not have that level of power.²⁰ Marianismo does, however, explain the idea of motherhood as important and honorable, giving mothers a special place in Latin American society. Their ability to bear children and their important role raising children were considered special responsibilities to society. This means that women were held to high moral standards. Society expected them to be morally immaculate and uphold the reputation of the family. This gave women an important role in the family but additionally held them to unrealistic expectations. Women's roles as mothers and moral leaders set the tone for the beginnings of feminism in Argentina.

Women began to call attention to and try to further their own importance and significance in society, especially toward the end of the nineteenth century and into the twentieth century when feminism began to emerge in Argentina. This time period became conducive to feminism in part because of industrialization. Industrialization meant that many more women were joining the workforce and also attaining more access to education. Women's groups began to gather and talk about the issues that they faced such as workers' rights and women's role in Argentine society.²¹ Women now had more of a means of discussion, which led to the first feminist groups. A variety of feminist groups emerged with different ideas promoting women's labor rights and suffrage, but most groups still saw women as mothers first and foremost. Work and education became accepted because they were considered ways that women could better themselves as wives and mothers, but domesticity remained the basis of a woman's life.²² Additionally, it was still considered important for women to maintain a sense of femininity. This was promoted, for example, in the women's magazine, *La Camilia*, created by Rosa Guerra in 1852. She said that women had a right to education, but that they must still maintain their morals and humility because an educated woman could be interpreted as indecent.²³ If they were to lose their sense of

propriety it would go against the core of what a woman should be according to Argentine values. A woman must still always be a spiritual leader for the family, which was her most important role.

The Church even developed more progressive attitudes toward women and began to support the expansion of their role. According to Sandra McGee Deutsch this occurred because Argentina's industrialization also meant the emergence of a middle class that lacked need or respect for the Church. The Church had always been an important part of Argentine life and society, but had been sympathetic to the upper class and the lower class did not have a choice of whether or not to follow them. As a result, the Church opposed industrialization and also the leftist ideas that it brought with it. This led the Church toward Social Catholicism, which would become more tolerant of the progress of women.²⁴ For example, Father Gustavo J. Franceschi, a Social Catholic activist, acknowledged the fact that in some situations women had to work and thought this should be allowed. At the same time he believed that they should not be participating in the same kind of labor as men because men and women were different. Ideally, in his opinion women were more suited to work in the home.²⁵ He and a variety of other Church leaders were able to understand women's labor and even accept the idea of women's suffrage. The fact that the Church was able to accept these principles gave working women moral recognition. Women were allowed to work, as long as it was not too physical, too political, or too far outside of the women's realm, and they could still uphold their Catholic religion.

Taking a step forward to the twentieth century, women's suffrage came to Argentina under the influence of Juan and Eva Perón, although whether or not they contributed positively toward feminism is debated. Juan Perón was elected president in 1946, running as a liberator of the working class. He was widely admired because of his populist desires to improve worker's rights and promote education

for the lower classes. Additionally, he supported women's suffrage, using his wife Eva Perón as a public advocate for women's rights.²⁶ Finally, on September 17th, 1947, Argentine women were given the right to vote. This monumental milestone for Argentina was met, however, by mixed reactions. Some feminists were not pleased with this result. Members of the Left wing and the Socialist Party thought that Perón was using women's suffrage simply as a way to promote his and his wife's careers. Also they did not agree with many of his questionable political tactics.²⁷ These traditional feminists tended to come from different socioeconomic groups than the supporters of Perón and had different opinions on how the government needed to be reformed. These political differences meant a clash between the two generations of feminists, and a mixed reception to the passage of the suffrage law.

Eva Perón, the public face of Juan Perón's campaign for women's rights, promoted a modern, voting woman, but one who was still held back by her traditional role. Eva said that women needed to be represented because they had a different view of the world based in empathy and love for family.²⁸ Still she endorsed the traditional idea that a woman was first and foremost a wife and mother, declaring that it was the role that they were born to serve. She greatly emphasized the importance of a woman's femininity, criticizing the feminists of the day because they did not maintain, or even rejected the importance of, femininity. For example, in her autobiography *My Mission in Life*, Perón says, "Don't you see that this class of 'feminists' detests womanhood? Some of them do not even use makeup... Don't you see they want to be men?"²⁹ Although her broader goal was to increase the standards of life for women, these stipulations and strict definitions of what a woman should be limited their freedom to decide who they wanted to be. A woman, in her eyes, could only be a woman if she looked and acted in a traditionally womanly way. She could begin to dip her toes into politics but never in the same way

that a man could.

Eva Perón promoted the idea of giving women economic compensation for their work as housewives, giving them more reason to stay at home as mothers. She wrote:

We were born to make homes. Not for the street... We must have in the home that which we go out to seek: our small economic independence—which would save us from becoming women with no outlook, with no rights and with no hope!³⁰

The solution she wanted to be able to give to women was to pay them for their work in their home rather than expanding their opportunities to different careers, therefore making their jobs as housewives all that they would need. This would certainly be useful for families and for women, helping out their circumstances and giving their work validation, but it would do nothing to promote women's participation in any other realm than that of the household. Thus Eva Perón's advocacy sought to improve women's lives and rights in a way that still promoted a male-dominated public realm.

The Madres de Plaza de Mayo became a recognized, highly respected organization for human rights despite the intensely traditional and repressive forces they fought against. They started out simply as a group of Argentine mothers, no different than their neighbors, filling the roles that typical mothers were supposed to fill. They lacked education, political knowledge, and opportunities. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the Dirty War and the disappearances of their children sparked a necessity for their entrance into the world outside the home. They began a struggle to find their children and also to step outside the home and into the dangerous world of Argentine politics. Their roles in Argentine society and their personal outlooks on those roles were forever changed by their social activism and tireless efforts to find out what happened to their children.

The women of the Madres grew up in a society where women played a very traditional role—a role that they did not resist. The

women of the Madres were uneducated and without opportunities, yet very adept at cooking, cleaning, and ironing. Marguerite Guzman Bouvard explains that the Madres did not really oppose this kind of lifestyle; it was simply what was available for them at the time.³¹ As working class women, they or their mothers would have been targeted by Juan and Eva Perón's campaign for women. They would have been taught to maintain their feminine morality and to fulfill their roles as mothers and wives as best they could. Opportunities to do anything else were not encouraged.

That did not mean, however, that they would not have liked a chance to become educated or to work outside of the woman's realm. Many of the women of the organization tell similar stories of how they were only allowed to spend a few years in school, moving quickly from grade school to housework and learning how to cook. Irene Rosa Lizzi de Cortez, for example, says she only finished primary school, even though she really liked school and did well. After primary school she started helping at home with housework and learned to make pasta from her Italian mother.³² Hebe de Bonafini says that at age twelve her mother sent her to classes to learn to sew, embroider, and finally weave which she did not hate as much and stuck with. Despite the fact that she liked school, she was forced to learn skills that would be useful to a woman who would become a wife and mother. She says even at that age, "I couldn't understand why men could do certain things and women certain other things. Who said so?"³³ These girls realized the injustice of their situation, but unfortunately this defined the reality of the world Argentine women and girls were living in. Women did not have many opportunities to break out of their traditional role.

Men also expected women to play the part of homemakers and mothers. De Bonafini mentions that she wanted to further her education, and her children suggested that she study alongside them as they went through high school. Her husband, however, would not

permit it.³⁴ Even if these women had the aspirations to become more educated or political, men often blocked that possibility. As they did begin to take control of their lives through the Madres, this became a problem in some marriages. Nina Cortiñas, for example, discusses how she and her husband began to argue more as she became involved in the Madres because he did not want her to become so independent.³⁵ According to the traditional ideals of women and the idea of *marianismo*, by stepping out of the bounds of the household and into politics, Cortiñas was leaving her responsibilities as the model of morality for their family. This meant that she was likely to be judged as indecent, reflecting poorly on the family. Cortiñas' husband did not want his wife acting in that way, accepting the standard that it was not right.

Like the children of De Bonafini, who encouraged their mother to further her education, many other women were inspired by the work of their own children. Maria Elisa Haschman de Landin speaks of her son's desire to help those who needed it. He was motivated to join a local church group and then the Peronist Youth Organization, a left wing organization of the Peronist Party, in order to work with impoverished Argentines. De Landin explains his influence on her saying, "It's as if he had given birth to me and not me to him."³⁶ Her son became her role model and she would use the drive that she saw in him to drive her own work. When her son Martin was disappeared, his own passion to work for change pushed his mother to join the Madres and start advocating for answers. Mercedes de Meroño says, "We are proud of our children, and in turn this gave birth to our fight."³⁷ She goes on to say that women of their time worked in the household. They cooked, ironed, and knitted while their husbands took part in politics and soccer because the public and political world belonged to them.³⁸ The women's pride in their children's political actions, however, was an inspiration and this was what pushed them to learn to be political. Their struggle was for their children—their

children who they not only loved but respected for their own work to make the world a better place. Participating in the Madres de Plaza de Mayo was life-changing and even life-giving for these women. They finally had a meaningful role in the world outside their homes. Not only were they women who raised children, cooked, and cleaned, but they were mothers who were making a difference in the political world.

As these women's children began to be disappeared, their worlds were turned upside down and they began to lose control in their own domain. The military regime that led their country stole their world as mothers and caretakers. They began looking for answers, asking at police stations, hospitals, and the Ministry of the Interior, but received no response or assistance. They did, however, find other women who seemed to be in the same positions as themselves and, after discussing their similar situations, started working together.³⁹ Elida Galletti describes approaching the group of mothers around the time they started congregating at the Plaza de Mayo and at first feeling nervous. When she went to talk to them they asked, "Who do you have that's disappeared?" She says she realized that, "I felt we were all the same person."⁴⁰ They were all mothers who were suffering the loss of their children to something they could not control and could not understand. They were all in the same position—wondering, waiting, and wanting answers. Cortiñas describes the way they came together and dealt with their grief as a group. She says that dealing with the loss of a child is always a tragedy, but they were experiencing something different even from that. They did not know if their children were dead; they had no bodies or proof and because of this she says they could not "process the death."⁴¹ It was impossible to know what had happened to their children and in order for any of them to be able to move forward with their lives it was essential to find answers as a group.

This fight to discover their whereabouts became the most impor-

tant part of their lives, and they continued to challenge the government and their societal roles in hopes that they could find their children. Because their children were the most important focus of their lives, they put their own lives on the line every day, risking their own disappearances in order to find out what had happened to their children. Three mothers, María Ponce, Esther Balestrina de Creaga, and Azucena de Villaflor de Vincente as well as two French nuns aiding the group were disappeared during their work with the Madres, all of whom were killed.⁴² The threat of danger was very real—something they all knew personally—but this did not stop the women's efforts. The Madres reacted in a way that they thought was necessary. Rene Epelbaum comments on the Madres' response to being in their position: "It wasn't that we weren't afraid. We were, but we overcame it, because of our obligation and our desperation."⁴³ Although in the past many of these women felt unhappy with their circumstances or felt a desire to find more opportunities or education, that was nothing compared to the immense heartbreak of the disappearances of their children and their drive to find out what happened to them. The Dirty War not only wounded their families, but also attacked their basic role as mothers. These women felt that they were supposed to be the supporters and caretakers of the family. In order to do this they had to find their children.

The tragedy of the disappearances was the catalyst that inspired these women to assume control in their own lives, socially and politically. Evel de Detrini describes the way that they had to learn to put themselves in harm's way; to go from being "humble women of the home" to women fighting for theirs and their children's lives. She says that there was "something pushing them forward, and that was the children."⁴⁴ This was a drive they had not felt before. In this case doing their best job as mothers meant not simply putting food on the table and keeping a house where their children could thrive. It meant becoming more active in Argentine society and politics than

they had ever been before, and they rose to the occasion. The job description that these Argentine mothers had been fulfilling for hundreds of years shifted from a mundane, household motherhood to a motherhood that required political knowledge and action. In some ways they were breaking out of their traditional role, but for them it was a necessary development to be able to perform that role to its fullest.

Much of Argentina excused the actions of the military junta and the necessity of the Madres participation was aggravated by the culture of silence that pervaded Argentina. No one in the country was asking questions for them, no one was trying to find out about the disappeared. Mercedes Barros analyzes the profound silence that existed during the Dirty War, which allowed it to rage on. She notes that the majority of the population did not speak out against the atrocities of the dictatorship, which meant that many people did not know the extent of the crimes that were occurring. A main reason she gives for this silence is that the military junta claimed that they were endorsing Western and Christian values and it was difficult to make an argument against that without being judged as backwards or immoral.

⁴⁵ Main facets of society like the Church, modes of communication, and political parties enabled the actions of the military through their silence. The general population feared the potential consequences of speaking out, and held onto the idea of not sticking your nose where it did not belong.

An important perpetrator of this silence was the Argentine press which, with the exception of the newspapers *La Opinión* and the English language *Buenos Aires Herald*, did not report on the events of the Dirty War or the disappeared. Jerry W. Knudson argues that the press stayed quiet for a variety of reasons. One reason was to protect their economic interests as they were told by the government, one of their economic backers, not to talk about any aspects of the disappearances or the war. A second reason is that the Argentine press

historically tended to support forces currently in power so they supported the current dictatorship. Also, they were quiet in order to avoid the possibility of becoming the next victims.⁴⁶ This is important because the war was not talked about in the press so the Argentine people were not getting any information that truly represented what was going on. There were simply whispers of people disappearing without real explanations; rather than articles there were rumors. No one really knew what was going on and no one was willing to risk finding out. But at the same time, the Madres could not merely stand off to the side — their own children were already the victims. Their only option was to become the voices calling for answers, and to make sure they were heard using whatever tactics were available to them. They took on the brave role of breaking the silence because no one else would and entered politics because, although everyone else took a step back, they needed answers desperately.

The Madres de Plaza de Mayo accomplished what they did by using their own identities to their advantage. In this case being mothers motivated and carried their message. They employed a form of maternalist politics, and used their roles as mothers to create change. Rebecca Jo Plan and Mariam van der Klein describe the two main fields of thought about maternalism, explaining that in some situations maternalist politics are seen as a feminist ideology in which women are recognized and esteemed for their work as caregivers. In others, however, it is interpreted that the ideology does not focus on equal rights for men and women and therefore should not be considered feminist.⁴⁷ The Madres de Plaza de Mayo have often been considered maternalist reformers, and Plan and van der Klein explain that in Latin America in general, maternalism tends to be seen as feminist because of the way feminism evolved there and motherhood's important significance.⁴⁸ Maternalism gave these women their opportunity to be successful in putting together the Madres because they were able to use what they knew in order to

create a movement and appeal to the public. Marguerite Guzman Bouvard also argues that the Madres employed maternalist politics stating that, “The Mothers not only transformed political action, but they also revolutionized the very concept of maternity as passive...”⁴⁹ They were not just mothers because they gave birth, but because they acted in support of their children. They took the stereotype of a woman’s role being inactive and submissive and turned it on its head. In the case of the Madres, being a mother meant fighting for their children’s rights and their own rights as mothers.

As the Madres worked hard to become a strong organization, the government began to see them as a threat. The actions of the Madres were always focused on the mothers and their love for their children. As de Bonafini says, “We always kept women’s feelings, mother’s feelings at the top of our priorities.”⁵⁰ After all, their passion for their children was what drove the movement and made it important. Showing a mother’s face to the world was a relatable image that presented a clear message of a mother’s love and her care for her children. Cortiñas says, however, that having this group of women, independent of men, fighting for answers did not sit well with the military government.⁵¹ They tried to turn the public against the Madres, saying that women should not act like that, calling them “Las Locas” or the “crazy women.”⁵² This was an attempt to discredit their actions, saying they were just a bunch of old women so they could not know what they were doing—an argument of the hysterical woman used on many women before them.⁵³ They continued to fight, however, attempting to break past the derogatory stereotypes and to continue to work for answers.

One way that the Madres promoted their image as mothers is through the shawls they wore on their heads when they walked and protested in the Plaza. This started because the women were going to walk in a religious procession sponsored by the Catholic community of Buenos Aires because it was a good opportunity to spread their

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message to a large group of people. As there would be so many people there they thought they should have some kind of sign that would distinguish them from a distance.⁵⁴ Cortiñas says they started out using baby diapers, which was something they all had at home. The diapers became their shawls, embroidered with the names of their disappeared, which became a symbol of the mothers.⁵⁵ It was not only a way to promote themselves as part of a group, but it was also a symbol of their children. The idea of using baby diapers had a direct connection to their children, although eventually they stopped using them because they did not hold up very well. That same sentiment behind the image, however, held. They began to wear them whenever they congregated in the Plaza. The image of the shawls showed the mothers' connection to their children and it showed that they were connected to each other and united as a group.

The white shawls became an icon that represented the Madres. Visitación de Loyola speaks with great emotion as she talks about her shawl. She says, "The shawl is life... it is light... it is the love so large that they fought for." Her shawl reminded her of her children's fight for a better world and also represented her own fight. It was a personal motivation as well as a symbol to the world. In this way, the mothers used their identity to emotionally move the people who were looking on; the shawls became an emblem of motherhood and change. In a poem about the Madres, Marjorie Agosín writes "Give me a kerchief against injustice..." and in another poem, "Then they wore white kerchiefs, the same way love is worn."⁵⁶ The shawls that the women wore on their heads grew to represent the same messages that the mothers were promoting. The Argentine people could look at the mothers wearing their shawls which would come to clearly represent the themes of their mission: mother's love, fight against injustice, and unity. It was an opportunity to highlight the important parts of being a mother and show the public that in order to protect this they needed to find their children.

Another powerful way they provoked emotion through images of mother and child was through the photographs of the children that the mothers displayed. As they marched in the Plaza de Mayo wearing their shawls on their heads, they also carried photos of their loved ones who had disappeared. It was a way to be visible, which was essential to their movement. It was an opportunity to let the public know what was going on because the events of the Dirty War were kept so quiet and guarded. Agosín says of the photographs that the mothers carried, “Each photograph commemorates the presence of an absence... Is there anything more somber than some mothers walking together with a poster filled with photographs of their dead relatives?”⁵⁷ This was a powerful image, each photograph transmitting immense emotion without the Madres even having to say anything. Parents have photos of their children throughout their lives — whether it is from the first day of school, their wedding day, or a birthday — and each of these photos represents a moment. These photographs, however, were referencing missing moments, stolen from them by the military dictatorship, perhaps disappeared forever. The photos that the mothers showed to the public humanized the disappearances. They were not just some whispers about someone’s friend’s neighbor’s husband. They were real people with real faces who were a part of these women’s lives, and they were giving a face to the movement that the Madres were beginning to execute.

The photographs were used in another active attempt to draw public attention to the pleas of the Madres. They wanted attention from the press but could not get it other than in the English-speaking *Buenos Aires Herald* or a negative mention in *La Prensa*, as most newspapers did not criticize the dictatorship. As a result, they decided to try to pay for an advertisement in *La Nación* and *La Prensa*. When the advertisement was run it read, “We do not ask for anything more than the truth,” accompanied by photos and names of the disappeared.⁵⁸ This was a bold step to get their message out to the

Argentine public and broke the barrier of silence that existed throughout society and in the press. It gave more responsibility to the Argentine people because they could no longer claim ignorance of the disappearances and were given concrete identities of the people who had been affected. The notice made it clear that the disappearances were truly occurring and real people were being kidnapped by the government. The advertisement also announced the objective of the Madres. These mothers asked to know what happened to their children, trying to fulfill their role as mothers, the role that was considered so important by society. They did not even ask for them to be returned, or returned alive. It sounds like a straightforward request, a simple *habeas corpus*, but as the Madres knew too well, the typical rights that they had come to accept had been taken from them as well. In addition to approaching the national press, the Madres garnered the attention of the international press making efforts to reveal the crimes of the dictatorship.

The suspicion of the international community, especially the United Nations, arose with the military coup in 1976, when the world became wary of the human rights situation in Argentina. The military junta attempted to protect their image in a variety of ways, however, including by requiring Argentina's ambassador to the UN, Gabriel Martínez, to cover up the disappearances. Martínez did all he could to keep international pressure off of Argentina and silenced anyone who spoke out against the country, and claimed the terrorist subversives were to blame for any deaths.⁵⁹ Amnesty International made steps to investigate the situation in Argentina and in 1977 sent a group of three representatives to Buenos Aires. While they were there the military tried to cover up their real identities, telling the people of Argentina that they were a group of Marxists who did not really understand the threat of terrorism in their country.⁶⁰ This did not keep Amnesty International from finding evidence of human rights abuse, however, and their report helped convince the United

States to stop sending military aid to Argentina, a move encouraged by President Carter's new Human Rights Campaign.⁶¹ The world had obviously taken notice of the actions of the military junta but because of their work to cover up and evade investigation, the picture of what the military was doing was still blurred. Nevertheless, the Madres made strides to try to clear up that picture.

The Madres took any opportunity they could to give the international community more information about what was really going on in Argentina and to share their stories. Another example of an attempt to distract the world from Argentina's economic and human rights issues was the decision to host the 1978 World Cup. De Landin said of the Argentine people during the World Cup, "The people were happy, enjoying the games. And me with my tears."⁶² The World Cup reminded the Madres of their losses and the lack of sympathy their country showed to them. It could have been a moment where they focused on their grief and allowed the world to turn their attention elsewhere. Instead the Madres used the Cup to their advantage and approached any foreign journalists they could, trying to spread their message, but keeping it as simple as possible because of the language barrier. They stated their basic mission: "We want our children."⁶³ Not only was the tournament broadcast to people in countries like the United States, but so were the words and demonstrations of the Madres. Whereas the Argentine press still only showed the games, international attention turned to the women in the white handkerchiefs and their powerful stories. With further international interest, there was hope for further international intervention.

The Madres continued to use any presence of foreign press to extend their message and endeavor to keep international pressure on Argentina which, as a result, helped keep the Madres themselves safe. Epelbaum shares the story of how she was almost disappeared during the World Cup. She describes walking down the street in Buenos Aires and suddenly being surrounded by military police and

fearing the worst. Before she could be forced into their vehicle, however, she heard the word, "Image!" from down the street.⁶⁴ Another officer announced the presence of tourists, visiting for the World Cup, and forced the officers to stop what they were doing in order to keep their image clean. They were reminded that they could not risk that kind of conduct in front of visitors from countries that had the power to influence their control. To evade judgment from foreign groups like the United Nations and Amnesty International, the military could not allow further knowledge of the disappearances to escape. The Madres understood this and tried to attract the attention of international powers because of the authority that those powers could demonstrate over the dictatorship. Other countries could not deny the horror of the human rights abuse that was occurring in Argentina if that abuse became visible.

The children of the Madres, the disappeared, suffered intense pain from the time of their disappearance. Some were killed right away, some were drugged and thrown in the ocean from planes, and some were taken to concentration camps where they would be tortured, and many killed. The horror stories of torture are repeated again and again in the testimonials and writings of the survivors of the concentration camps and the different treatments have become infamous. Many prisoners underwent electric shock, being probed with an electric prod while lying wet on a steel bed. A hood was also commonly used to keep prisoners blindfolded and unaware of their surroundings for days at a time.⁶⁵

One of the most famous of the disappeared was Jacobo Timerman, the former editor of the Argentine newspaper *La Opinión*, who upon his release in September of 1979 began to tell the world about the horrors of the Dirty War.⁶⁶ In his book, *Prisoner Without a Name, Cell Without a Number*, Timerman talks about his experiences in a concentration camp, illustrating for the audience just how inhumane the conditions were. He describes the tiny cell that he had to endure

— always wet, cramped, stale, and dark.⁶⁷ His captors also used psychological tactics. For example, Timerman recalls an occasion when he was blindfolded and tied to a chair outside in the cold rain. He was eventually let inside to a warm room where a guard asked him if he wanted to lie down, have something to eat, or go to bed with a female prisoner. Timerman explains, “In some way he needs to demonstrate to me and to himself his capacity to grant things, to alter my world, my situation. To demonstrate to me that I need things that are inaccessible to me and which only he can provide. I’ve noticed this mechanism repeated countless times.”⁶⁸ Because he refused to respond he was put back out into the rain. The members of the military who ran these camps knew how to get at the core of the disappeared through their torture. They used the most prisoner-personalized tactics they could and attacked physically, emotionally, and psychologically. The thoroughness of methods and desire to cut down anyone who could possibly have harmed the government’s movement enabled the Dirty War to grow to such a terrible magnitude.

The torture that women endured in the camps was targeted at them specifically because they were breaking the laws of the dictatorship, but also for breaking the gender norms, making them bad women. Female prisoners not only had to deal with the torture, but also degradation as women. Mary Jane Treacy cites the work of Chilean sociologist Ximena Bunster-Burotto that suggests that Latin American culture tended to define women either as madonnas or whores.⁶⁹ She goes on to say that women who were in politics, who left their jobs as wives and mothers in the home, were automatically considered whores. Treacy claims that this gave the torturers all the more reason to rape and abuse the women’s bodies — because those bodies no longer deserved to be treated with respect, as a mother’s would.⁷⁰ They were abused physically but also emotionally, in part, because of their sex. Through torture, they were told that they should not be participating in politics and the public sphere. Their

captors made it clear they did not deserve any respect because not only were they a threat to the military regime, but they were a threat to their sex. Because they had stepped outside the world of the home, they had abandoned the marianismo that came with that role. In the eyes of their captors they were no longer protectors of morality but offenders of it.

The role of a mother is important in analyzing the concentration camps and torture because it illustrates the differences between the Madres, who were empowered by their own motherhood, and their daughters, who had this role taken from them. Looking at any progressive feminist movement in the Southern Cone of South America, it is important to understand that motherhood plays a very important role in the culture. Feminists in the region, although looking to further women's rights as citizens, have also always been very conscious of their importance as mothers.⁷¹ Motherhood has always been given respect and value. The Madres de Plaza de Mayo give one example of women using their motherhood as a means to attempt to procure rights as a citizen. While the Madres were out fighting for answers about their lost children, their daughters had their rights as mothers ripped away from them.

With more unthinkable tragedies, motherhood and children also became victims of the Dirty War. Many women arrived at the concentration camps pregnant or with children. These women experienced a variety of fates including not being allowed to see their children or being beaten up so that they would have a forced miscarriage.⁷² Juan Enrique Velázquez Rosano shared his story with the Argentine National Commission of the Disappeared, speaking about his experiences with his wife and children in the concentration camps. He describes a time that he and his wife were being tortured in the presence of their four children: "After beating my wife, they took the youngest child and held her upside down by the feet and hit her, saying to the mother, 'If you don't talk we will kill her.'"⁷³

The mother, Elba Lucía Gándara de Castromán, no longer had any control over what happened to her child. The military's tactics went past individual torture and began to attack the entire family. Not only would de Castromán surely have been petrified for the life of her child, but her own life and role in society was being attacked. Her captors took away her ability to protect her children which violated her most important role as defined by society. The military abused her from the core of what it meant to be a woman in Argentina.

The torture that was aimed at the disappeared mothers affected their role in the Dirty War in a different way than it affected their own mothers, the members of the Madres. Elisa Tokar, Miriam Lewin, and Munú Actis discuss a story, similarly horrifying to that of the de Castrománs, in which they remember the concentration camp at the Navy Mechanics School, known by its Spanish acronym ESMA. A couple named Víctor and Lita arrived at ESMA with a twenty-day-old baby. The baby was subjected to an electric shock and threatened to be smashed against the wall if the couple did not cooperate and talk.⁷⁴ The torturers created an intense atmosphere of fear for the parents, one that would likely get them to go along with exactly what their torturers wanted. In this way, the loss of children for the disappeared was different than the loss of children for the Madres de Plaza de Mayo. In the former case the attack on motherhood was paralyzing. It forced compliance from the people who had been working so hard against the government in the first place. Their role as mothers and their role as political activists both took direct hits. In the latter case, where the torture was removed from view, the Madres were able to take the fear and sadness they felt and draw empowerment from it by working to fix it. They felt their jobs as mothers had been expanded as opposed to taken away from them. They achieved the courage that was necessary to fight the abductors of their children.

The atrocities against families did not stop with torturing children

but continued to pervade society inside and outside of the concentration camps. Pregnant mothers in the camps lived out their pregnancies and gave birth in excruciating circumstances. For example, Gladys de H. testified to have been tortured even while pregnant, still receiving electric shocks and being beaten and raped. The electric shocks resulted in a neuro-physiological imbalance in her child when he was born.⁷⁵ Tokar revealed that while she was in ESMA the pregnant women were kept together in a locked room. "When they had to use the bathroom, they had to bang hard on the door from the inside so the guard would open it," she claimed.⁷⁶ Some of the women were forced to give birth blindfolded.⁷⁷ Outstandingly tragic as well was the fate of the babies that were born in the camps. Young babies were often taken from their mothers either when they arrived at the camps together or if the mother gave birth while captive. They were whisked away and frequently given or sold to military or military-sympathetic families for adoption.

Although the women in the concentration camps did not know their babies would be given away, the military again attacked their families. The women who wrote *That Inferno* discuss the fact that in the camps they did not know for sure what happened to the babies who were born there, they could only postulate. Lewin says that she always believed they gave the babies to the family members of the women because the pregnant women were told by the oppressors to write a letter to a family member who could raise the child until the mother was released.⁷⁸ Of course often neither of those things happened. The women died in the camps and the children were given away. This is another example of the junta taking control of motherhood and family. In this case they not only took it away from the mothers, but any family that was left behind. The people who were supposed to receive the babies never did, erasing two generations from their families.

This left many grandparents wondering about their lost grandchild-

dren. Señora Estela B. de Carlotto, for example, received a message from someone who was in a cell with her pregnant daughter, telling her where the baby should be after it was born. When the time came, de Carlotto searched the orphanage where the baby was supposed to be, and all the other orphanages in the area. A couple months later de Carlotto received another message, telling her to go to the district police station. The police told her that her daughter was dead and when questioned about the baby denied knowing anything about it. De Carlotto testified later about her potential grandchild saying that, "A short time ago it would have been six years old. I am still looking for him. And I will go on looking for him all my life."⁷⁹ Her statement demonstrates the lasting affects that the Dirty War had on the nation. Thousands of people lost their lives and thousands of people lost their loved ones. It was impossible for Argentina to recover from that quickly, even after the regime fell. At the same time, however, people like the Madres and de Carlotto continued to have faith and continued their search for answers. This included another organization, the Abuelas de Plaza de Mayo, which consisted of grandmothers who gathered together to search for answers to the location of their missing grandchildren.⁸⁰ They continued to ask questions about the disappeared and the generation of disappeared children that they left behind, some of which who did not even know they were lost.

Juan Gelman, a poet and author whose son and daughter-in-law were disappeared, comments on the strange grief of having lost a grandchild to the people who stole his own children in the piece called "An Open Letter to my Grandson or Granddaughter." He expands on the possibilities of what could have happened to the child and what his role as a grandparent should be in this case:

Conflicting ideas keep coming to me. On the one hand I have always found repugnant the idea of your calling "Daddy" some military or police gangster who stole you, or some friend of those who assassinated your father. On the other hand I have always wished that in whatever home you may have grown up you were well brought up

and educated and loved a lot.⁸¹

Gelman's commentary paints a picture of what the disappearances of these children meant to their families. The military not only potentially killed their children, but also stole the lives of their grandchildren from their families. They would never get to know them, tell them about their parents, or even know what they looked like. It was an affront to the familial life, leaving behind a generation with no one left. The 1985 film *The Official Story*, which explored the subject of stolen adopted children, won the 1985 Oscar for Best Foreign Language Film, drawing the world's attention to Argentina in a time when its story demanded awareness.⁸² This fascinating issue was extremely compelling and ended up as a way to publicize the events of Argentina which had been so silenced during the time of the Dirty War.

Through their actions during the Dirty War, the Madres de Plaza de Mayo broke free from the gender repression that had restricted them in Argentina for hundreds of years. They took control of their situation using motherhood as the backbone for their resistance movement. At the same time, they were redefining what the role of a mother was, finding that politics and interaction with public society could be compatible with protecting the morals of their society.

The military's power began to wane around 1981, and change was imminent. There was conflict within the ranks of the armed forces, the economy was on the verge of collapse, and international opinion criticized the dictatorship.⁸³ In 1982 the military junta made a fatal mistake when it attempted a final effort to retain power and tried to take the long-disputed Falkland Islands from Britain, not thinking that Britain would find it significant enough to send a strong defense. Argentina lost the Falklands War, however, and it became apparent that the military had lost their power. The Argentine public began to rally around the Madres, protest the government, and call for elections.⁸⁴ Shortly after, Raúl Alfonsín was elected as the new democrat-

ic leader of the country and his government took control on December 10th, 1983.

The Madres continued to work for justice after the disappearances stopped. With the restoration of democracy, the Madres de Plaza de Mayo wrote a bill that would make a commission to try the military, but the bill was defeated on the grounds that it would destabilize the government. Instead a different commission was created which would only investigate the disappearances. As far as the judgment of those responsible for the disappearances, the government considered it important to keep intact their defense; it was only the top military leaders that would be judged.⁸⁵ The government claimed that only these leaders were responsible because the lower ranking military was following orders, essentially excusing much of the military for their actions regarding the disappeared. Still, many of the Madres were not happy with these results.

The Madres continued, and still continue, to use their reclaimed political rights to focus on the future of a better Argentina. In 1986 the Madres split into two groups, the Madres de Plaza de Mayo-Founding Line and the Madres de Plaza de Mayo Association. The goal of the Founding Line was to continue work toward locating and identifying the disappeared through DNA testing and also to bring more of the military to justice. The Association focused more on a transformation of the government, vying for political change and socialist reform. What all of these women had in common, however, is that through their actions during the Dirty War they were able to create a new identity for women in Argentina. Belonging to the Madres de Plaza de Mayo allowed these women to show the world the significance of motherhood, but also demonstrated to themselves and their society that women belonged in other realms besides the home. Many of the Madres were able to go back to school, continue to work in the political world, and expand their lives outside of their homes. They even began to work with other human rights organiza-

tions, especially those for women, across the globe to share their expertise and help women institute change worldwide. Through their grassroots organization, the Madres de Plaza de Mayo reminded Argentina of the importance and power of motherhood, but also seized the opportunity to expand the presence of women in the political realm and redefine what it meant to be a woman.

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A WINTER WALK BY KARRIE HOAG

THE BIRTH OF POSTWAR AMERICANISM: THE ORIGIN OF THE COLD WAR



BY JOHN FRANCIS O'HALLORAN

In West Potomac Park, Washington, D.C., three solitary, lonely statues of American and South Korean soldiers stand in eternal vigilance. There's an inscription beneath them, in both Korean and English, displaying the park's theme as "The Forgotten War." On a nearby wall, underneath the known lists of men and women who fought and died during the Korean conflict, a placard reads, "Freedom is not Free." Just over the wall and down the park's carefully kept pathways, a cluster of marble-white soldiers stand forever frozen in a replicated environment of the Korean War that pillaged the Korean peninsula with the blood of Koreans and Americans in 1950. One last bronze-casted plaque summates the entire thematic enterprise of the Korean War, glorifying the American "Sons and Daughters/ Who Answered the Call/ to Defend a Country/ They Never Knew/ and A People They Never Met."¹

In an attempt to restore significance to an apparently forgotten war, the Korean Memorial Park symbolizes two contradictory, yet quintessential effects of the Korean War. While 'Forgotten' by the current historiography of the Cold War, the Korean War solidified the twentieth-century role of an international, militarized America. From the post-World War II period to nearly the end of the twentieth-century, a foreign policy of exceptionalism began to manifest itself in various justified military and economic interventions. A common trope of this justification originated from a vilified depiction of Communism. The preoccupation with Communism first began with the United States' government in the post-World War II period. The government foresaw the threat that Communism posed to United States' international interests and began to fret over the implications of a

powerful and global Communist presence. Yet, in post-World War II America, the general public did not prioritize the international scene as a direct and existential threat to American domestic interests. The threat Communism posed to the legitimacy of the United States' democratic free market society only became synonymous with both the general public and government at the physical manifestation of the North Korean invasion of the United States' trusteeship of South Korea in 1950.

In the historiographical tradition of Cold War America, near unanimous consensus stated that the American experiences of the Cold War had severe implications on the domestic rhetoric throughout the twentieth-century.² Yet, there has been little unanimity regarding the specificity of the advent of the Cold War as an American experience: what this means is that no one can say for certain when the Cold War began.³ Before propositioning this paper's theory, it is important to understand how the history of the Cold War has so far been comprehended because this paper directly engages with the Cold War's historiographical tradition.

John Fousek, a historian who specializes in American foreign policy during the twentieth-century, claims the Cold War's aggression resulted from the acclaimed moral American victory of World War II.⁴ By fighting a 'good war' against the evil Nazi Germans, the American postwar mindset began to promote ethical justifications for international interventionism in the name of morality and 'just war.' Fousek argues that, over the course of the Cold War, the public continually referenced the victorious sentiments of World War II and, in doing so, spread an ideology legitimizing the need for American interventionism during the Cold War for the 'good' of the world. Therefore, Fousek argues that the Cold War never truly began; rather, World War II's recognition of the justified morality of the American acts of war continued to manifest throughout the Cold War, only with a different enemy. Properly understanding the Cold War and Korean

War within the ideological inertia generated from two previously rhetorically justified World Wars demonstrates how the larger public discourse so easily acclimatized to the Cold War's call for a moral America that had a responsibility to the international arena.

In contrast to Fousek, John Gaddis, a preeminent military historian at Yale University, suggests in *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* the Cold War really began in 1945 at the Potsdam Conference.⁵ Conducted at what seemed to be the sure downfall of the German threat, the purpose of the Conference was to settle on an agenda for the administrations of the postwar territories of the Axis powers. Gaddis argues that the personalities of Truman, Churchill (Atlee after 1945), and Stalin so thoroughly clashed in the war of wills at the Conference that the inevitable byproduct resulted in a global petrified stalemate known as the Cold War.⁶ Therefore, the Cold War became inevitable and institutionalized at the 1945 Potsdam Conference. In 2005, Gaddis, responding to postmodern criticism, wrote *Cold War: A New History*, in which he recognizes the importance of the continued domestic legitimatization of the American role in the Cold War.⁷ Without the public's legitimatization of the Cold War, Gaddis argues, the interrelationship between America on the international stage, and the international Cold War on the American public discourse would not be as severe as historically suggested. Regardless, the Cold War, Gaddis concludes, as a conceptual advent of the world divided between the democracies and Communist states began at the Potsdam Conference in 1945. The public later infused the resulting government's preoccupation with the international threat of Communism.

These historiographical interpretations offer a foundation to promulgate this paper's argument. Fousek's recognition that the legitimization of the Cold War and the American role within it rose out of the American public discourse directly contradicts Gaddis' insistence on the centrality of the role of the government propagating a

national attitude of anti-Communism.⁸ However, both overlook a critical piece of the post-World War II era that complicates their arguments. That is to say, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the American public, in general, had no interest in continuing to participate on the international arena. The Cold War, therefore, could not be said to have begun in 1945, as Gaddis argues, because the American public had not yet conceptualized the idea of a Cold War and an American role within it. Rather, it took a series of domestic events, such as the dramatized and publicized trials of Senator McCarthy and the Supreme Court convictions of US citizens as communists, in 1949 that culminated in the advent of the Korean War in 1950 to formulate and instill a conceptualization of the Cold War within the American discourse.

Beginning in the 1940s, the American economy experienced an upswing that left the people basking in the comforts of their newfound material wealth and industrial capabilities.⁹ At the barest of glimpses of Census data, it is easy to see how America had become inoculated against any serious preoccupation with foreign affairs.¹⁰ Wages increased triple-fold, with a 178% increase in consumer expenditures, accompanied by a 151.9% increase of the average household's income as compared to post-World War I.¹¹ Average family expenditures increased 120.1% in the new economic prosperity. Food, clothing and housing accounted for 68.4% of total spending, a decrease from 1934-1940, signifying the mass profusion of consumer products in the economy.¹² Not only did the dollar have a greater value, but also the accessibility to consumer goods became seemingly ubiquitous throughout the American culture. To top it all off, there had been a 10% increase in the population, with a 58% rise in newborns as compared to the 1935-1940 period.¹³ The experience of wealth and new opportunities, while generally limited to the enjoyment of an exclusive proportion of the population, generated a post-World War II social attitude of narcissistic optimism. The American

people became absolutely captivated by the possibility of the fulfillment of their various consumerist aspirations.¹⁴ In their search for the manifestation of their sacrifices during the War, the public regarded external affairs as secondary, if at all.

Meanwhile, the American government descended into an anxious and defensively aggressive posture towards the international community. The fears of a reoccurrence of totalitarian regimes, like in Hitler's Nazi Germany, kept intelligence agencies constantly mobilized. This prolonged hyperextension resulted in a paranoid state, fearful of the any suggestion of illiberal movements on the international stage. Reflections on the previous two wars within governmental agencies brought about a somewhat timid consensus that misery, destruction and ruin necessarily created the appropriate ingredients for authoritarianism and militant fascism. A 1947 Department of State Policy Planning Staff meeting's minutes demonstrates such a belief. The memo suggests how any

further deterioration might be disastrous to Europe. It might well bring such hardship, such bewilderment, such desperate struggle for control over inadequate resources as to lead to widespread repudiation of the principles on which modern European civilization has been founded and for which, in the minds of many, two world wars have been fought... United States interests could not fail to be profoundly affected by such a trend of events.¹⁵

The 'desperate struggle' for simple basic necessities like food, shelter and water underlined the belief that an unstable European continent would necessarily lead to the resurgence of another fascist or authoritarian leader.¹⁶ These thoughts were not unfounded beliefs, for the rise of Hitler came about with the campaign promise to restore a German dignity, pride, and, most importantly, reestablish a stable society.¹⁷ Therefore, the State Department believed European post-war destruction increased the chances of another Nazi Germany or Mussolini Italy. Without American intervention, such a fatalistic prediction could become a reality. This speculation generated a sense of

global stewardship in the minds and policies of United States' bureaucracy.

For example, National Security Council Memo #68 (NSC68), written in 1950, demonstrates the government's belief in the American economy to save Europe.¹⁸ The American industrial strength has the potency, NSC68 argued, to support the fledgling European states. In doing so, the inherent attractiveness of dictatorial regimes and Communism came into question. By lending funds, machinery, and subsidizing the rebuilding of general infrastructure, outlined within NSC68, the National Security Council hoped to entice the devastated populations with the superiority of democratic governance and capitalist free market economies. By restoring a modicum of stability to the society, American assistance could reverse the disparity that pushed the population to seek extreme leftist solutions, as it had in both World War I and II, as well as in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1908. As such, NSC68 demonstrates how the government believed it had a direct role in the sustaining and propagating the international democratic order.

NSC68 demonstrates the government's belief that the international war against Communism could be fought with simple means such as economic loans, industrial recovery programs, and, most interestingly, food programs.¹⁹ Indeed, an official War Department memo in 1946 recorded an open hostility and barely-concealed anxiety in the American government at the presence of neighboring Soviet territories.²⁰ On March 17th 1951, the Digest of the Office of Current Information, a daily communiqué that relayed critical news updates throughout the Central Intelligence Agency, worried over the trade relations between India and China. Even though an expected delivery of two million tons of US wheat was scheduled for the next year, 13,100 tons of Communist Chinese rice already reached India, with two more shipments on their way.²¹ A tone of impatience, worry and a concluding call for expedited attention to the seriousness of being

outpaced by the Communists ran throughout the communiqué.

Throughout the post-War World II era, President Truman made numerous appeals to the American Congress and its people to help overwhelmed states preserve their sociopolitical integrity from illiberal revolutions.²² In 1947, President Truman stood before the 79th Joint Congressional Session to ask for appropriations to intervene on behalf of the besieged states of Greece and Turkey. The purpose of the funds, Truman suggested, would be to give Greece and Turkey the opportunity “to work out their own destinies in their own way.” President Truman came to the conclusion that because “there is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn,” the political solidarity and duty to “keep...hope alive” fell to America, its people and leaders.²³ The famous example of this new American ulterior ‘altruism’ came to be known as the Marshall Plan, which funneled 44.8 billion US dollars into loans and rebuilding programs, with over 85% of the loan targeting areas in Europe from its start of 1948 till 1953.²⁴ The Marshall Plan and the internal departmental communications demonstrate the United States’ belief in the necessity of taking proactive, interventionist, and international steps in the name of democracy.

However, with World War II officially over, the public reverted back to an isolationistic attitude, unsympathetic to the pleas of devastated postwar states. The government’s role as a global American savior failed to register within the public in the immediate postwar period. In fact, pressured by businessmen and corporations to lower taxes, Congress severely restricted the fiscal budget, specifically targeting the military budget as revealed in Appendix I.²⁵ Instead, at the demand of its constituency, federal tax dollars were shuffled and interchanged in the Revenue Acts of 1945 and 1948 in the interest of reducing taxes in both the corporate and individual interests. This had the effect of severely restricting the previous wartime government’s powers.²⁶ Rather than expanding power in a manner that was

conducive to waging a global war, the American government's capabilities were restricted and limited in the postwar period at the demand of the public in the interest of domestic pursuits. This suggests that the conventionalization of the Cold War in the postwar public discourse had not yet taken root.

In fact, Gallup Polls conducted at this time registered a public appeal for the government to fulfill the public's World War II sacrifices by making accessible a variety of consumer products. For example, 98% of American cities denoted a shortage of available housing from 1945 to 1946. Petitions for redress of this shortfall requested the government's assistance in helping the public realize their dreams of owning their own home.²⁷ Furthermore, consumer products, like houses, tallied in Gallup Polls as the foremost concern on the American mind.²⁸ In fact, U.S. foreign policy never surpassed the fifth position from 1946 to 1949 according to Gallup Polls.²⁹ It is illuminating how, even though 85% of the American public knew of the Chinese Civil War, a little over half of those said that the United States no longer had a role or responsibility in the matter.³⁰ Additionally, even though there was wide support in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the idea that the United States would find itself in another war within the next ten years did not resonate with the majority of the American population.³¹ In these examples, the United States' public interest never wandered outside of their pursuits at home. Instead, they remained firmly fixed within the domestic sphere.³²

Yet, a series of subsequent events from the end of 1949 to 1950 inspired fear and paranoia that synched the public's mindset to a similar militarized attitude of their hawkish government. These events were heard, read and followed by every American through the intense attention devoted by various news media outlets. For example, in August 1949, the *New York Times* confirmed that the Soviets had detonated their own atomic bomb.³³ Throughout the following

months, the media worked to calm the growing panic in the public, by publishing articles like 'US Plans Unaltered Despite Soviet Denotation.'³⁴ In this article, the government announced that measures had been planned for a Soviet nuclear arsenal, but in order to keep ahead of the Soviets, "more steam must be put on" to indemnify American security and stability in their dominance.³⁵ Not a month afterwards, on October 1, 1949 Mao Zedong christened China as the People's Republic of China, and by May of 1950, the Chinese Communists overran the last nationalist stronghold in the Hainan Islands.³⁶ These two events quite vividly put the idea of a powerful enemy, antagonistic to American interests, in the center of the American mind.

Furthermore, in October 1949, eleven members of the American Communist party were convicted in the United States Supreme Court for insurrection and treason in a conspiracy of a violent Communist insurrection in the United States.³⁷ Again, on January 21, 1950, Alger Hiss, a high-ranking State Department official, received a five-year sentence for conspiracy and collaboration with Communist intentions.³⁸ To top it all off, Senator McCarthy's Chairmanship on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and the House Un-American Committee (HUAC) brought forth a total of 653 people for investigations into acclaimed subversive actions and intent.³⁹ From the Lavender Scare to the Red Scare, the wild accusations of the HUAC inspired an atmosphere of fear and distrust throughout the government and public.⁴⁰ Quite suddenly, from a removed threat of a Soviet nuclear bomb and a remote, primitive culture as the Chinese, the Communist specter became a palpable existence not only surrounding America, but also within the very walls of society itself.⁴¹ The rhetoric of an international competition with the Soviets and a claim of an increased wariness of the Chinese decisively warped into a demand for a governmental guarantee of the public stability and safety, not only on an international scale, but also within the domes-

tic context.

On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the United States protectorate of South Korea. That same day, President Truman appealed to both the people and to Congress for a fully militarized response. Only this time, in his rhetoric, Truman depicted the threat that Communism posed in direct opposition to the self-interests of the United States, international stability, and global democratic legitimacy.⁴² President Truman concluded his speech to Congress by crying,

Our country stands before the world as an example of how free men, under God, can build a community of neighbors, working together for the good of all. That is the goal we seek not only for ourselves, but for all people.⁴³

President Truman provoked an intense imagery of America as not just a successful icon of freedom, capitalism and Western society, but also an America that was universally attractive.⁴⁴ The underlying principles of Truman's exceptionalism seemingly demanded global actualization. The Korean War and its immediate context of the public's heightened trepidation gave the United States' government the legitimacy to fully reengage with the threat of Communism on an international stage in the name of defense and the pursuit of the nation's self-interest.⁴⁵ The guarantee of stability and security that the public had been looking for since the events of the previous year found a resonance with the President's declaration of war. However, the declaration of war wasn't just in the name of South Korean democracy, and by extension global democracy, but also against the Communist aggression wherever it was to be found. This declaration of war demonstrates a beginning conception of American global responsibility for democratic principles and democracies. As such the genesis of American Cold War sensibilities took place within the context of the American rhetoric of ethical interventionism of the Korean War.

On June 29, 1950, a few days after the American military formal-

ized against the North Korean invasion, approximately 675 constituent telegrams and letters were received at the White House. A Presidential memo indicates that 525 of 675 telegrams and letters responded favorably to the President's actions in authorizing General Douglas MacArthur to respond to the North Korean invasion with armed force.⁴⁶ However, the public's perception of what the war meant in these communications had profound implications. One letter of this vast collection foresaw the intent of the Korean War "to deter the Russians from attacking anywhere else in the world"; the letter's author, Mrs. Whitman, as portrayed in Appendix II, suggests a preemptive strategy by having "complete mobilization now" against all forms of Communist aggression.⁴⁷ Mrs. Whitman's letter is typical in expressing approval of the new international role of America and its purpose in the global stage. For months after the United States entered the war in Korea, as John Fousek argues, "public opinion polls showed high levels of support for the administration's defense buildup; they also suggest that most Americans viewed the Korean situation in global terms."⁴⁸ The social and political shift in priorities, from internal domestic concerns of housing and the like, to the demand of supremacy of an American democracy reflects a broad foundation of public support for the war against the North Koreans and the Soviet-inspired, global Communist aggression. The Korean War and its surrounding context provided enough momentum to distract the public from their immediate self-interests to prioritize the threat posed by Communism.

Literature, music and movies from the 1950s succinctly demonstrate this shift. In literature, pulp fiction metaphorically presented the Communist 'enemy' and American 'savior.' For example, as exhibited in Appendix III, the Korean soldier in the backdrop of the cover page of *The Naked and the Lost*, by Franklin M. Davis and published in 1952, represents a villainous Communist archetype.⁴⁹ A naked, white, young woman stands to the side, hiding behind the

door; a white, middle-aged man in the center of the title appears to tense in preparation for defending the woman and fighting the Korean.⁵⁰ By holding a pistol, it seems the American will use armed defense in order to save the dignity of the vulnerable female.⁵¹ As only one example of many, *The Naked and the Lost* exemplifies the manifestation of Cold War rhetoric through the context of the Korean War within the literature genus. While it's unknown to the extent these types of fiction were consumed, an induction from this title page suggests that the symbolic personification of the Cold War took on an idealization of America as a defender against a Communist aggressor.

Country music witnessed a similar transition to romanticizing the patriotism of an international America, demonstrating a shift in the conceptualization of the Korean War and the principles behind the war. Singers like Harry Choates, Elton Britt, and Wilif Carter sang lyrics laced with a glorification of inherent American political and social superiority.⁵² On January 24, 1952, Carter sang, *Good-Bye Maria (I'm Off to Korea)*. A lyric in *Good-Bye Maria* reads, "It's the same old story and it's up to Old Glory/ To win another fight for liberty."⁵³ Carter's lyrics directly correlate the moral duty of America, personified by Carter as 'Old Glory,' to an American responsibility for the promotion of democracy. Resonations of American involvement in World War II also reverberate in Carter's lyrics by comparing the 'same old story' of World War II in 1945 to the new war in Korea. Seen through Carter's lyrical composition, country music during the 1950s makes unmistakable parallels between the future of democracy and the role of an international America.⁵⁴ The thematic tropes in the 1950s country music genre positively sentimentalized the association of an American role in defending democracy on an international stage.⁵⁵

In his article "Reluctant Crusaders," Lary May, a historian at the University of Minnesota who specializes in the visual culture of the early Cold War era, discusses the patriotic cinematography of the

1950s. May states that the patriotism displayed in the cinema during the 1950s was designed between the government and Hollywood producers. May argues that government leaders “saw the mass arts as a vehicle not to reflect group life, but to recreate American myths and symbols.”⁵⁶ As a prime example, in 1951, President Truman praised Hollywood during a meeting with producers and his top cabinet members, saying, “no organization in the world can make a better contribution to [constructing] truth than yours.”⁵⁷ The creation of over thirty-five Korean War films from 1950 to 1960 converged with government and Hollywood efforts to build a postwar consensus of American identity or, as President Truman called it, the construction of ‘truth.’ The Korean War, May continues, “provided a golden opportunity... to promote to a wider audience, the call for containment at home and abroad,” and to assume “a global role as a model of liberal capitalism and defender of the world from Communism.”⁵⁸ Through the consumption of visual depictions of good (America) versus evil (Communists) in the cinema during the Korean War, like in music and fiction, government officials hoped the public would rally behind a patriotic message of an international America.⁵⁹

The appearance of nationalistic movies, literature and music in the 1950s indicates a distinctive change in the public discourse as compared to only a few years before.⁶⁰ From 1945 to 1949, the American experience of postwar economic abundance disengaged the public's prioritization from the international scene. The Cold War could not have begun before the 1950s because the concept of an international America with a moral obligation to the world for the continual preservation of democracy did not exist within the public rhetoric at the time. Instead, the public's attention fixated on the realization of their consumerist aspirations. However, the government's distress of a third World War arising from the postwar ashes led to a far earlier bureaucratic preoccupation on the international stage. The interdepartmental dialogues from the State Department and National Secu-

rity Council demonstrate the perceived belief in the correlation between the prevalence of Communism in ravaged states and the consequential discrediting of democracy and free market societies. As a result, the government struggled to evolve into a role where it could combat the Communist spread through various economic and military means when its public had no interest in following suit.

It took the physical invasion of Communist forces, depicted as the North Koreans, on a United States' South Korean protectorate, to create the public and government's consonance on the threat of Communism. As a result, the public legitimized the government's compulsion for a role on the international stage. The constituent letters received at the White House, the indicative voting records registered through the Gallup Polls, and the emergence of jingoistic music, literature and cinematography substantiate the public's shift in priorities. The synching between the government and public's fear of Communism generated what the historiography of twentieth-century America calls the Cold War.

Therefore, John Gaddis and John Fousek are correct in assuming that significant inertia for the Cold War psyche originated from World War II and its era. However, they do not consider the effects of war weariness on the American public in the immediate postwar years. Undoubtedly, as Gaddis argues, the Potsdam Conference of 1945 had severe repercussions in systematizing the international geopolitical arena for the coming Cold War. Similarly, according to Fousek, the morality of a 'just war,' like that of the American role during World War II, continued to justify future American interventions. However, neither of these explanations account for the postwar public fixation on domesticity from 1945-1949. The advent of the Korean War and the analysis presented in this paper reveal the significance of the events of the early 1950s for creating the accordance between the public and the government in the threat of international Communism. By presenting the 'Forgotten War' as the nucleus event in

the genesis of the Cold War, the Korean War regains its due reputation in the historiography of Cold War America.

NOTES

¹ "Washington, D.C. Korean War Memorial Park," *Google Maps*, Google, retrieved from <https://maps.google.com/maps/ms?ie=UTF8&oe=UTF8&msa=0&msid=110474354619290582136.00048f79c5a09878ddb7a>.

² Elizabeth Cohen, *A Consumers' Republic: The Politics of Mass Consumption in Postwar America* (New York: Random House, 2003).

³ Tom Engelhardt, *The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and Disillusioning of a Generation* (New York, NY: BasicBooks, 1995): 95.

⁴ John Fousek, *To Lead the Free World: American Nationalism and the Cultural Roots of the Cold War* (New York: The University of North Carolina Press, 2000): 2.

⁵ John Lewis Gaddis, *The United States and the origins of the cold war, 1941-1947* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1972).

⁶ The entire field of modern international relations is based on chronology and outcomes of the Cold War. For instance, see Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996); also, Francis Fukuyama, *The End of History and the Last Man* (New York: Free Press, 1992).

⁷ John Lewis Gaddis, *The Cold War: a new history* (New York: Penguin Press, 2005).

⁸ Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 63.

⁹ Cohen argues this prosperity was created by the centralized control over wages and consumer prices during and in the immediate aftermath of World War II. For more information see Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic*, 62-109.

¹⁰ Although there had been minor interventions in Northern Turkey and the 1950's mass propaganda in Iran, these operations were seen or heard of very little except within the higher echelons of the government and intelligence agencies: US Department of State, *Outgoing Airgram: To Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1950* (Washington, D.C.: National Security Agency Archives, 1992):

www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%a20016.pdf.

¹¹ U.S. Department of Labor, U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Report 991: 100 Years of US Consumer Spending: Data for the Nation, New York City, and Boston* (Washington, D.C.: Government Publications Office, 2006): 21.

¹² *Ibid.*

¹³ *Ibid.*, 22.

¹⁴ Elaine Tyler May, "The Commodity Gap: Consumerism and the Modern Home," from *Homeward Bound: American Families in the Cold War Era*, in *Consumerism Society in American History: A Reader*, ed. Laurence Glickman (New York: Cornell University, 1999): 304-305, 308, 313; Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic*, 202-204; J. Ronald Oakley, *God's Country: America in the Fifties* (New York: Dembner Books, 1986): 117.

¹⁵ US Department of State, George Kennan, *Department of State Policy Planning Staff meeting regarding the U.S. and European reconstruction* (c. July 1947):

<http://www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/documents/episode-3/07-04.htm>.

¹⁶ Aaron Bobrow-Strain, "Making White Bread by the Bomb's Early Light: Anxiety, Abundance, and Industrial Food Power in the Early Cold War," *Food and Foodways: Explorations in The History and Culture of Human Nourishment* 19 (2011): 1-2, <http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/07409710.2011.544191>.

¹⁷ Frank McDonough, "Why Did Hitler Come to Power?" in *Hitler and the Rise of the Nazi Party* (Harlow, England: Pearson, 2012).

¹⁸ Executive Secretary, NSC 68: *A Report to the National Security Council*, President's Secretary's File, Truman Papers (April, 1950): http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/10-1.pdf.

¹⁹ For additional information, see the historical analysis of American production of food in a cross-cultural and international stage in Nathan Abrams, "Mother's Old-Fashioned Gefilte Fish," ed. Nathan Abrams and Julie Hughes in *Containing America: Cultural Production and Consumption in Fifties America* (Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham Press, 2000): 87; also, Bobrow-Strain, "Making White Bread," 1-2, 74-97.

²⁰ Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Memo: Joint Chiefs of Staff to Harry S. Truman*. July 26, 1946. Subject File, Clifford Papers. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/coldwar/documents/pdf/7-1.pdf#zoom=100.

²¹ Central Intelligence Agency, *Daily Digest of Significant Traffic: February 17th* (Office of Current Intelligence, 1951): http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/index.php.

²² Harry Truman, "Radio Appeal to the Nation for Food Conservation to Relieve Hunger Abroad," *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman: 1945-1953*, April 19, 1946, <http://trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=1529>.

²³ Harry Truman, "Special Message to the Congress on Greece and Turkey: The Truman Doctrine," *Public Papers of the Presidents: Harry S. Truman: 1945-1953*, March 12, 1947, <http://www.trumanlibrary.org/publicpapers/index.php?pid=2189&st=&st1=>.

²⁴ George Marshall, the US Secretary of State and a widely admired political actor, namesake of the Marshall Plan, echoed Truman's sentiments at a Harvard University Conference, creating the foundations of what was to be known as the Marshall Plan. See, http://www.oecd.org/general/the_marshallplanspeechatharvarduniversity5june1947.htm; "Summary of State Department's Position of European Recovery Plan", August 26, 1947. Subject File, Clifford Papers. http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/marshall/large/documents/index.php?pagenumber=2&document-date=1947-08-26&documentid=6-2. See: European Recovery Act of 1948, Pub. L. No. 472 (General Records of the United States Government: Record Group 11, 1948): http://www.archives.gov/exhibits/featured_documents/marshall_plan/.

²⁵ See Appendix I. Dinah Walker, "Trends in U.S. Military Spending," *Council on Foreign Relation* (July 30, 2013): www.cfr.org/defense-budget/trends-us-military-spending/p28855.

²⁶ Revenue Act of 1948, ch. 168, 62 Stat. 110 (Apr. 2, 1948): http://www.law.cornell.edu/topn/revenue_act_of_1948. Accessed November 3, 2013; Revenue Act of 1950, ch. 994, 64 Stat. 906 (Sept. 23, 1950): http://www.law.cornell.edu/topn/revenue_act_of_1950. Accessed November 3, 2013.

²⁷ For more information see Regine Lee Blaszczyk, *American Consumer Society, 1865-2005: From Hearth to HDTV* (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 2009); also, footnote

28.

²⁸ This idea of the home as an obsessive preoccupation of the postwar America has wide historical consensus. For a much more comprehensive on the nature of postwar consumerism, see: May, "The Commodity Gap"; Cohen, *A Consumer's Republic*.

²⁹ George Gallup, *The Gallup Poll: 1935-1971 v.2* (New York: American Institute of Public Opinion, 1972): 835; May, "The Commodity Gap," 303.

³⁰ *Ibid.*, 903.

³¹ *Ibid.*, 1026.

³² May, "The Commodity Gap," 301;

³³ "Soviet Union has 'Atomic Weapon,'" *The United Press* (September 25, 1949): pg. 1,

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³⁴ "US Plans Unaltered By Soviet Atom Bomb," *New York Times* (October 15, 1949): pg. 5, <https://login.ezproxy-eres.up.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy-eres.up.edu:2048/docview/105911747?accountid=14703>.

³⁵ *Ibid.*

³⁶ "Wholesale Evacuation," *New York Times* (December 8, 1949): pg. 14,

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[eres.up.edu:2048/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/105890239/141916711697B6B5559/7?accountid=14703](http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy-eres.up.edu:2048/hnpnewyorktimes/docview/105890239/141916711697B6B5559/7?accountid=14703).

³⁷ On the persecution of American Communists, see Trial Testimony in Joint Appendix, United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, *United States of America v. Eugene Dennis et al.* (1950), vol. IV, in *The United States since 1945: A Documentary Reader*, ed. Robert Ingalls and David Johnson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009): 31-35.

³⁸ "Alger Hiss: Guilty as Charged Courtroom Scene Four Big Questions," *New York Times*

(January 22, 1950): pg.127,

[https://login.ezproxyeres.up.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy-](https://login.ezproxyeres.up.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy-eres)

[eres.up.edu:2048/docview/111352853?accountid=14703](https://login.ezproxyeres.up.edu/login?url=http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy-eres.up.edu:2048/docview/111352853?accountid=14703).

³⁹ Oakley, *God's Country*, 65.

⁴⁰ U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Departments, *Employment of Homosexuals and Other Sex Perverts in Government: Interim Report*, S. Doc. 241, 81st Cong. 2nd Sess. (1950) in *The United States since 1945: A Documentary Reader*, ed. Robert Ingalls and David Johnson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2009): 31-35. For the theme of the rising domestic tension and the resulting byproducts, see Karin Stanford, *If We Must Die: African American Voices on War and Peace*, ed. Karin L. Stanford (Lanham, Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc., 2008): 179-209, 181-182.

⁴¹ *The New York Times* comments extensively throughout the postwar years about the looming threat of the Communist spreading disease, the so-called political theory of the domino effect. The Domino Theory believed that when one country structures their government and socioeconomics around a Marxist political philosophy, nearby states have an increased likelihood of instability and inclination towards a similar design. For example, "Communism in Latin America," *New York Times* (January 3,

1947): pg. 20, <http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy-eres.up.edu:2048/hnpnewyork-times/docview/111682326/1418F1A349B1506C913/5?accountid=14703>.

⁴² Fousek, *To lead the free world*, 166. Harry Truman, "Document 55: President Truman's Televised Address to the Nation on the Deployment of U.S. Forces to Korea, July 19, 1950," in *Calls to Arms: Presidential Speeches, Messages, and Declarations of War*, ed. Russell Buhite (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources Inc., 2003): 200, 208, 209.

⁴³ *Ibid.*, 211.

⁴⁴ Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 166.

⁴⁵ Report No. 748, S. 2319, 81st Cong., 1st sess, "A Bill to Promote World Peace... by Providing Aid to the Republic of Korea" (July 22, 1949): Harry S Truman Administration, Elsey Papers, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?pagenumber=4&documentdate=1949-07-22&documentid=kr-3-14. It is important and, I believe, indicative of the overall thesis of this paper to the list the full name of the bill: "A Bill - To promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States by providing aid to the Republic of Korea." The grammatical causation in the previous title lends a suggestion that by becoming international interventionists, in this case to the Republic of Korea, the general welfare and national interest of America, not to mention world peace, will be promoted.

⁴⁶ W.J.H., *Memorandum for Mr. Ross: June 29, 1950* (Washington: National Archives and Records Service, Truman Papers):

[http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-06-29&documentid=ki-10-2&pagenumber=1)

[documentdate=1950-06-29&documentid=ki-10-2&pagenumber=1](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-06-29&documentid=ki-10-2&pagenumber=1).

⁴⁷ Roland Whitman, Jr. to Harry S. Truman with Reply From William D. Hassett. August 4, 1950. Official File, Truman Papers.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/

[index.php?documentdate=1950-08-04&documentid=ki-11-2&pagenumber=.](http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-08-04&documentid=ki-11-2&pagenumber=.) Accessed November 5, 2013.

⁴⁸ Fousek, *To Lead the Free World*, 168.

⁴⁹ Franklin M. Davis, *The Naked and the Lost* (New York: Lion, 1952).

⁵⁰ As Bill Osgerby points out, "The magazines' heroes were, without exception, wholesome white Americans or (occasionally) western Europeans": Bill Osgerby, "Muscular manhood and salacious sleaze: the singular world of the 1950s macho pulps," in *Containing America: Cultural Production and Consumption in Fifties America*, edited by Nathan Abrams and Julie Hughes. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham Press, 2000. Also echoes of World War II pulp fiction propaganda reverberate in the second generation pulp fiction books for Korea. Wendy Kozol argues, "these images functioned as surrogate object of heterosexual desire but also as symbols of the reasons American men were fighting": Wendy Kozol, "The Kind of People Who Make Good Americans': Nationalism and *Life's* Family Ideal," in *Looking for America: The Production of Nation and People*, ed. Ardis Cameron (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd., 2005): 180; also, Ella Taylor, *Prime-time families: television culture in postwar America* (Los Angeles, CA: University of California Press, 1989).

⁵¹ Franklin M. Davis, Jr., *The Naked and the Lost* (New York: Lion Books, 1952). For a full explanation on the phenomenon of postwar pulp fiction, see Osgerby, "Muscular manhood," 127.

⁵² John Schram and Charles Grean, *The Unknown Soldier*, with Elton Britt (1951) RCA Victor 20-5140: http://www.authentichistory.com/1946-1960/2-korea/3-music/19510000c_The_Unknown_Soldier-Elton_Britt.html; Harry Choates, *Korea, Here We Come*, with Harry Choates, (1950): http://www.authentichistory.com/1946-1960/2-korea/3-music/19500000c_Korea_Here_We_Come-Harry_Choates.html.

⁵³ Don Larkin, Ken O'Rourke and Joe Simson, *Goodbye Maria (I'm Off To Korea)*, with Wilif Carter, RCA Victor 47-4523 (1952): http://www.authentichistory.com/1946-1960/2-korea/3-music/19520124_Good-Bye_Maria_Im_Off_To_Korea-Wilif_Carter.html#78.

⁵⁴ Ivan M. Tribe, "Purple Hearts, Heartbreak Ridge, and Korean Mud: Pain, Patriotism, and Faith in the 1950-53 'Police Action,'" in *Country Music Goes to War*, ed. Charles K. Wolfe and James E. Akenson (Lexington, KY: The University Press of Kentucky, 2005): 126-143.

⁵⁵ For additional examples, see: Jimmy Osborne, *The Voice of Free America*, SRC-13 (1951): http://www.authentichistory.com/1946-1960/2-korea/3music/19511011_The_Voice_of_Free_America-Jimmie_Osborne.html; also, Howards Howard, *When They Drop The Atomic Bomb*, with Jackie Doll and his Pickled Peppers, Mercury 6322 (1951): http://www.authentichistory.com/1946-1960/2-korea/3music/19510000_When_They_Drop_The_Atomic_Bomb-Jackie_Doll_and_his_Pickled_Peppers.html.


⁵⁶ Lary May, "Reluctant Crusaders: Korean War Films and the Lost Audience," in *Remembering the Forgotten War: The Korean War through Literature and Art*, ed. Philip West and Suh Ji-moon (New York: Maureen and Mike Mansfield Center, 2001): 112.

⁵⁷ "Truman meets with Hollywood big wigs 1951," YouTube video, 0:43, posted by "historycomestolife," (April 13, 2012): <http://youtu.be/224aWgiKNu4>.

⁵⁸ May, "Reluctant Crusaders," 126, 127.

⁵⁹ Kerry Freedman makes an interesting claim in his article, "Art Education and Changing Political Agendas: An Analysis of Curriculum Concerns of the 1940s and 1950s." He says that a historical analysis of the pedagogy and syllabi of art classrooms from 1947 to 1950 demonstrates a similar emphasis on the visual depictions of a nationalistic and moral international America. The study of Freedman's work and the history of education during the beginning of the Cold War deserve greater attention in the historiography of the Cold War. See Robert Hughes, *American Visions: The Epic History of Art in America* (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1997): 465-514.


⁶⁰ Oakley, *God's Country*, 116; Fousek, *To lead the free world*, 13, 171: "By 1950, then, American nationalist globalism provided the ideological framework for a broad public consensus behind the Truman administration's Cold War stance. Some Americans held opinions outside of that consensual framework, of course, but such opinions were now thoroughly marginal, culturally demonized, and politically irrelevant."



Appendix I

Walker, Dinah. "Trends in U.S. Military Spending." *Council on Foreign Relations*. July 30, 2013. www.cfr.org/defense-budget/trends-us-military-spending/p28855.


NORTHWEST PASSAGES



Appendix II

Whitman, Jr, Roland to Harry S. Truman with Reply From William D. Hassett. August 4, 1950. Official File, Truman Papers.

http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/-koreanwar/documents/index.php?documentdate=1950-08-04&documentid=ki-11-2&pagenumber= . Accessed November 5, 2013.



Appendix III

Davis, Franklin M. *The Naked and the Lost*. New York: Lion, 1952.



MISSISSIPPI HEROES BY SIERRA HUITT

“WITH GREAT POWER
COMES GREAT RESPONSIBILITY”:
AMERICAN COMIC BOOK CENSORSHIP
AND THE COLD WAR CONSENSUS

■
BY CARISSA YOUNG

“Faster than a speeding bullet, more powerful than a locomotive and able to leap tall buildings in a single bound”— Comic books have been a dynamic commodity in American history.¹ During the Great Depression and World War II, comic books and graphic novels emerged as a new form of mass culture which uniquely targeted adolescents. Known as the “Golden Age of Comics”, the period from 1938 to early 1950s saw an unparalleled rise of comic sales. Scholars have estimated that in 1944, ninety-four percent of American children ages 6-11 and eighty-five percent ages 12-17 read comic books regularly.² The superhero genre, largely modeled after the success of Superman, became extremely popular during WWII when writers like Jerry Robinson, Will Eisner, and Stan Lee penned new soldiers to win the war: Batman, The Spirit and Captain America.³ Most of the superhuman celebrities that have dominated popular American culture with lunchboxes, backpacks, and billion dollar blockbuster films were “born” during WWII. Children paid over 20 million dollars a year to see Captain Marvel and others brutally defeating the Axis enemy.⁴ Despite their trivial association today, comic books were an important medium through which nationalistic ideas were imparted to children.

Regardless of their patriotic themes during the war, these youth-centered commodities caught the negative attention of the larger population. In the 1950s parental organizations, psychoanalysts, and church groups called for a closer investigation of comic book content. A psychiatrist, Dr. Frederic Wertham, published *The Seduction of the Innocent* (1954) which claimed that comic books gave children

“criminal or sexually abnormal ideas.”⁵ The best-selling book and the Senate Subcommittee on Juvenile Delinquency effectively ended the “Golden Age” of comic freedom. Anticipating the impending threat of government censorship, a group of comic publishers developed the Comic Code Authority (1954).⁶ The Comics Code “Seal of Approval” on the cover of a comic book marked that it was morally acceptable for sale in the U.S. Ultimately, the Comics Code Authority and the Comics Code, the set of rules established at the convention, radically transformed the standards for comic publishing.

While historians have noted that the 1950s controversy ended the Golden Age of comics, few have understood the shifting attitudes that made the anti-comic campaign so effective. Why had a commodity that was deemed an inoffensive pastime for children during the war, become the center of an impassioned debate during the 1950s? Building off of the work of historians Amy Kiste Nyberg and Paul Lopes, I will show that this large scale backlash was not simply prompted by a desire to protect children from profane material. Instead, it reflected broader cultural shifts of the 1950s toward cultural consensus. The anti-comic crusade and the Comics Code both hoped to temper a counter-cultural media to fit the family-centered conservatism of the Cold War.

Today, comics are associated with hobby shops and cultural sub-groups, but in the 1950s they represented an enormously successful industry with a significant popular following. During the war, comic book writers and publishers capitalized on the conflict by publishing superhero and war titles. The fact that the number of new comic issues jumped from 22 in 1939 to 1,125 in 1944 despite wartime paper rationing demonstrates the pervasiveness of comic literature.⁷ The end of the war signaled victory for the allies, but comic publishers feared they would lose their best material and sales would take a hit. Comic publishers frantically diversified their issues, adding new genres of comic books to the stands, creating a multiplicity of genres in

addition to the conventional superhero: teen, crime, romance, westerns, horror, history, animal, and animated classics. Titles such as *Millie the Model* (1945) and *Archie's Girls, Betty and Veronica* (1950) targeted the untapped market of teen girls; Romance titles targeted older females and boasted titles such as *Young Romance*, *Romantic Secrets*, *Sweethearts*, *Love Mystery* and *Cupid*.⁸ By the end of the war, publishing companies attempted to reach even wider audiences with female-targeted genres.

Other grittier comic book genres emerged in the 1940s and 50s to survive the postwar slump. Entertaining Comics, or EC, lead the industry in crime and horror books, the genres most criticized by Wertham and others. Children increasingly spent their nickels and dimes to read the grisly tales of *The Vault of Horror*, *The Crypt of Terror* and *Tales from the Crypt*. *Crime Doesn't Pay*, *Crime Can't Win*, *Crime Patrol*, and *Crime Suspense Stories* were among the most popular of the crime genre.⁹ The publishing of these new assorted genres ensured that comic books could be found in nearly every home in America during the early 1950s.¹⁰ Comic books became a staple of youth culture, much to the chagrin of adults

However, this period of unbridled growth did not last; the 1950s saw the rise of a widespread, but largely unfounded, belief that reading comic book harmed children's learning. The criticism was not new; Sterling North, literary critic for the *Chicago Daily News* had already launched a large-scale public campaign against "the highly colored enemy" in 1941, claiming that comic books stunt children's literacy. Parenting magazines of the 1940s and 50s published countless articles about "the comic problem."¹¹ One journalist wrote, "These comics may be leading back to the drawings of the caveman, reducing our vocabulary to monosyllables such as 'Oof!' and 'Zowie!'"¹² Historian Amy Kiste Nyberg evaluated the claim that comic books harmed children's intelligence by looking at several psychological studies that were conducted in the 1940s about the effect of comic

book reading on adolescents.¹³ Furthermore, some educators felt that comic books could be a useful “stepping stone” to get children into reading.¹⁴ Analysis of the debate caused Nyberg to ask, “Why did adults find children’s preoccupation with comic books disturbing, despite evidence that suggested that it was an apparently harmless leisure activity?”¹⁵ Educational grievances cannot account for all of the concern about comic books.

Adding to fears about literacy and comics, many believed that reading comic books caused juvenile delinquency. Psychologists and journalists of the era consistently linked comics to the criminal and violent behavior of children. Dr. Frederic Wertham presented the most demining evidence of the connection in his 1954 book *Seduction of the Innocent*. In his psychological practice, he came across countless delinquent adolescents and found one commonality between them: they all read comic books obsessively.¹⁶ He wrote of his discovery:

Slowly, and at first reluctantly, I have come to the conclusion that this chronic stimulation, temptation and seduction by comic books, both their content and their alluring advertisement of knives and guns, are contributing factors to many children’s maladjustment... If I were asked to express in a single sentence what has happened mentally to many American children during the last decade I would know no better formula than to say that they were conquered by Superman.¹⁷

Wertham presented many cases in which children had committed “sadistic” acts of violence. He aimed to link the patterns in delinquency to the rise of comic book popularity. In *Seduction of the Innocent*, Wertham described the case of a 10-year-old boy who pushed a small boy into water so that the small boy drowned. In interviews the boy admitted to loving crime comics where, “Sometimes they get killed, the gangsters, the cops kill them. Sometimes they hit each other when one of them does something wrong. Sometimes they use knives.”¹⁸ The interview caused Wertham to conclude, “... our patient

would not have been pushed to the murder if his mind had not been imbued with readiness for violence and murder by his continuous comic-book reading."¹⁹ According to Wertham, kids learned violence from comic books. Another example comes from the *New York Times*. It reported that two boys, ages 11 and 12, flew a stolen plane 120 miles "on knowledge obtained from comic books."²⁰ The public believed that the deviance present in comic books elicited deviance in their readers.

Despite the fact that Wertham and his supporters exposed shockingly violent comic content. Nonetheless, concerns about crime and juvenile delinquency do not fully explain the explosion of criticism. The abundance of graphic and gruesome comics indeed fueled the fire for Wertham's argument.²¹ Themes of violence, horror, and crime clearly dominated American comic books. However, the link between these themes and childhood delinquency was not as strong as Wertham suggested. Famous comic artist Stan Lee replied to Wertham: "He did a study that demonstrated that most of the kids in reform schools read comic books. So I said to him, 'If you do another survey, you'll find that most of the kids drink milk, too. Should we ban milk?'"²² Defenders of comic books, like Lee, doubted Wertham's theory of causation and posited that the relationship between delinquency and comics was merely a correlation. Historian James Gilbert argued that the fear of juvenile delinquency in the 1950s was not based on actual statistics. While the FBI warned about rising youth crime in the 1950s, according to Gilbert, Children's Courts showed "little increase, and where it did, much of that was of the victimless variety, or related to a challenge of authority."²³ If indeed comic books enticed adolescents to commit violent crimes, the explosion of comic book popularity should have coincided with a dramatic increase in adolescent crime rates, but this did not occur. Furthermore, the censorship and decline of comic books in the late 1950s did not result in a corresponding decline in juvenile delin-

quency. Crime comics and horror comics contained a significant amount of grisly images and explicit violence and, perhaps, parents were justified not to want their kids to consume such graphic material. However, a closer look at the delinquency argument reveals that concerns about criminality and comics do not sufficiently explain the extreme negative response and resulting push for censorship.

Instead, there were a few unspoken, and possibly unintentional, motives behind the anti-comic crusade: to promote ideal American family values, delineate proper gender and sexual conduct, and promote democratic order. After the end of WWII, the relationship between the communist Soviet Union and the United States became contentious. The Cold War conflict between American democracy and Soviet communism infiltrated common domestic issues, such as agriculture, suburbanization, and consumerism. American Cold War leaders wished to prove the American way of life as more desirable than all other countries, especially communist ones. Thus, national appearance became a central issue. American industry, families, morality, and government all had to be obviously superior to those of the Soviets. It was also vital to minimize conflict among citizens and create what historian Matthew J. Costello deems a “cultural consensus.”²⁴ In many ways, comic books, with their controversial images and plotlines, posed a threat to the consensus so crucial for “winning” the Cold War. The comic crusade aimed to censor comic books to reflect the supremacy of particular American institutions

Importantly, critics of comic books framed the debate around the American family, emphasizing the protection of childhood and parental responsibility. Opponents of comics frequently used phrases such as “seducing the impressionable”, “entrapping American’s children” and “violating innocent minds.”²⁵ In a society increasingly centered on the family home, comic books were characterized as a danger to the security and happiness of the home.

In 1948, on a public radio debate titled “What’s Wrong with the

Comics?" John Mason Brown, a critic for the *Saturday Review of Literature*, called comic books "the marijuana of the nursery; the bane of the bassinet; the horror of the house; the curse of the kids; and a threat to the future."²⁶ In other words, comics were a dangerous immoral object that had infiltrated the family. Comic artists preyed on children and parents had an obligation to do something about it. A 1953 article in *Catholic World* expressed how letting children read comic books reflected upon the parents. It read, "Parents have to realize that everytime their children sit down to peruse a comic book their own failure as parents is being exposed."²⁷ The author expressed the need for parents to be more involved in the products their children consumed. Critics conveyed comic books as a threat to the decency and strength of the American family.

Likewise, the Comics Code revealed the public's anxiety about comics' portrayal of marriage and divorce. In her extensive study of romance comics from the post war period, Jeanne Emerson Gardner discovered that the portrayal of romance and married life in comic such as *True Romance* and *Young Love* was anything but idyllic. In fact, many comic stories featured women falling in passionate love outside of their mundane marriages. One panel from a particularly telling issue of *Girl Confessions* in 1954 contained a young wife saying, "Between taking care of the baby, washing diapers, cooking and cleaning, I became more irritable as time went on...Why can't he stop for a few minutes and give me some help?"²⁸ Like this unhappy woman, many characters in romance comics found themselves trapped in flawed marriages. However, the anti-comic crusade wished to put an end to this negative portrait of married life, which conflicted with the 1950s ideal. Romance comics could not continue their habit of, as Gardner wrote, "exposing the wrongs of the institutions [marriage and consumerism] they promoted as right."²⁹ Instead Comic Codes stated new rules:

- (1) Divorce shall not be treated humorously nor represented as desirable

(3) Respect for parents, the moral code, and for honorable behavior shall be fostered. A sympathetic understanding of the problems of love is not a license for morbid distortion.

(4) The treatment of live-romance stories shall emphasize the value of the home and the sanctity of marriage.³⁰

The Code cemented the notion that there would be no more unhappy marriages in American comic books. This “morbid distortion of the problems of romance” reflected badly upon the American institution of marriage and the increasing concern with the suburban family home.³¹ During the 1950s, the Comic Code Authority forbade publishers to reveal “cracks in the facade” and encouraged them to uphold the sanctity of the American family.

The war against comics also endorsed regulations about sexuality. Aside from simply wanting to protect children from sexually explicit images, they also wished to eliminate themes they viewed as “sexually abnormal.”³² Some comic fans have labeled this portion of the comic conflict, a “gay witch hunt.”³³ Batman and Robin; The Spirit and Ebony White; Captain America and Bucky: It seemed that nearly every comic superhero in the Golden Age had a trusty young sidekick. They were fiercely loyal to each other and dedicated to thwarting crime. Yet, the hero-sidekick relationship alarmed parents and psychoanalysts, who labeled it pederasty. Wertham wrote, “They [Batman and Robin] live in sumptuous quarters, with beautiful flowers in large vases, and have a butler. It is like a wish dream of two homosexuals living together ... the Batman type of story may stimulate children to homosexual fantasies.”³⁴ Wertham’s suggestion that the innocent storylines conveyed subliminal homosexual messages to kids sparked a barrage of questions. Was The Spirit so keen to protect Ebony because he was loyal to him or because he was in love with him? Did Wonder Woman’s adoption of a daughter really have “lesbian overtones?”³⁵ The comic industry immediately responded to the speculations. Bob Kane, Batman’s writer, retorted, “No, Batman is not gay. Why? Because he isn’t written that way!”³⁶ When that didn’t sat-

isfy, comic writers introduced more female love interests for the masked crusaders.³⁷ Roberta Pearson and William Uricchio argue that the introduction of characters like Cat-Woman and BatGirl intended to quell rumors of Batman's homosexuality.³⁸ Comic books rewrote stories and characters in order appease the public's fear of controversial sexuality in comic books.

The Comics Code of 1954 dealt with the issue of sexuality more blatantly. It stated that "sex perversion and sexual abnormalities or any inference to same is strictly forbidden."³⁹ The convention decided that comic books presented sexuality; it should be "normal sexuality." The American Psychological Association in 1952 officially labeled homosexuality a mental disorder in 1952.⁴⁰ Thus, the worry about homosexuality in comics likened itself to a fear of a disease that could infect children. In order to uphold the moral code and protect the health and normality of American youth, all hints of homoeroticism had to be eliminated from superhero comics.

The role of women offered another point of contention in the comic controversy, as female comic characters often behaved in ways that were not compatible with the 1950s standard for femininity. A collection of *The Spirit* comics from the 1940s and 50s called *Femme Fatales* gives insight into the typical portrayal of women in comic books. During the Golden Age, Will Eisner created the characters of Silk Satin, Madam Minx and Nylon Rose, all equally voluptuous and diabolical.⁴¹ These women used their sexuality to lure men into traps and thwart The Spirit's heroic effort. They smoked, drank, swore and fought violently, a dangerous model for young girls. Even female superheroes fell short of societal standards. As Wertham wrote, "They are not homemakers. They do not bring up a family. Mother-love is entirely absent."⁴² Wertham worried that girls who read comic books would look up to these fictional women as role models.⁴³ Wertham and others saw that comic books had the potential to shape young children's view of women.

Comic books, especially Wonder Woman issues, were criticized for presenting a controversial characterization of American women. Wonder Woman, argues feminist historian Lillian S. Robinson, was too strong and independent to fit well in the 1950s social climate.⁴⁴ Her crime-fighting persona distressed audiences in a time when "the most fundamental job of the American woman", as Secretary of Labor James O. Mitchell stated, was "being a good wife, a homemaker, a mother."⁴⁵ Wonder Woman did not fit the bill, and many critics reproached her as an "anti-masculine" lesbian.⁴⁶ Resultantly stripped of her powers and status as an Amazonian princess, Wonder Woman assumed the role of a career woman who quietly pined over Steve Trevor and fought crime through conventional means (she did not regain her superpowers until the 1970s).⁴⁷ Her transformation paralleled larger societal shifts about American womanhood.

The Comics Code set a standard for male-female relationships by responding to the widespread reproach of flirtatious and scandalous women in comic books. Rule #4 under the heading "Marriage and Sex" stated "The treatment of romance stories shall emphasize the value of the home and the sanctity of marriage."⁴⁸ The relationships between men and women in comic books, as evidenced by Will Eisner and *The Spirit's* many vixens, had become too controversial. The Comics Code restricted the portrayal of romance to fit with the strict gender norms of the conservative 1950s.

In many ways, the Cold War concern about the triumph of democracy and the American way influenced the debate about comic books. In the midst of the Cold War, Americans wanted to believe that America and its laws were superiorly modern and effective. Thus, any suggestion that large-scale conflict, such as crime and racism, existed throughout the country was injurious to America's success. Politicians and the media strived to consistently portray America as a virtuous nation that protected its moral citizens. However, crime and superhero comic books posed an obstacle for this positive inter-

pretation. The report from the 1954 Senate Subcommittee Hearings on Juvenile Delinquency expresses how superheroes cast a negative light on the American criminal justice system. It read:

Members of the subcommittee believe that in this respect content of the comic books can be criticized. In many crime comics, law and order are maintained by supernatural and superhuman heroes, and officers of the law, ineffective in apprehending criminal, must depend on aid from fantastic characters. The law-enforcement officials who do solve cases often succeed through "accidental events." In contrast, actual law-enforcement officials are at a disadvantage in terms of prestige and the small part they play in apprehending criminals. The impressions obtained from the comic books are contrary to the methodical routine work characteristic of police investigation.⁴⁹

The senate feared that the portrayal of incompetent cops and supernatural forces overtaking criminals painted a damaging picture of the justice system. One story found in *Blue Beetle* #35 showed cops thwarted by the villain throwing pies in their faces, while the superhero successfully apprehended the criminal.⁵⁰ Congress feared that comic book highlighted social ills like crime and demeaned government entities.

The Comic Codes echoed the public's desire for a more positive portrayal of American institutions. Several of the rules dealt with the portrayal of crime:

- (1) Crimes shall never be presented in such a way as to create sympathy for the criminal, to promote distrust of the forces of law and justice ...
- (3) Policemen, judges, Government officials and respected institutions shall never be presented in a way as to create disrespect for established authority...
- (6) In every instance good shall triumph over evil and the criminal punished for his misdeeds.⁵¹

The codes essentially banned any adverse depictions of the American government and its officials. The publishers at the convention wanted comics to present America as a place where good would always win, and the government would eradicate evil. Thus, the

American system, as opposed to a communist one, worked because its citizens lived safely and happily. Not only did comic crusaders desire to curb the criminality of children; they also had a political stake in reducing the depictions of crime.

The dissemination of comic books abroad heightened the anxiety about the negative portrayals of America. During WWII, hundreds of thousands of comic books were sent to soldiers and civilians abroad as morale-boosters and propaganda.⁵² However, in the postwar period, the presence of comic books abroad caused alarm. One comic book boasted that it was “Published in 25 countries throughout the world!” Yet this same comic depicted corrupt Federal Agents and Police Officers bungling their jobs.⁵³ Wertham saw comic books as an “ill-will ambassador abroad.”⁵⁴ After WWII, the United State of America found itself in a position of power throughout the world. It was imperative that these trivial children’s magazines did not undermine their authority abroad. Wertham even dedicated a chapter of his book to the subject of American comic books abroad, showing the embarrassment caused by the widespread readership of “such trash.”⁵⁵ Other European countries had already passed laws limiting the sale of comic books. Wertham claimed that the U.S. government’s failure to ban comics demonstrated a failure of democracy. He wrote:

The pure food and drug laws, the ordinances against spitting in the subway and about clean drink-cups protect bodies. Surely the minds of children deserve as much protection. I do not advocate censorship, which is imposing the will of the few on the many, but just the opposite, a step to real democracy: the protection of the many against the few.⁵⁶

Wertham wished the Senate to pass laws banning the creation of horror and crime books, in part, so they would not reach international audiences. His supporters, such a senator Joseph F. Carlino, asked the subcommittee of Juvenile Delinquency to “give the world an example of American integrity” and ban comics.⁵⁷ Comic books, like

other aspects of American life, had an obligation to reflect the success of American democracy.

The 1950s comic controversy had disastrous results for the comic book industry. Fifteen of the forty-two comic book publishers went bankrupt and closed in the summer of 1954 alone. An additional twenty publishers closed their doors by 1958.⁵⁸ The number of annual publications in 1952 had been in the 3,000s and fell to less than half that by 1956. The Golden Age had ended, setting the stage for the Silver Age. The few publishers who survived the crash (DC, Marvel, Archie, Harvey and Charlton) innovated to maintain moderate cultural relevance.⁵⁹ However, due to the anti-comic crusade, comic books would never again occupy the same place in American culture.

The early 1950s controversy about comic books represented, on the surface, a moral panic about childhood innocence. However, looking at the work of comic opponents and the industry's response (the Comics Code), one can identify several underlying themes within the debate. In order to stay afloat in the Cold War America, comic books must reflect the dominant cultural messages about family, marriage, sex, and democracy. Looking at the genesis and devolution of the comic book industry does not merely indulge comic book fans; it provides a vivid example of the dialectic nature of culture and consumerism. The Cold War move toward cultural consensus impacted the industry dramatically; the criticisms proffered by parental, governmental and psychological groups irrevocably transformed it. The formerly unrestricted comic book industry translated messages and values to their audience, but during the 1950s, many in the American public attempted to alter those messages. The comic book industry's hold on the minds and pocket books of American children gave it enormous power. Yet, these critics claimed that the industry had a responsibility to reflect responsibility to promote the values of contemporary America. Thus, comic books were swept away by the tidal wave of Cold War consensus.

NOTES

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- ²⁶ *Ibid.*, 12.
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- ²⁸ *Ibid.*, 106.
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- ³³ Wertham, *Seduction of the Innocent*, 190.
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