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The Birth of Postwar Americanism: The Origin of the Cold War

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In West Potomac Park, Washington, D.C., three solitary, lonely statues of American and South Korean soldiers stand in eternal vigilance. There's an inscription beneath them, in both Korean and English, displaying the park's theme as “The Forgotten War.” On a nearby wall, underneath the known lists of men and women who fought and died during the Korean conflict, a placard reads, “Freedom is not Free.” Just over the wall and down the park's carefully kept pathways, a cluster of marble-white soldiers stand forever frozen in a replicated environment of the Korean War that pillaged the Korean peninsula with the blood of Koreans and Americans in 1950. One last bronze-casted plaque summates the entire thematic enterprise of the Korean War, glorifying the American “Sons and Daughters/ Who Answered the Call/ to Defend a Country/ They Never Knew/ and A People They Never Met.”

In an attempt to restore significance to an apparently forgotten war, the Korean Memorial Park symbolizes two contradictory, yet quintessential effects of the Korean War. While ‘Forgotten’ by the current historiography of the Cold War, the Korean War solidified the twentieth-century role of an international, militarized America. From the post-World War II period to nearly the end of the twentieth-century, a foreign policy of exceptionalism began to manifest itself in various justified military and economic interventions. A common trope of this justification originated from a vilified depiction of Communism. The preoccupation with Communism first began with the United States' government in the post-World War II period. The government foresaw the threat that Communism posed to United States' international interests and began to fret over the implications of a
powerful and global Communist presence. Yet, in post-World War II America, the general public did not prioritize the international scene as a direct and existential threat to American domestic interests. The threat Communism posed to the legitimacy of the United States' democratic free market society only became synonymous with both the general public and government at the physical manifestation of the North Korean invasion of the United States' trusteeship of South Korea in 1950.

In the historiographical tradition of Cold War America, near unanimous consensus stated that the American experiences of the Cold War had severe implications on the domestic rhetoric throughout the twentieth-century. Yet, there has been little unanimity regarding the specificity of the advent of the Cold War as an American experience: what this means is that no one can say for certain when the Cold War began. Before propositioning this paper's theory, it is important to understand how the history of the Cold War has so far been comprehended because this paper directly engages with the Cold War's historiographical tradition.

John Fousek, a historian who specializes in American foreign policy during the twentieth-century, claims the Cold War's aggression resulted from the acclaimed moral American victory of World War II. By fighting a ‘good war’ against the evil Nazi Germans, the American postwar mindset began to promote ethical justifications for international interventionism in the name of morality and ‘just war.’ Fousek argues that, over the course of the Cold War, the public continually referenced the victorious sentiments of World War II and, in doing so, spread an ideology legitimizing the need for American interventionism during the Cold War for the ‘good’ of the world. Therefore, Fousek argues that the Cold War never truly began; rather, World War II’s recognition of the justified morality of the American acts of war continued to manifest throughout the Cold War, only with a different enemy. Properly understanding the Cold War and Korean
War within the ideological inertia generated from two previously rhetorically justified World Wars demonstrates how the larger public discourse so easily acclimatized to the Cold War's call for a moral America that had a responsibility to the international arena.

In contrast to Fousek, John Gaddis, a preeminent military historian at Yale University, suggests in *The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1941-1947* the Cold War really began in 1945 at the Potsdam Conference. Conducted at what seemed to be the sure downfall of the German threat, the purpose of the Conference was to settle on an agenda for the administrations of the postwar territories of the Axis powers. Gaddis argues that the personalities of Truman, Churchill (Atlee after 1945), and Stalin so thoroughly clashed in the war of wills at the Conference that the inevitable byproduct resulted in a global petrified stalemate known as the Cold War. Therefore, the Cold War became inevitable and institutionalized at the 1945 Potsdam Conference. In 2005, Gaddis, responding to postmodern criticism, wrote *Cold War: A New History*, in which he recognizes the importance of the continued domestic legitimatization of the American role in the Cold War. Without the public's legitimatization of the Cold War, Gaddis argues, the interrelationship between America on the international stage, and the international Cold War on the American public discourse would not be as severe as historically suggested. Regardless, the Cold War, Gaddis concludes, as a conceptual advent of the world divided between the democracies and Communist states began at the Potsdam Conference in 1945. The public later infused the resulting government's preoccupation with the international threat of Communism.

These historiographical interpretations offer a foundation to promulgate this paper's argument. Fousek's recognition that the legitimization of the Cold War and the American role within it rose out of the American public discourse directly contradicts Gaddis' insistence on the centrality of the role of the government propagating a
national attitude of anti-Communism. However, both overlook a critical piece of the post-World War II era that complicates their arguments. That is to say, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the American public, in general, had no interest in continuing to participate on the international arena. The Cold War, therefore, could not be said to have begun in 1945, as Gaddis argues, because the American public had not yet conceptualized the idea of a Cold War and an American role within it. Rather, it took a series of domestic events, such as the dramatized and publicized trials of Senator McCarthy and the Supreme Court convictions of US citizens as communists, in 1949 that culminated in the advent of the Korean War in 1950 to formulate and instill a conceptualization of the Cold War within the American discourse.

Beginning in the 1940s, the American economy experienced an upswing that left the people basking in the comforts of their newfound material wealth and industrial capabilities. At the barest of glimpses of Census data, it is easy to see how America had become inoculated against any serious preoccupation with foreign affairs. Wages increased triple-fold, with a 178% increase in consumer expenditures, accompanied by a 151.9% increase of the average household's income as compared to post-World War I. Average family expenditures increased 120.1% in the new economic prosperity. Food, clothing and housing accounted for 68.4% of total spending, a decrease from 1934-1940, signifying the mass profusion of consumer products in the economy. Not only did the dollar have a greater value, but also the accessibility to consumer goods became seemingly ubiquitous throughout the American culture. To top it all off, there had been a 10% increase in the population, with a 58% rise in newborns as compared to the 1935-1940 period. The experience of wealth and new opportunities, while generally limited to the enjoyment of an exclusive proportion of the population, generated a post-World War II social attitude of narcissistic optimism. The American
people became absolutely captivated by the possibility of the fulfillment of their various consumerist aspirations. In their search for the manifestation of their sacrifices during the War, the public regarded external affairs as secondary, if at all.

Meanwhile, the American government descended into an anxious and defensively aggressive posture towards the international community. The fears of a reoccurrence of totalitarian regimes, like in Hitler's Nazi Germany, kept intelligence agencies constantly mobilized. This prolonged hyperextension resulted in a paranoid state, fearful of the any suggestion of illiberal movements on the international stage. Reflections on the previous two wars within governmental agencies brought about a somewhat timid consensus that misery, destruction and ruin necessarily created the appropriate ingredients for authoritarianism and militant fascism. A 1947 Department of State Policy Planning Staff meeting's minutes demonstrates such a belief. The memo suggests how any further deterioration might be disastrous to Europe. It might well bring such hardship, such bewilderment, such desperate struggle for control over inadequate resources as to lead to widespread repudiation of the principles on which modern European civilization has been founded and for which, in the minds of many, two world wars have been fought... United States interests could not fail to be profoundly affected by such a trend of events.

The ‘desperate struggle' for simple basic necessities like food, shelter and water underlined the belief that an unstable European continent would necessarily lead to the resurgence of another fascist or authoritarian leader. These thoughts were not unfounded beliefs, for the rise of Hitler came about with the campaign promise to restore a German dignity, pride, and, most importantly, reestablish a stable society. Therefore, the State Department believed European post-war destruction increased the chances of another Nazi Germany or Mussolini Italy. Without American intervention, such a fatalistic prediction could become a reality. This speculation generated a sense of
global stewardship in the minds and policies of United States' bureaucracy.

For example, National Security Council Memo #68 (NSC68), written in 1950, demonstrates the government's belief in the American economy to save Europe. The American industrial strength has the potency, NSC68 argued, to support the fledging European states. In doing so, the inherent attractiveness of dictatorial regimes and Communism came into question. By lending funds, machinery, and subsidizing the rebuilding of general infrastructure, outlined within NSC68, the National Security Council hoped to entice the devastated populations with the superiority of democratic governance and capitalist free market economies. By restoring a modicum of stability to the society, American assistance could reverse the disparity that pushed the population to seek extreme leftist solutions, as it had in both World War I and II, as well as in the Bolshevik Revolution of 1908. As such, NSC68 demonstrates how the government believed it had a direct role in the sustaining and propagating the international democratic order.

NSC68 demonstrates the government's belief that the international war against Communism could be fought with simple means such as economic loans, industrial recovery programs, and, most interestingly, food programs. Indeed, an official War Department memo in 1946 recorded an open hostility and barely-concealed anxiety in the American government at the presence of neighboring Soviet territories. On March 17th 1951, the Digest of the Office of Current Information, a daily communiqué that relayed critical news updates throughout the Central Intelligence Agency, worried over the trade relations between India and China. Even though an expected delivery of two million tons of US wheat was scheduled for the next year, 13,100 tons of Communist Chinese rice already reached India, with two more shipments on their way. A tone of impatience, worry and a concluding call for expedited attention to the seriousness of being
outpaced by the Communists ran throughout the communique.

Throughout the post-War World II era, President Truman made numerous appeals to the American Congress and its people to help overwhelmed states preserve their sociopolitical integrity from illiberal revolutions. In 1947, President Truman stood before the 79th Joint Congressional Session to ask for appropriations to intervene on behalf of the besieged states of Greece and Turkey. The purpose of the funds, Truman suggested, would be to give Greece and Turkey the opportunity “to work out their own destinies in their own way.” President Truman came to the conclusion that because “there is no other country to which democratic Greece can turn,” the political solidarity and duty to “keep...hope alive” fell to America, its people and leaders. The famous example of this new American ulterior ‘altruism’ came to be known as the Marshall Plan, which funneled 44.8 billion US dollars into loans and rebuilding programs, with over 85% of the loan targeting areas in Europe from its start of 1948 till 1953. The Marshall Plan and the internal departmental communications demonstrate the United States' belief in the necessity of taking proactive, interventionist, and international steps in the name of democracy.

However, with World War II officially over, the public reverted back to an isolationistic attitude, unsympathetic to the pleas of devastated postwar states. The government’s role as a global American savior failed to register within the public in the immediate postwar period. In fact, pressured by businessmen and corporations to lower taxes, Congress severely restricted the fiscal budget, specifically targeting the military budget as revealed in Appendix I. Instead, at the demand of its constituency, federal tax dollars were shuffled and interchanged in the Revenue Acts of 1945 and 1948 in the interest of reducing taxes in both the corporate and individual interests. This had the effect of severely restricting the previous wartime government’s powers. Rather than expanding power in a manner that was
conducive to waging a global war, the American government's capabilities were restricted and limited in the postwar period at the demand of the public in the interest of domestic pursuits. This suggests that the conventionalization of the Cold War in the postwar public discourse had not yet taken root.

In fact, Gallup Polls conducted at this time registered a public appeal for the government to fulfill the public's World War II sacrifices by making accessible a variety of consumer products. For example, 98% of American cities denoted a shortage of available housing from 1945 to 1946. Petitions for redress of this shortfall requested the government's assistance in helping the public realize their dreams of owning their own home.27 Furthermore, consumer products, like houses, tallied in Gallup Polls as the foremost concern on the American mind.28 In fact, U.S. foreign policy never surpassed the fifth position from 1946 to 1949 according to Gallup Polls.29 It is illuminating how, even though 85% of the American public knew of the Chinese Civil War, a little over half of those said that the United States no longer had a role or responsibility in the matter.30 Additionally, even though there was wide support in the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the idea that the United States would find itself in another war within the next ten years did not resonate with the majority of the American population.31 In these examples, the United States' public interest never wandered outside of their pursuits at home. Instead, they remained firmly fixed within the domestic sphere.32

Yet, a series of subsequent events from the end of 1949 to 1950 inspired fear and paranoia that synched the public's mindset to a similar militarized attitude of their hawkish government. These events were heard, read and followed by every American through the intense attention devoted by various news media outlets. For example, in August 1949, the *New York Times* confirmed that the Soviets had detonated their own atomic bomb.33 Throughout the following
months, the media worked to calm the growing panic in the public, by publishing articles like ‘US Plans Unaltered Despite Soviet Deno-
tation’34. In this article, the government announced that measures had been planned for a Soviet nuclear arsenal, but in order to keep ahead of the Soviets, “more steam must be put on” to indemnify American security and stability in their dominance.35 Not a month afterwards, on October 1, 1949 Mao Zedong christened China as the People’s Republic of China, and by May of 1950, the Chinese Communists overran the last nationalist stronghold in the Hainan Islands.36 These two events quite vividly put the idea of a powerful enemy, antagonistic to American interests, in the center of the American mind.

Furthermore, in October 1949, eleven members of the American Communist party were convicted in the United States Supreme Court for insurrection and treason in a conspiracy of a violent Communist insurrection in the United States.37 Again, on January 21, 1950, Alger Hiss, a high-ranking State Department official, received a five-year sentence for conspiracy and collaboration with Communist intentions.38 To top it all off, Senator McCarthy’s Chairmanship on the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations and the House Un-American Committee (HUAC) brought forth a total of 653 people for investigations into acclaimed subversive actions and intent.39 From the Lavender Scare to the Red Scare, the wild accusations of the HUAC inspired an atmosphere of fear and distrust throughout the government and public.40 Quite suddenly, from a removed threat of a Soviet nuclear bomb and a remote, primitive culture as the Chinese, the Communist specter became a palpable existence not only surrounding America, but also within the very walls of society itself.41 The rhetoric of an international competition with the Soviets and a claim of an increased wariness of the Chinese decisively warped into a demand for a governmental guarantee of the public stability and safety, not only on an international scale, but also within the domes-
tic context.

On June 25, 1950, the North Korean army invaded the United States protectorate of South Korea. That same day, President Truman appealed to both the people and to Congress for a fully militarized response. Only this time, in his rhetoric, Truman depicted the threat that Communism posed in direct opposition to the self-interests of the United States, international stability, and global democratic legitimacy.42 President Truman concluded his speech to Congress by crying,

Our country stands before the world as an example of how free men, under God, can build a community of neighbors, working together for the good of all. That is the goal we seek not only for ourselves, but for all people.43

President Truman provoked an intense imagery of America as not just a successful icon of freedom, capitalism and Western society, but also an America that was universally attractive.44 The underlying principles of Truman's exceptionalism seemingly demanded global actualization. The Korean War and its immediate context of the public's heightened trepidation gave the United States' government the legitimacy to fully reengage with the threat of Communism on an international stage in the name of defense and the pursuit of the nation's self-interest.45 The guarantee of stability and security that the public had been looking for since the events of the previous year found a resonation with the President's declaration of war. However, the declaration of war wasn't just in the name of South Korean democracy, and by extension global democracy, but also against the Communist aggression wherever it was to be found. This declaration of war demonstrates a beginning conception of American global responsibility for democratic principles and democracies. As such the genesis of American Cold War sensibilities took place within the context of the American rhetoric of ethical interventionism of the Korean War.

On June 29, 1950, a few days after the American military formal-
ized against the North Korean invasion, approximately 675 constituent telegrams and letters were received at the White House. A Presidential memo indicates that 525 of 675 telegrams and letters responded favorably to the President's actions in authorizing General Douglas MacArthur to respond to the North Korean invasion with armed force. However, the public's perception of what the war meant in these communications had profound implications. One letter of this vast collection foresaw the intent of the Korean War “to deter the Russians from attacking anywhere else in the world”; the letter's author, Mrs. Whitman, as portrayed in Appendix II, suggests a preemptive strategy by having “complete mobilization now” against all forms of Communist aggression. Mrs. Whitman's letter is typical in expressing approval of the new international role of America and its purpose in the global stage. For months after the United States entered the war in Korea, as John Fousek argues, “public opinion polls showed high levels of support for the administration's defense buildup; they also suggest that most Americans viewed the Korean situation in global terms.” The social and political shift in priorities, from internal domestic concerns of housing and the like, to the demand of supremacy of an American democracy reflects a broad foundation of public support for the war against the North Koreans and the Soviet-inspired, global Communist aggression. The Korean War and its surrounding context provided enough momentum to distract the public from their immediate self-interests to prioritize the threat posed by Communism.

Literature, music and movies from the 1950s succinctly demonstrate this shift. In literature, pulp fiction metaphorically presented the Communist ‘enemy’ and American ‘savior.’ For example, as exhibited in Appendix III, the Korean soldier in the backdrop of the cover page of *The Naked and the Lost*, by Franklin M. Davis and published in 1952, represents a villainous Communist archetype. A naked, white, young woman stands to the side, hiding behind the
door; a white, middle-aged man in the center of the title appears to tense in preparation for defending the woman and fighting the Korean. By holding a pistol, it seems the American will use armed defense in order to save the dignity of the vulnerable female. As only one example of many, *The Naked and the Lost* exemplifies the manifestation of Cold War rhetoric through the context of the Korean War within the literature genus. While it's unknown to the extent these types of fiction were consumed, an induction from this title page suggests that the symbolic personification of the Cold War took on an idealization of America as a defender against a Communist aggressor.

Country music witnessed a similar transition to romanticizing the patriotism of an international America, demonstrating a shift in the conceptualization of the Korean War and the principles behind the war. Singers like Harry Choates, Elton Britt, and Wilif Carter sang lyrics laced with a glorification of inherent American political and social superiority. On January 24, 1952, Carter sang, *Good-Bye Maria (I'm Off to Korea).* A lyric in *Good-Bye Maria* reads, “It's the same old story and it's up to Old Glory/ To win another fight for liberty.” Carter's lyrics directly correlate the moral duty of America, personified by Carter as ‘Old Glory,’ to an American responsibility for the promotion of democracy. Resonations of American involvement in World War II also reverberate in Carter's lyrics by comparing the ‘same old story’ of World War II in 1945 to the new war in Korea. Seen through Carter's lyrical composition, country music during the 1950s makes unmistakable parallels between the future of democracy and the role of an international America. The thematic tropes in the 1950s country music genre positively sentimentalized the association of an American role in defending democracy on an international stage.

In his article “Reluctant Crusaders,” Lary May, a historian at the University of Minnesota who specializes in the visual culture of the early Cold War era, discusses the patriotic cinematography of the
1950s. May states that the patriotism displayed in the cinema during the 1950s was designed between the government and Hollywood producers. May argues that government leaders “saw the mass arts as a vehicle not to reflect group life, but to recreate American myths and symbols.”56 As a prime example, in 1951, President Truman praised Hollywood during a meeting with producers and his top cabinet members, saying, “no organization in the world can make a better contribution to [constructing] truth than yours.”57 The creation of over thirty-five Korean War films from 1950 to 1960 converged with government and Hollywood efforts to build a postwar consensus of American identity or, as President Truman called it, the construction of ‘truth.’ The Korean War, May continues, “provided a golden opportunity... to promote to a wider audience, the call for containment at home and abroad,” and to assume “a global role as a model of liberal capitalism and defender of the world from Communism.”58 Through the consumption of visual depictions of good (America) versus evil (Communists) in the cinema during the Korean War, like in music and fiction, government officials hoped the public would rally behind a patriotic message of an international America.59

The appearance of nationalistic movies, literature and music in the 1950s indicates a distinctive change in the public discourse as compared to only a few years before.60 From 1945 to 1949, the American experience of postwar economic abundance disengaged the public’s prioritization from the international scene. The Cold War could not have begun before the 1950s because the concept of an international America with a moral obligation to the world for the continual preservation of democracy did not exist within the public rhetoric at the time. Instead, the public’s attention fixated on the realization of their consumerist aspirations. However, the government’s distress of a third World War arising from the postwar ashes led to a far earlier bureaucratic preoccupation on the international stage. The interdepartmental dialogues from the State Department and National Secu-
rity Council demonstrate the perceived belief in the correlation between the prevalence of Communism in ravaged states and the consequential discrediting of democracy and free market societies. As a result, the government struggled to evolve into a role where it could combat the Communist spread through various economic and military means when its public had no interest in following suit.

It took the physical invasion of Communist forces, depicted as the North Koreans, on a United States' South Korean protectorate, to create the public and government's consonance on the threat of Communism. As a result, the public legitimized the government's compulsion for a role on the international stage. The constituent letters received at the White House, the indicative voting records registered through the Gallup Polls, and the emergence of jingoistic music, literature and cinematography substantiate the public's shift in priorities. The synching between the government and public's fear of Communism generated what the historiography of twentieth-century America calls the Cold War.

Therefore, John Gaddis and John Fousek are correct in assuming that significant inertia for the Cold War psyche originated from World War II and its era. However, they do not consider the effects of war weariness on the American public in the immediate postwar years. Undoubtedly, as Gaddis argues, the Potsdam Conference of 1945 had severe repercussions in systematizing the international geopolitical arena for the coming Cold War. Similarly, according to Fousek, the morality of a 'just war,' like that of the American role during World War II, continued to justify future American interventions. However, neither of these explanations account for the postwar public fixation on domesticity from 1945-1949. The advent of the Korean War and the analysis presented in this paper reveal the significance of the events of the early 1950s for creating the accordance between the public and the government in the threat of international Communism. By presenting the 'Forgotten War' as the nucleus event in
the genesis of the Cold War, the Korean War regains its due reputation in the historiography of Cold War America.

NOTES

8 Fousek, To Lead the Free World, 63.
9 Cohen argues this prosperity was created by the centralized control over wages and consumer prices during and in the immediate aftermath of World War II. For more information see Cohen, A Consumer’s Republic, 62-109.
10 Although there had been minor interventions in Northern Turkey and the 1950’s mass propaganda in Iran, these operations were seen or heard of very little except within the higher echelons of the government and intelligence agencies: US Department of State, Outgoing Airgram: To Certain American Diplomatic and Consular Offices 1950 (Washington, D.C.: National Security Agency Archives, 1992): www2.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/NSAEBB/NSAEBB78/propaganda%a20016.pdf.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid., 22.


For more information see Regine Lee Blaszczyk, *American Consumer Society, 1865-2005: From Hearth to HDTV* (Wheeling, IL: Harlan Davidson, Inc., 2009); also, footnote
This idea of the home as an obsessive preoccupation of the postwar America has wide historical consensus. For a much more comprehensive on the nature of postwar consumerism, see: May, “The Commodity Gap”; Cohen, A Consumer's Republic.


Ibid., 903.

Ibid., 1026.

May, “The Commodity Gap,” 301;


Ibid.


Oakley, God's Country, 65.


The New York Times comments extensively throughout the postwar years about the looming threat of the Communist spreading disease, the so-called political theory of the domino effect. The Domino Theory believed that when one country structures their government and socioeconomics around a Marxist political philosophy, nearby states have an increased likelihood of instability and inclination towards a similar design. For example, “Communism in Latin America," New York Times (January 3,
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times/docview/111682326/1418F1A349B1506C913/5?accountid=14703.

42 Fousek, To lead the free world, 166. Harry Truman, “Document 55: President Tru-
man’s Televised Address to the Nation on the Deployment of U.S. Forces to Korea,
July 19, 1950,” in Calls to Arms: Presidential Speeches, Messages, and Declarations of War;

43 Ibid., 211.

44 Fousek, To Lead the Free World, 166.

45 Report No. 748, S. 2319, 81st Cong., 1st sess, “A Bill to Promote World Peace... by Pro-
viding Aid to the Republic of Korea” (July 22, 1949): Harry S Truman Administration,
Elsey Papers, http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/korean-
war/documents/index.php?documentdate=1949-07-22&documentid=kr-3-14. It is important and, I believe, indicative of the overall thesis of this paper to the list the full name of the bill: “A Bill - To promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States by providing aid to the Republic of Korea.” The grammatical causation in the previous title lends a sugges-
tion that by becoming international interventionists, in this case to the Republic of Korea, the general welfare and national interest of America, not to mention world peace, will be promoted.

46 W.J.H., Memorandum for Mr. Ross: June 29, 1950 (Washington: National Archives and
Records Service, Truman Papers): http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/docu-
umber=1.

47 Roland Whitman, Jr. to Harry S. Truman with Reply From William D. Hassett. Au-
http://www.trumanlibrary.org/whistlestop/study_collections/koreanwar/docu-
ments/index.php?documentdate=1950-08-04&documentid=ki-11-2&pagene

48 Fousek, To Lead The Free World, 168.


50 As Bill Osgerby points out, “The magazines’ heroes were, without exception, whole-
some white Americans or (occasionally) western Europeans”: Bill Osgerby, “Muscular
manhood and salacious sleaze: the singular world of the 1950s macho pulps,” in Con-
taining America: Cultural Production and Consumption in Fifties America, edited by
Nathan Abrams and Julie Hughes. Birmingham, UK: University of Birmingham Press,
2000. Also echoes of World War II pulp fiction propaganda reverberate in the second
generation pulp fiction books for Korea. Wendy Kozol argues, “these images func-
tioned as surrogate object of heterosexual desire but also as symbols of the reasons
American men were fighting”: Wendy Kozol, “The Kind of People Who Make Good
Americans: Nationalism and Life’s Family Ideal,” in Looking for America: The Produc-
tion of Nation and People, ed. Ardis Cameron (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing Ltd.,
2005): 180; also, Ella Taylor, Prime-time families: television culture in postwar America

51 Franklin M. Davis, Jr., The Naked and the Lost (New York: Lion Books, 1952). For a
full explanation on the phenomenon of postwar pulp fiction, see Osgerby, “Muscular
manhood,” 127.


58 May, "Reluctant Crusaders," 126, 127.


60 Oakley, *God’s Country*, 116; Fousek, *To lead the free world*, 13, 171: “By 1950, then, American nationalist globalism provided the ideological framework for a broad public consensus behind the Truman administration's Cold War stance. Some Americans held opinions outside of that consensual framework, of course, but such opinions were now thoroughly marginal, culturally demonized, and politically irrelevant."
Appendix I
Appendix II
Appendix III